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One of the common debates in the European Union revolves around the argument 
that labour mobility in the EU is too low and well below the general expectations. 
Since the implementation of neoliberal policies in the 1980s, the EU has increasingly 
favoured ‘high labour mobility levels within the EU’ and has desperately been trying 
to increase them ever since. In particular, in the last decade the EU has implemented 
various programmes in order to boost labour mobility between the member states. 
 
This thesis challenges the current view of EU institutions with their call for higher 
mobility levels between the EU member states. According to migration theories (the 
neoclassical theory of migration), individuals move in order to profit from economic 
advantages, i.e. they move to regions with better prospects of earning higher wages. 
In other words, under this lens migration takes places between economically 
different regions. In addition, the EU has been trying to achieve convergence 
between the regions by implementing cohesion polices, which means the reduction 
of economic disparities between regions. 
 
Through semi-structured interviews, the motivations of EU-migrants between 
converged and non-converged regions are explored and compared. The outcomes of 
this research study bring into question the perspective of the EU institutions by 
providing evidence that high mobility levels cannot be achieved in converged 
regions as both ambitions correlate from the same source, namely wage differentials. 
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The 1980s were marked by a change in the political course regarding the European 
integration process from Keynesian to neoliberal policy making. Together with the 
introduction of the neoliberal policy agenda and the creation of the Single European 
Market (SEM), labour mobility gained in importance and this led to the revival of 
the integration process. Since then, increased or high mobility levels have been 
associated with economic superiority and hence, have become one of the main 
objectives of the European Union (EU).1 In parallel, a further aim on the neoliberal 
policy agenda was convergence through cohesion policies as part of the integration 
process. This PhD research involves critically scrutinising the neoliberal approaches 
of the EU as part of the economic integration process and interrogates their 
compatibility, i.e. in integrated economies, are increased labour mobility levels 
compatible with convergence? According to the neoclassical theory of migration, 
labour migrants move as a consequence of wage differentials, which help in making 
a reality what the EU institutions 2  are aiming at, namely, reducing economic 
disparities. This thesis investigates the appropriateness of the neoliberal EU 
perspective on migration by testing the neoclassical theory on EU labour migrants. 
The empirical research comprises semi-structured interviews with labour migrants 
who came to the UK from other EU member states with different economic 
backgrounds. Considering the economic background of their country of origin, the 
aim is to define the determinants of the various migration corridors within the EU. If 
the prevailing motivation behind the bigger migration streams is based on wage 
differentials and if these are lacking between converged regions, then the neoliberal 
aims are at odds with the reality. That is, if the motivators of the neoclassical theory 
of migration are only applicable in non-converged regions, then the EU goal of 
convergence through social cohesion is unlikely to be achieved. The final aim of the 
research is to provide an explanation for the low mobility levels in Europe from a 
new perspective, in a way that is distinct to the conventional approaches in the 
current literature. Whilst the EU is trying to increase intra-EU mobility levels 
between converged regions as they consider them to be too low, the aim is to 
demonstrate through qualitative data that this is a very difficult task, because 
                                                        
1 From now onwards, the term EU will refer to the previous forms of the EU, i.d. EC, EEC, etc.  
2 EU Institutions, such as e.g. the EU Commission. 
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according to the classical theory of migration, the current situation is in line the 
macroeconomic givens. That is, under this theory, converged regions would not 
expect to experience as high mobility as converging ones, because big wage 
differentials are absent.  
The EU integration process and internal labour mobility 
In the 1980s, the European Union underwent a thorough renewal regarding the 
policy agenda and labour mobility became one of the central features in the 
European integration process. As a result of the oil crisis, the European economy 
was experiencing economic stagnation (Bache & George, p. 407, 2006), affecting the 
integration process in a negative way. This particular period became later known as 
that of ‘Eurosclerosis’. Despite the underlying idea behind integration being to 
achieve a competitive Union with a globally powerful economy having always been 
one of the fundamental aims of the EU, the 1970s were marked by only low level of 
integrationist impulses. At the same time, the global economy was changing 
dynamically and international competition grew immensely. The need for member 
states to compete in world markets, especially against the United States and Japan, 
became increasingly an overriding concern (e.g. George & Bache, 2006 or Molle, 
1994). Consequently, there was a growing consensus among political and business 
leaders that a new strategy was necessary, which eventually led to pressure being 
applied for the creation of a single market.  
The Keynesian economic policy proved to be insufficient in competing with the fast 
changing global economic environment and therefore, there was a change of course 
to a market-driven, neoliberal policy agenda, with a ‘genuine common market in 
goods and services, and the promotion of a radically neo-liberal agenda’ (Cini, 2003, 
p. 35). On the basis of these ideas, the proposed treaty reforms were brought together 
under what was to become the Single European Act (SEA). The aim was to regain 
economic power and this marked an entirely new phase in the European integration 
process. Championed under the Commission of Jacques Delors in 1985, the SEA of 
1986 was the first major revision to the Treaty of Rome of 1957. The core of the 
SEA consisted of the preeminent four ‘freedoms’: the free movement of goods, free 
movement of services, free movement of labour, and the free movement of capital. 
Regarding the free movement for workers, the original concept was established for 
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the first time together with the birth of the EU and the Treaty of Rome in 1957, but 
was not realised until the 1980s. According to the theories of economic integration, 
free movement of workers is considered as one of the main components for an 
effectively working and economically powerful single market (Molle, 1994; Swann, 
2000). Thanks to the new neoliberal market policy agenda, the concept of the free 
movement of workers, or in other words labour mobility, thus regained economic 
significance and from then on became a fundamental ingredient of a powerful 
European Union. 
‘Competitiveness’ constitutes a crucial element of economic integration and has been 
one of primary aims of EU politics since the beginning. The basic idea of the process 
of integration was set in motion when the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) was decided upon in Paris 1951, as the forerunner to the European 
Community (EC) established in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Since then, the 
European Union has been founded on the notion of being a well-harmonised entity 
with the ultimate aim of creating a stable, sustainable and globally competitive 
economic environment. Economic integration and sustained peace for the EU 
regions became a priority after World War II, particularly in the core continental 
regional economies in Europe that had suffered total devastation of their economies. 
The French political economist, Jean Monnet, who is regarded today as one of the 
founding fathers of the European Union, realised that a permanent form of peace and 
stability between the historic rivals Germany and France would only be achieved 
through the integration of their economies. Not only was the achievement of 
permanent peace a major concern, the integration of the economies would mean 
increased productivity of the member states, which would re-strengthen their 
economies. Firmly convinced that economic development and prosperity could be 
best achieved at a European rather than on a national level, Monnet proposed that 
France and Germany should form the core of the integrative venture. Following his 
suggestion, first, came the establishment of the abovementioned ECSC in 1951, 
hailed by him as the “first expression of the Europe that is being born” (Cini, p. 17, 
2003), which would be Europe’s first organisation that involved the yielding of a 
degree of state sovereignty to a supranational authority (Diebold, 1959). Schumann, 
then French Foreign Minister, who eagerly subscribed to Monnet’s view, drafted and 
provided the blueprint for the ECSC, also known as the Schumann Plan. This was 
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overtly about more than just coal and steel, for as Schuman emphasised, it would set 
down a “common basis for economic development” (Cini, p. 17, 2003), with the free 
movement of workers being a vital element. Despite labour mobility having always 
been considered important as part of the integration process, it was not until the 
creation of Single European Market in the 1980s that it really became prominent in 
the Union discourse.  
Labour mobility or high mobility levels as an aim of the EU 
At this point, it is useful to discuss the two notions ‘movement of labour’ and ‘high 
mobility levels’. The literature on European Integration specifically emphasises the 
promotion of ‘free movement’. As Laffan (2000) put it, “for labour, the provisions 
for free movement meant the abolition of restrictions on labour mobility, allowing 
workers to get jobs anywhere in the EC” (p. 25). However, it could be argued that 
the ‘free movement of labour’ as a final objective might not necessarily entail the 
desire ‘to aim for high mobility levels of workers’. That is, it could simply denote 
free movement in the form of a fundamental right; a precondition that is not linked to 
the idea of high mobility levels.   
Despite Molle (1994) asserting that “massive migration flows were never an 
objective of the EU” (p. 482,), during the years right after the introduction of the 
SEM, the issue of the ‘lack of mobility of EU citizens’ started to become an 
increasingly serious concern and later, even turned into a major worry, with the 
absence of high mobility of workers in the EU being regarded as “more than ever an 
obstacle” (Broyer et al., 2011). Consequently, the Commission decided to combat 
the low mobility levels by introducing various strategies, such as the Job Mobility 
Action Plan of 2007 – 2010. In addition, in recent years, an abundance of studies has 
emerged, which have focused on the removal of the ‘barriers’ to mobility levels, 
which again underlines how low levels are considered by many as being detrimental. 
In sum, the Commission’s reaction to the barriers as well as the plentiful literature on 
these demonstrate that low mobility levels are seen as a problem in the European 
Union and that ‘high levels of mobility’ are desirable, because they serve an 
important macroeconomic function, not just the existence of the basic right to move.  
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Researchers on migration have developed a wide spectrum of theoretical approaches 
in order to explain the origins, patterns, and characteristics of migration flows. In the 
main, the literature discusses the various determinants for migrants to move, with the 
most conventional and influential approaches in the decision-making process to 
migrate being with regards to economic motivations or social reasons or a 
combination of these. One of the principle lenses is the neoclassical theory (Ranis 
and Fei, 1961; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1969), the proponents of which 
state that the decision to migrate is affected by income maximisation, wealth 
differentials as well as differences in employment opportunities as important pull 
factors. Sjaastad (1962) extended the neoclassical theory by adding a microeconomic 
dimension, whereby individuals as rational actors decide to migrate by undertaking a 
cost-benefits analysis to estimate their utility maximisation, and this became known 
as the Human Capital Theory. Another migration theory that involves both economic 
as well as social factors is the New Economics of Labour Migration theory (NELM), 
which considers both social and family networks as well as wage calculations, such 
as risk assessment and migration decisions. (Borjas, 1989; Massey et al., 1993 and 
1998, Bauer and Zimmermann, 1995). Other migration theories deal with non-
economic determinants, only focusing on social factors, like e.g. accessibility and the 
vitality of the social networks in the destination country (Massey et al., 1993; 
Massey et al., 1994; Hatton and Williamson, 2002), one of which is the network 
theory. Under this optic, social networks are seen as creating the transferability of 
social capital to incoming migrants and thus, yielding a better circulation of the 
necessary information than in their absence, which as a result fosters mobility 
(Massey et al., 1994). The general social systems theory, put forward by Nowotny-
Hoffmann (1970 & 1973), focuses on the role of prestige, social status and power as 
determinants. 
A review of the research studies on intra-EU migration leads to the conclusion that 
high levels of labour migration in the EU have predominantly occurred due to wage 
differentials, as put forward in the neoclassical theory. Immediately after the 
enlargement of 2004, the UK received massive flows of migrants from the Eastern 
European countries, especially Poland, who came to accept jobs that were well 
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below their skills levels.3 Hence, it would appear to be inappropriate to argue that 
mobility levels in the EU are consistently low, given that some countries have 
received large influxes of migrants from specific nations in recent years. It could be 
the case that these levels are only low between countries that have converged.  
Economic convergence and labour mobility: An impossible coupling? 
Throughout the stages of EU integration, the policy makers came together several 
times and developed various strategic plans in order to boost the economic 
integration process, where convergence and labour mobility played a major role in 
their policy agenda. Later, as a result of the economic crisis in the 1970s, the EU 
changed course from a Keynesian to a neoliberal market-driven economy and with it, 
labour mobility gained more significance than previously. 
Next to increased labour mobility levels and the removal of the barriers, a further 
channel on the agenda of the SEA and the neoliberal aims to increase 
competitiveness in the European Union, is the promotion of economic convergence 
(Cini, p. 37, 2003). This refers to the catching-up effect of lagging economies with 
the average (Leonardi, 1995), constituting, alongside ‘regional competitiveness and 
employment’ and ‘European territorial cooperation’, one of the three objectives set 
out in the Regional Policy of the European Union, also referred as the Cohesion 
Policy. 4  Parallel to the basic four freedoms within the framework of the SEM, 
structural policies aim to boost the aggregate competitiveness through the 
improvement of the economic well-being of regions in the EU, e.g. through the 
minimisation of regional disparities (e.g. Hix & Hoyland, 2011; Cini & Perez-
Solorzano Borragan, 2010). The Cohesion Policy covers Europe's poorest regions 
whose per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is less than 75% of the EU average. 
Similar to the increased mobility levels, cohesion policies were considered as part of 
the SEM project in response to challenges from China, India and other emerging 
economies as well as from more established competitors, such as the United States.  
                                                        
3 Some of the Central European countries put up restrictions for workers, which were lifted in 2011. 
From now onwards, central and Mid-Europe are used interchangeably and refer to the core European 
countries such as Germany and France.  
4 The Treaty Establishing the European Community (Art. 158, TEC) defines economic and social 
cohesion in terms of reducing regional disparities in the level of development, usually measured by 
GDP per head (relative to the EU average) in terms of purchasing power parities. 
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In essence, convergence between the regions and member states as well as an active 
level of labour mobility are seen as providing one of the essential pillars for a 
competitive European Union.  
Migration and divergence 
The large south-north migration corridor, as a result of economic instability in the 
southern member states in the European Union, provides another example of how 
increased labour mobility is a result of divergence instead of convergence. Mundell 
(1961) argued that labour mobility in monetary union zones is endowed with a 
special function, as according to optimum currency theory (Mundell, 1961), labour 
mobility in monetary unions is essential as it can provide an adjustment effect in 
cases of asymmetric shocks. That is, in a monetary union with an optimum currency 
area (OCA), the active flow of labour migrants is advanced as a fundamental 
criterion as they have a regulatory effect. However, in the literature, labour mobility 
as an adjustment mechanism is argued to have been a failure as it has never taken 
place in significant numbers in the European Monetary Zone (e.g. Hix, 1999, p. 
300). This raises the doubts about the practical functionality of labour mobility in 
converged regions, leading to the question as to whether it is really necessary as 
currently put forward in the theoretical debates and by the EU Commission. 
Although labour migration caused by asymmetric shocks took not only place 
between the EMU member states in the last crisis, nevertheless increased divergence 
in the EU shows how increased labour mobility is a result of economic disparities, as 
opposed to convergence.  
To summarise, from the beginning of the EU, labour mobility was seen as a key 
component of integration. However, it was not brought centre stage until the 
rejuvenation process of integration galvanised by the establishment of the SEM and 
with the adoption of the neoliberal policy agenda in the 1980s. This was a time when 
the focus was set on the liberalisation of the market and on the removal of internal 
barriers. With the spread of neoliberal ideas and a new market-driven approach, 
labour mobility became a priority as it was supposed to ensure a market that operated 
smoothly and efficiently. That is, labour mobility was not only considered as being 
beneficial for the individual EU citizen from a socio-political view, for it was also 
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seen by the leaders as a core integrative tool for maintaining the economic health of 
the whole community.  
Research question 
Particularly since the introduction of the Single European Market and the 
liberalisation the of the labour markets between the EU member states, the EU has 
set high or increased mobility aims as one of its aim on its policy agenda. One of the 
other goals is to achieve convergence. This research concerns whether high levels 
are achievable in converged regions. Therefore, the main research question is: 
The paradoxes of neo-liberalism in the EU: is it possible to have high 
mobility levels in converged regions? 
In order to find out whether convergence, i.e. the reduction of economic disparities, 
and high mobility levels, compatible, this research involves testing the migration 
theories on labour migrants who came to the UK from different regions through 
three case studies. For the first case study it is hypothesised that large migration 
streams can be accounted for by the neoclassical theory. In the second case study 
chapter, the hypothesis is that mobility levels are low when economic incentives to 
move are missing (neo classical theory is not applicable). The third case study 
concerns the motivation of labour migrants from partially converged regions under 
the impact of economic crisis. The final aim of the research is to provide an 
explanation for the low mobility levels in Europe from a new perspective that is 
distinct from the conventional approaches in the current literature.  
Methodology 
The majority of the studies on east-west labour migration comprise quantitative 
analyses with large data sets. This study is aimed at explaining Polish, German and 
Portuguese labour migration through the employment of qualitative methods 
triangulated by the use of large secondary datasets. Specifically, data collected on the 
personal characteristics, feelings, thoughts and attitudes of the three groups of labour 
migrants are subsequently compared with numerical data gathered from 
EUROSTAT and the World Bank, among other sources. In other words, micro-socio 
characteristics are integrated with macroeconomic data. The novelty of this study lies 
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in the accumulation of first-hand information via primary data from the migrants in 
their destination countries through personal, face-to-face interviews. Unlike the 
previous studies, the outcomes are not based on predictions or assumptions from 
‘potential migrants’ from cross-countries surveys, but rather, on first-hand 
information from migrants who in fact ‘moved’. Subsequently, the gathered data 
from the field research are embedded into the macro framework and its fit with the 
theoretical literature, descriptive statistics, as well as existing studies, is examined. 
This allows for the interactions of the various determinants to be uncovered, in 
particular, the interrelations between the economic and social factors.  
Significance of work and originality 
To sum up the prima facie evidence on migration flows in Europe, according to the 
European Institutions, mobility in European nation states lags behind the level they 
desire. A substantial number of studies have examined the determinants of the 
various migration patterns in the EU. Special attention has been given in the 
literature to the large streams of migration, whereas regarding the ‘lower’ levels, 
generally the questions revolve about why they are low in relation to institutional, 
social or cultural barriers, rather than asking about the determinants. Hence, it is not 
possible to ascertain why EU citizens do not move between particular regions, or 
move in lower numbers. Despite there being a wealth of studies about the mass 
migration of the EU enlargement countries based on statistical data, few have 
researched the motivations of migrants from the lower GDP countries on a personal 
level. In addition, there has been scant investigation of the dimension of 
convergence, in particular, in relation to the qualitative perspective. 
The consideration of the convergence theory within the debate on labour migration 
in the EU and its incorporation into the framework of migration offers a novel 
approach to the studies of migration. This will allow for the differences in motivation 
to migrate to be elucidated in a more efficient way and help in addressing the issue 
as to whether the EU Commission’s desire to increase mobility levels is realistic in 
converged regions. Furthermore, the thesis outcomes will add to the discussion on 
intra-EU migration by contesting the idea that the ‘reduction of barriers’ can lead to 
significant change in mobility levels, which still prevails as the dominant narrative 
across the Union. In place of this, it will be argued that the determinants 
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underpinning the motivation to migrate are the main factors that need to be 
considered.  
Structure of the thesis 
Following this introduction, in Chapter two, the first section contains a review of the 
extant theories of migration, thereby revealing their complex frameworks and 
models. Those most pertinent will be summarised in a table according to their 
variables and types of determinants. The following section will provide a brief 
literature review on intra-EU migration and the determinants of migration and 
mobility in the EU as well as a critique regarding the shortcomings of the literature 
on such migration. Lastly, the various definitions in relation to types of migration 
and mobility will be discussed.  
Chapter three focuses on the practical side of mobility and migration within the EU. 
The first section will portray the emergence of the concept of labour movement in 
the European Union. It will demonstrate how the perspective changed after the 
introduction of the Single European Market and the liberalisation of the markets 
from those of ‘free movement’ to ‘increasing mobility levels’. It will be underlined 
how the EU Institutions have favoured high mobility levels in the European Union, 
regarding this as one of the major priorities on their policy agenda. Next, higher 
mobility levels are considered in the context of the convergence and social cohesion 
agenda of the EU. After discussing the implications of the convergence theory, the 
chapter will close with a brief discussion on the viability of having increased labour 
mobility, as desired by EU Institutions, in a converged EU. 
Chapter four will explain and justify the methodology of the research. After 
presenting the research design, which includes a discussion on the variables, data 
collection, interview techniques and participant selection, the country profiles for 
each case study and the criteria in relation to why they were regarded as suitable 
subjects are explained. Particular focus will be given to their economic performance 
and convergence levels since their membership of the EU, as well as their migration 
levels.  
Chapter five will investigate the determinants of the decision-making process of 
Polish migrants to the UK. Those determinants identified in the migration theory 
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chapter will be applied to the narratives of the labour migrants. In other words, the 
aim of this chapter is to find out what kind of determinants prevail among Polish 
labour migrants and whether and if so, how, they relate to macroeconomic factors. 
The findings from the field research will be triangulated with secondary data.  
Chapter five will present the findings in the context of migration of Germans who 
came to London to work. The main interest is to find out the determinants 
undergirding their decision-making process in relation to migration and to elicit the 
extent to which the migration theories discussed in the theory chapter are applicable.  
Chapter six will examine the stories of Portuguese labour migrants who came to the 
UK to work during the economic crisis. The focus of this case study is to analyse 
how the divergence experienced by this nation after the recent economic crisis, as 
opposed to convergence, has impacted on its migration levels to other EU member 
countries.  
Chapter seven presents a discussion of the findings in relation to theories in the 
extant literature and in so doing addresses the research question. The chapter will 
also explain the significance of the results within the framework of EU Integration 
and draw conclusions about how they might challenge the dominant narrative within 
the Union, namely, underlining the fact that mobility levels are low. The chapter 
closes with consideration of the limitations of the study, the generalisability, and the 
implications of the findings regarding the aims and objectives of intra-EU migration 
and convergence.  
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Chapter 1 Theories of Migration: Why do people move? A review of the most 
common theories of migration 
1.1 Introduction 
Studies of migration theories seek to understand the causes and consequences behind 
the geographical movement of individuals. Whilst migration theories began with the 
interlinking of simple economic driven incidents in the early 20th century, their 
analysis became increasingly interdisciplinary and migration itself became a highly 
complex phenomenon; which led to the establishment of an independent academic 
discipline in the field of social sciences. Throughout the years, a variety of different 
theoretical models have been put forward to explain why (cross-border) migration 
occurs. Despite each theory ultimately seeking to explain the same process, differing 
assumptions, concepts and frameworks regarding different dimensions have evolved 
over time. The various theories however, emerged in an isolated way from each 
other, such that the absence of a comprehensive migration theory has been a major 
complaint of several migration researchers (Lee, 1966; Massey et al., 1998; 
Zelinsky, 1971). In spite of the fact that there have been numerous calls and attempts 
to develop one general migration theory, so far all the theoretic models have failed to 
explain the phenomenon in this way. Among the main reasons why it is so difficult 
to generalise about its causes and consequences of it lies the difficulty of separating 
it from other socioeconomic and political processes, as well as the complex nature of 
combining macro- and micro-level theories of migration (Salt, 1987; Van 
Amersfoort, 1998). Notably, the complexity and interrelatedness has led some 
scholars of migration theories to the conclusion that there probably will never exist 
one single and comprehensive theory.  
Regarding, in particular, the studies on intra-EU migration, there is no particular 
theory, which addresses the European Union as one special unit or field of theory. 
The economic type of migration is currently considered as the only single significant 
migration stream, due to its large numbers. Other types of movement are not 
considered as ‘migration’, as their numbers are regarded as ‘too low’, although they 
do exist. In recent decades, most attention has been given to east-west migration and 
the literature in this field has grown enormously. The flows from the new European 
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member states from the peripheries of the EU into the core ones in Central Europe 
are the currently the mostly discussed migration stories in the literature on intra-EU 
migration. The guestworker schemes as far back as the 1960s and 70s represent the 
last wave. Another recent focus in the migration literature is the ‘low’ mobility levels 
within the EU. These research studies explain the massive migration flows largely 
based on the neoclassical theory as presented below. However, there is no theory that 
can account for those small streams of migration across the wealthier member states. 
The existing theories provide insufficient evidence to explain the different levels of 
migration within the EU. As this study will reveal, people in the EU move not only 
for economic, but also, for social reasons and the levels of mobility vary according to 
these two determinants and their variables. Nevertheless, there is no migration theory 
at present that considers both types of determinants in one migration framework with 
assigned weightings for each. Thus, the complexity of the migration theories is also 
proven within the theorisation of intra-EU migration. 
In this chapter, a brief overview of the present theories of migration and their 
determinants are presented. The aim is to identify their basic tenets, which will 
provide the foundation for the following discussions and analyses on the migration 
of EU citizens between member states. The coverage of the migration theories, in 
particular, involves highlighting the most popular migration concepts from the 
literature as well as those considered as most relevant for migration and mobility in 
the EU. After the theoretical exposure of the causes of cross-border migration, the 
variables of the determinants of migration will be extracted and placed within one 
table so as to provide a summary of the variables, determinants and their 
characteristics. The second part of the chapter contains a brief literature review on 
the determinants of labour migration in the EU. Here, the most commonly discussed 
migration theories in the literature within the framework of intra-EU labour mobility 
are covered. 
1.2 The levels of migration and the nature of migration studies: Frameworks of 
migration models  
Migration theories are commonly classified according to the level they focus on and 
the literature distinguishes three levels: macro, meso and micro. Theories on 
migration on the macro-level approach the problem by examining global structural 
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factors and conditions (largely economic, but also political and legal) that induce 
migration. The meso level, in between the micro and macro levels, involves focusing 
on the household and community. Specifically, the social relations and social ties 
between individuals in kinship groups (e.g. families), neighbourhoods, and 
friendship circles or even within formal organisations are investigated. At the micro-
level, how these forces shape the decisions and actions of individuals and families is 
examined. Basically, the factors that motivate individuals to move are determined.  
It was Faist (1997) who elaborated upon the three different levels of analysis and 
provided a clear differentiation through an explicit separation between the structural 
(macro), relational (meso) and individual levels (micro). According to this scholar, 
the macro level pertains to the political, economic and cultural structures of the 
country of origin (sending country) and the country of destination (receiving 
country). He denotes an array of factors in their political and economic systems, e.g. 
political stability, administrative units or differences in characteristics, such as living 
standards, jobs, working conditions, unemployment rates and wages as well as 
differences in the normative expectations as being the drivers at this level. In the 
cultural realm, the collective identity, for example, constitutes such a factor. The 
author noted that “such differentials are important prerequisites for migration to 
occur between nation-states” (Faist, 1997, p. 194-195).  
On the relational or meso-level, the density, strength and content of social relations 
between stayers and movers within units in the areas of origin and destination are 
relevant. The social ties of the two parties vary with respect to ‘density, strength and 
content’ and can pertain to the receiving or the sending countries or to both at the 
same time. The density can vary from a dense network of social ties to a break (no 
social relations anymore) or a reorientation in the country of destination. The social 
ties can be maintained in the origin country even in the case of permanent settlement 
in the destination country and hence, this does not necessarily mean fewer social ties 
to the origin country. At the individual or micro level, the degree of freedom or 
autonomy of a potential mover is important, or in other words, the degree to which 
he or she has the ability to decide on moving or staying. Whilst at one end, a migrant 
does not have the possibility of being the essential decision maker (e.g. slaves, 
convicts, contract workers or spouses), at the other, there are individuals with a high 
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degree of autonomy, based on resources such as money, information and connection 
(Faist, 1997). In the literature on migration, the separation between the three levels is 
relatively common. This division allows for an improved understanding of 
international migration by reducing the complexity of the numerous theories.  
1.2.1 The migration-system approach and the individual rational choice decision-
making model 
1.2.1.1 The migration-system approach 
Migration system theories are associated with the following four characteristics: 
firstly, it is assumed that a migration system provides the context in which 
movement occurs, which influences actions on whether to stay or move. This means 
that a migration system is defined by at least two places that are connected to each 
other. Secondly, the connection is based on linkages, e.g. between trade and security 
or even colonial ties and flows of goods, services, information and ideas (Portes and 
Walton, 1981). Thus, migration system theories, in particular, stress the ‘existence of 
linkages between countries other than people’ (Faist, 1997, p. 192), which often exist 
before migration occurs. Historic examples are the case of European receiving 
countries, (e.g. France, Netherlands and Great Britain). A third character of 
migration system theories is, according to Faist (1997), that movements are not a 
“one-time event but rather a dynamic process, just as push-pull or cause-effects and 
turn into a self-feeding process” (p. 193), as networks reduce the monetary, 
opportunity and psychological costs of adjustment. Lastly, according to factors such 
as economic inequalities within and between nation-states as well as the admission 
policies of the receiving states, individuals, households and families develop 
strategies to cope with stay-or-go alternatives. As Charles Tilly (1990) put it, it is 
“not people who migrate but networks” (Tilly, 1990, p. 75). The system-theoretic 
perspectives do not completely ignore other factors, but embeds them into the 
framework, such as wage differentials or administrative barriers. They rather 
contribute to the enhancement of the flow of migrations or slow down migration. 
Thus, it can be contended that network theory is closely affiliated to the migration 
systems theory. The latter’s main assumption is that migration alters the social, 
cultural, economic and institutional conditions at both the sending and receiving 
ends, hence, forming an entire developmental space within which migration 
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processes operate (de Haas, 2009b). Moreover, the environment is subject to 
constant change, thus making the system open and dynamic. Other authors (e.g. 
Kritz & Zlotnik, 1992) have also emphasised the importance of viewing international 
migration as an interdependent dynamic system. While migration systems theory has 
its roots in geography, migration network theory is of sociological and 
anthropological origin (Recchi, Baldoni, Francavilla, and Mencarini and Miller, 
2009). The key deficit of migration system theories is that, there is no clear 
understanding of the mechanisms by which macro-factors shape micro-level 
decision-making.  
1.2.1.2 The individual rational choice decision-making model  
The opposite lens to the migration system theories is the framework of rational 
choice. Whilst the former move from the macro towards micro level theories, in the 
latter, the model of migration decision-making theory grounded in moving through 
the levels in the opposite direction, i.e. micro to macro (Faist, 1997). Regarding the 
microeconomic model, labelled the model of individual choice by Massey et al. 
(1993), the fundamental idea is that individuals act rationally to maximise their 
utility. On the basis of a set of tastes, in particular, preferences or additional values, 
such as expectations and information, the individual’s option will result in the 
highest perceived value. Certain elements, such as information, play an important 
role as with their availability, migrants can optimise their benefits. Preferences, or 
values, can differ in their nature: improving and securing (wealth, income), status (a 
prestigious job) or comfort (better working and living conditions). Rational choice 
decision-making models are regarded as a powerful concept among the migration 
models. However, researchers in the sociological as well as anthropological fields 
have come to the conclusion that migration decisions are frequently taken in social 
units, such as the family or at the community level, rather than that of the individual 
decision maker. Also, within the rational choice model, it is difficult to link micro 
elements to macro elements. Faist (1997) argued that both the migration system 
model as well as the model of rational choice show a decisive weakness in 
“conceptualizing the social ties of movers and stayers within families or households 
and networks’ and that processes between these social units have to be brought into 
analysis. He contends that more attention should be paid to the meso-level relational 
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(social ties). Following the critiques, “both rational choice and migration-systems 
theories have started to place more emphasis on processes linking micro- and macro-
levels” (Faist, 1997, p. 191). 
Furthermore, studies of migration differ in their nature. From the perspective of a 
demographer the central question is the nature of the population change. Whilst 
anthropologists’ goal is to engage in cross-cultural comparisons that make possible 
generalisations across space and time, and hence “nomothetic theory building” 
(Brettell & Hollifield, 2000, p. 4). By contrast, historians’ principal research 
questions are related in particular to paces and times, focus more on individual 
migrants as agents. They are less concerned with explaining how social structures 
influence constraint behaviour. Nevertheless, their questions are similar to those of 
other social scientists, such as: what are the determinants (and consequences) of 
population movement? In more precise terms, they ask who moves, when do they 
move, why do they move. Coming to sociologists, this group of researchers tend to 
emphasise social relations as central to understanding the processes of migration and 
are especially interested in its causes (Brettell & Hollifield, 2000, p. 4-5). So far as 
economists are concerned, although their set of research questions on migration is 
similar to those of sociologists, they often focus on other units of analysis, such as 
the labour market in the receiving society or the economy of the sending ones. 
Despite economists also borrowing from and working with other disciplines, 
demography, sociology and history, for example, they maintain their focus on their 
own methodology and models, especially the rational choice model (Bretell & 
Hollifield, 2000, p. 18). Their research analysis is heavily based on predictive 
models. Bretell and Hollifield (2000) noted that economics can also operate at both 
the macro and micro levels, depending on the research questions. To exemplify this, 
economists have not only theorised about how wage or employment opportunity 
differentials between sending and receiving societies affect general flows of 
populations, but also, about how such differentials influence individual household 
costs/benefits.  
Regarding this research study, after having considered the complex nature of the 
movement of people in converging and converged regions, this research will provide 
evidence of how difficult it is to capture the act of migration in one overarching 
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framework. The migration theories covered in the next section are considered in light 
of the economic and social variables they identify.  
1.3 The most common theories of migration 
1.3.1 The foundation of the migration theories: Raventein’s laws of migration 
The first scholarly approach to migration theories dates back to the late 19th century 
with Sir Ernest George Ravenstein’s two articles which formulate the ‘’laws of 
migration’’ based on theoretical work and empirical data (Ravenstein, 1885; 1889). 
As Lee (1966) notes, many of the generalisations, or ‘laws’ of migration developed 
by E.G. Ravenstein in his two classic papers (Ravenstein, 1885 and 1889) have stood 
the test of time and still remain starting-points for contemporary migration theories. 
In his theoretical and empirical work, Ravenstein perceptively analysed relations 
between the propensity and distance to move by constructing the seven ‘laws’ of 
migration. The laws can be summarised briefly as follows: (1) The majority migrate 
only short distances and thus establish ‘currents of migration’ towards larger centres. 
(2) This causes displacement and development processes in connection with 
populations in the sending and destination regions. (3) The processes of dispersion 
and absorption correspond to each other. (4) Migration chains develop over time. (5) 
Migration chains lead to exit movements towards centres of commerce and industry. 
(6) Urban residents are less prone to migrate than rural people. (7) This is also true 
for female population (Massey, 1994).5 Although he did not construct a theory, but 
rather a description of various patterns, Ravenstein himself found abundant evidence 
for these ‘laws’ in mid-nineteenth-century internal English migration (Massey et al., 
1993). Later, to garner whether his generalisations were true or not, they were placed 
into different frameworks, such as the rational choice and systems theory (Faist, 
1997, p. 189). During the course of the second half of the 20th century, the numerous 
theories of migration emerged, so to speak, on the basis of Ravenstein’s 
observations, the forerunner of the total migration theories. Two of the currents of 
migration theorising were in particular influenced by Ravenstein’s work, namely the 
push-pull model and economic model based on neoclassical presuppositions, which 
are presented next.  
                                                        
5  See Todaro (1976) p. 15 or Faist (1997) p. 34 for other summaries on Ravenstein’s laws of 
migration. 
 29 
1.3.2 Macro-level theories  
1.3.2.1 The neo-classical theory of migration 
The oldest and best-known theory of international migration is the neo-classical 
theory. It was originally developed to explain labour migration in the process of 
economic development, i.e. supply of and demand of labour between the rural 
traditional agricultural sector and the urban modern manufacturing sector. It 
appeared in the early works of Lewis (1954) and Ranis and Fei (1961) and 
concentrates on the economic aspect of migration. It can be employed from the 
perspectives of two dimensions – macro and micro.  
At the macro-level, in the neoclassical theory the most basic model assumes that 
migration results from ‘actual’6 wage differentials across markets or countries. The 
process of migration is initiated thanks to the existence of the following economic 
combination: a country generally characterised as having a low market wage with a 
large endowment of labour relative to capital. By contrast, if a country exhibits only 
a limited endowment of labour relative to capital, then its market wage is generally 
high. The resulting differentials in wages cause workers to move from the low-wage, 
labour-rich country to the high-wage and labour-scarce countries or regions (from 
rural areas to the cities). Therefore, the central argument of the neoclassical theory 
proposes that wage differentials are the main cause of migration and that the volume 
of migration is determined by the relative differences in the supply of and demand 
for labour in different geographic locations. In these models migration occurs until 
wage equalisation has occurred.  
Harris and Todaro (1970) augmented the simple wage differential approach by 
adding the consideration of the probability of employment when deciding to move 
instead of simply calculating the income differentials. The latter added that the 
migration models were mainly developed in the context of advanced industrial 
economies and thus, assumed the existence of full or near-full employment, 
proceeding to write, ‘‘unfortunately, such an analysis is not very realistic in the 
context of the institutional and economic framework of most Third World nations’’ 
(Todaro, 1976, p. 29). Known as the “Harris-Todaro model”, their basic two-sector 
                                                        
6 As opposed to ‘expected’ earnings in the extended versions of the neoclassical theory. 
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model of rural- to urban labour migration assumes that as long as rural-urban income 
differences remain high enough to outweigh the risk of becoming unemployed, the 
“lure of relatively higher permanent incomes will continue to attract a steady stream 
of rural migrants” (Todaro, 1969, p. 147). Under the assumption of full employment, 
the model predicts a linear relationship between wage differentials and migration 
flows. Consequently, in the extended version of the model, migration is determined 
by ‘expected’ rather than actual earnings and the key variable ‘earnings’ is weighted 
by the probability of employment. The Harris-Todaro model was modified further in 
the literature, e.g. in the works by Johnson (1971), Porter (1973), Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan (1974), Corden and Findlay (1975), Fields (1975) and others.7 Maansoor 
and Quillin (2006) and Krieger and Maitre (2006) determined the margin in their 
empirical study and found out that more than 30% wage differential8 has been set as 
a margin to override the costs of migrating. Moreover, they found that the linearity 
relationship in the wages-migration tandem in fact does not hold. Accordingly, both 
the degree of wage differentials, as well as the level of country income, matters.  
To put it briefly, the simple propositions and assumptions that result from the 
neoclassical theory are (ignoring the employment possibilities) as follows: 
- The international migration of workers is caused by differences in wage rates 
between countries/across borders 
- The elimination of wage differentials will end the movement of labour and 
migration will not occur in the absence of such differentials 
The neoclassical model has been tested a lot, for instance, one of the principal 
migration theorists, Massey et al. (1994) attempted to test the neoclassical 
equilibrium model and could confirm in their study that “immigration is tied to 
international differences in wages” (Massey, 1994, p. 710). The theory constitutes 
one of the major theories that are used to explain the prominent east-west migrations. 
Rather than providing a sufficiently suitable explanation for the causes of migration, 
the neoclassical theory served as a foundation theory for further upcoming studies, 
                                                        
7 See Todaro (1976, p. 40-45) for more.  
8 Income differentials (measured as GDP per capita) between EU8 countries and the EU15 average at 
the time of EU accession were greater than 30%.  
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which resulted in emergence of numerous other research designs regarding the 
phenomenon.  
1.3.2.2 Dual labour market theory  
The dual labour market theory explains migration based on structural changes in the 
economy. As opposed to the neoclassical theories of migration it is explained 
entirely from the perspective of the macro level. The determining variable is the 
characteristics of the labour market in the receiving country. Developed by Piore 
(1979), under this lens it is contended that migration is caused by a strong labour 
demand (pull-factor), which is inherent to the economic structure of developed 
nations. Piore (1979) maintained that migration is not caused by push factors in 
sending countries (low wages or high unemployment), but by pull factors in the 
receiving countries (i.e. a chronic and unavoidable need for foreign workers). 
Accordingly, in advanced economies the occupational structure unfolds along two 
lines, a duality, which capital intensive where both skilled and unskilled labour is 
utilised, and labour intensive where unskilled prevails. This particular character of 
the economy in advanced countries creates a demand for low-skilled jobs, which 
domestic workers refuse to take up due to, for example, their seeing them being 
beneath their status, i.e. wages reflect status and prestige. Moreover, there is a 
primary sector providing well-paid jobs and a secondary sector, for unskilled jobs, 
e.g. manufacturing. Due to structural inflation, there are constant wage rises in the 
former sector. However, proportionate wage rises in the secondary are considered 
too expensive and the consequent lower pay makes the secondary sector unattractive 
to native workers. Migrants are more motivated to work in these low-status jobs, 
because they do not consider themselves as part of the destination society. 
Employment in the secondary sector fluctuates according to the economic cycle, 
making it unstable and their being an uncertainty of work availability, which is again 
unattractive to native workers. In addition, traditional influxes of labour in the 
secondary sector, such as woman and teenagers are not available any more, due to 
demographic changes. As immigration becomes desirable and necessary to fill the 
job vacancies, policy choices, in the form of active recruitment efforts, address the 
needs of the market. In the history of labour migration in Europe, the existence of the 
dual labour market perspective is observable in the post-migration trends during the 
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period immediately after World War Two as part of the reconstruction process, when 
the core economic powers of the EU signed bilateral agreements in the 50s and 60s 
and started to recruit migrant a labour force not only from the Mediterranean 
countries like Italy, but also from then non-EU countries, like Portugal and Spain or 
even from Turkey. Today, however, it cannot be claimed that the dual labour market 
theory perspective plays a significant role.  
In general, the dual labour theory for today’s EU labour market is undoubtedly too 
simple to explain the complex phenomenon of intra-EU labour migration. Whilst the 
dual labour market theory implicitly ‘asks’ migrants to come, it will be shown in the 
second part of the chapter how the interrogation of the low mobility levels has 
changed regarding today’s older EU member countries, and that the literature now 
prioritises asking “why do people ‘not’ move”. Massey wrote, “although this 
perspective has been influential in labour studies, it has suffered from various 
conceptual and methodological shortcomings” (Massey et al., 1994, pp. 715-717). 
1.3.2.3 World systems theory 
The world systems theory developed by Wallerstein (1974) takes a historical 
structural approach and explains migration by linking the determinants to structural 
changes in world markets. As a result of globalisation, the increased interdependence 
of economies and the emergence of new forms of production (Massey at al. 1993) 
can be accounted for, which are neglected in the other theories of migration. 
Capitalist expansion entails new capitalist farming methods, land consolidation, etc., 
leading to stronger transportation and communication links. 
This particular kind of approach, based on historical and structural changes, denies 
the free choice of individuals during the migration process (de Haas 2008), thus 
implying that the resulting migration patterns are deterministic. This makes it 
evidently difficult to determine the exact mechanisms of migration. The study of 
international migration in the recent years has lost a lot of the world systems or 
global development perspective that was present in the earlier works, perhaps not 
least because is difficult to derive a set of testable hypotheses and the character of 
this framework is strongly descriptive as it emerged as an ex ante formulation of 
empirical facts (Favell 2008a; Bijak 2006).  
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1.3.2.4 Migration system model  
The world systems theory can be linked to Mabogunje’s (1970) system model of 
migration, through which he explains the phenomenon as a dynamic spatial process. 
Aggregate migration flows and interactions are modelled by starting with a pool of 
rural potential migrants that is affected by various factors in the decision to migrate. 
The rural control sub-system controls outflows (e.g. family or community norms), 
the urban control sub-system controls inflows (e.g. through employment agencies), 
feedback is channelled back to potential migrants and the background environment 
also affects migration flows (social and economic conditions, government policies, 
transport and communications infrastructure etc.). The environment and subsystems 
are constantly changing, also as a result of the migration flows, which make the 
system open and dynamic. Other authors (e.g. Kritz & Zlotnik, 1992) have also 
emphasised the importance of viewing international migration as an interdependent 
dynamic system, for sending and receiving countries and feedback, with adjustment 
coming from the migration process itself.  The authors contend that it is important to 
take note of interactions between different actors and to emphasise the dynamic 
nature of migration (ibid). Nevertheless, the migration system models are vague and 
hence, do not allow for concrete prediction of migration trends. 
1.3.2.5 Mobility of transition  
Zelinsky’s hypothesis of mobility transition (1971) holds that migration is part of the 
economic and social changes inherent in the modernisation process. It should be 
considered under the lenses the wider range of functionalist theories of social change 
and development, which try to link theories to past empirical trends. The author 
argues that patterns and rates of migration can be closely linked to the stage of 
modernisation (e.g. industrialisation) and demographic factors (e.g. high birth rates). 
He emphasises that the preference for more personal freedom is part of the 
modernisation process. While his theories broadly make sense when looking at past 
migration patterns in industrialised nations, it is vague and does not allow for 




1.3.3 Micro-level theories 
1.3.3.1 The push-and-pull theory of migration by Lee  
Lee (1966) revised Ravenstein’s ‘laws on migration’ and proposed an entirely new 
analytical framework. He focused on the development of a more general schematic 
framework for analysing the volume of migration that takes into account the 
development of ‘streams’ and ‘counter-streams’ as well as the characteristics of 
migrants. In his view, the decision to migrate is determined by factors associated 
with the area of origin and the area of destination: “no matter how short or how long, 
how easy or how difficult, every act of migration involves an origin, a destination 
and an intervening set of obstacles” (Lee, 1966, p. 49). Basically, the emphasis is put 
on the economic context of the flow of workers (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1999, p. 
20) and less exclusively on the economic advantages. Lee (1966) embedded the 
factors that enter the decision to migrate and the migration process under four 
categories, which are: 1) Factors associated with the area of origin; 2) Factors 
associated with the area of destination; 3) Intervening obstacles and; 4) Personal 
factors.  
The origin and destination area are assumed to have ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ factors, 
which ‘pull’ or ‘push’ people away from the particular areas. These factors push 
migrants towards (non) migration, which, however, can be hindered by intervening 
factors. The intervening factors exist between all origin and destination points, e.g. 
Lee (1966) formulated the so-called intervening obstacles as distance, physical 
barriers, transport costs, restrictive immigration laws and physical controls over 
population movements, where some contribute only ‘minor frictions’, whilst others 
can be ‘insurmountable’ (Todaro, 1976, p. 18). It is noteworthy to mention that these 
intervening obstacles tend to exert differing influences on different people: a minor 
obstacle to one potential migrant can be a major obstacle to another. 
Secondly, according to Lee (1966), personal factors as well as individual traits also 
play a role in the decision-making process about whether to migrate or not. The 
individual characteristics of the migrants respond differently to ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ 
factors at origins and destinations, possessing different abilities to cope with the 
intervening variables (Reniers, 1999, p. 681). However, by and large, there exists a 
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general set of factors towards which most people tend to react in the same way 
(higher wages, more job opportunities, better amenities, etc.). Todaro (1976) 
acknowledged that the importance lies in the ability to identify these factors and to 
quantify their influences on different classes of people. Uncertainty, expectations and 
risks become an important element in the migration process, as people living in the 
former place will possess better knowledge of the precise outcome of origin pluses 
and minuses than they will of that in the potential destination (Todaro, 1976, p. 18). 
Based on his conceptualisation, Lee (1966) formulated a number of general 
hypotheses about the volume of migration, the development of stream and counter-
stream and the characteristics of migrants. (see Lee, 1966, pp. 53-57). In the 
migration literature, Lee’s analytical framework is simply known as the ‘push-pull’ 
model. 
This model has gained enormous popularity within the migration literature and has 
become the dominant migration model in secondary as well as university education. 
Because of its apparent ability to integrate other theoretical insights, it has been 
frequently suggested that a general view of labour migration could best be achieved 
using a push-pull framework (Bauer & Zimmermann, 1998; Schoorl, 1998, p. 103). 
The major critique of it in the literature is its inability to determine the dominant 
factors, seemingly implying that push and pull factors are largely a mirror image of 
each other (de Haas, 2008). Consequently, it is unable to determine which plus 
factors, and which minus ones at both origin and destination are quantitatively the 
most important to different groups of people, nor does the existence of intervening 
obstacles help in comprehending which are major and which are minor. By not 
specifying the inter-relationships between dependent and independent variables 
within the context of a rigorous theoretical framework, Lee’s (1966) theory of 
migration and indeed, most other ‘’non-economic’’ social science migration models 
offer little practical policy guidance for decision-makers in developing nations 
(Todaro, 1976, p. 19). It is probably for this reason that Todaro (1976) claimed that 
‘’in seeking such a practical policy guidance, we must inevitably turn to the 
economist’s formulation of the migration problem to econometric methods’’ (p. 20).    
Regarding the theory within the framework of this study, the push-and pull 
perspective does apply, to some extent, to the migrants in the EU. However, in the 
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literature survey not much emphasis is placed on this model concerning labour 
migration in the EU, because there is little evidence that it is applicable.  
1.3.3.2 The human capital theory: The neoclassical micro-level migration theory 
The neoclassical model can be transferred to the micro-level of individual choice. At 
the micro level, under this theoretical lens, migrants are considered as individuals 
and rational actors, whose decisions to move are based on a personal cost-benefit 
calculation (Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro 1969, 1976, 1989; Todaro and Maruszko, 1987). 
The microeconomic model of individual choice, termed the human capital theory of 
migration, was first introduced by Sjaastad in 1962 and enriches the classical 
framework by incorporating the socio-demographic characteristics of the individual 
as important determinants of migration, such as age, skills, human capital 
endowments, marital status, gender, occupation as well as preferences and 
expectations. Heterogeneity between individuals is an important factor and different 
individuals in the same sending country demonstrate different propensities to 
migrate, also choosing different receiving countries (Bonin et al. 2008).  
The core of the rationale behind the human capital theory can be described as 
follows: when the calculations of the individual migrant meet the expectation of a 
positive net return, only then will the potential migrant move (Bauer and 
Zimmermann, 1999). To paraphrase, basically each potential migrant compares the 
costs and benefits relating to mobility before taking the decision whether or not to 
move. Given the precondition that there exists free choice and full access to 
information, the individual will choose to go where he/she can earn the highest 
wages and be the most productive. Before moving, the migrant estimates certain 
investment, such as the costs of travelling, the cost of maintenance while moving and 
looking for work, the effort involved in learning a new language and a new culture, 
the difficulty in experiencing, while adapting to a new labour market as well as the 
psychological costs of cutting old ties and forging new ones, amongst other things 
(Massey, 1993). Generally, they will migrate to regions where the expected 
discounted net returns are greatest over some time horizon (Borjas, 1990).9 Human 
                                                        
9Net returns in each future period are estimated by taking the observed earnings corresponding to the 
individual's skills in the destination country and multiplying these by the probability of obtaining a 
job there (and for illegal migrants the likelihood of being able to avoid deportation) with the 
"expected destination earnings." These expected earnings are then subtracted from those expected in 
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capital endowments, like skills, age, marital status, gender and occupation are 
considered as highly influential factors that strongly affect the individuals in making 
their choice whether to move or not. The majority of the studies agree that the 
likelihood of migration decreases with age and normally increases with education 
level (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1999). Hence, the human capital approach assumes 
that migration tends to have a stronger effect on skilled people as it increases their 
chances of success.  
The human capital theory was tested empirically in several studies, such as Todaro 
(1969), Harris and Todaro (1970), Mincer (1970) and Bielby (1992), all of which 
incorporated more than one migration decision-making theory within a single 
research study, namely, the human capital and the network theory. Other scholars 
that have used the human capital theory to explore migration decision-making 
include those of Yezer and Thurston (1976), Hunt and Kau (1985) Farber (1983) and 
Shumway and Hall (1996). However, within the context of migration in the EU, the 
‘skill factor’ led to irregular as well as paradoxical observations during the course of 
this research study. The theory of the microeconomic model of individual choice is 
questionable regarding its accuracy when applied to the EU citizen and this is 
discussed further in the subsequent section. The microeconomic model seems very 
attractive from the formal point of view, however, it has received the severe criticism 
that people do not necessary behave in an unconditionally rational manner. Rather, it 
is often argued that their decisions are dependent on the information, which could be 
incomplete (Fisher, Martin and Straubhaar, 1997). Moreover, within this approach 
the social context is neglected, but this has been addressed by the new economics of 
labour migration (NELM), which is discussed next. 
1.3.3.3 Wolpert’s stress-threshold model 
There are two more theories at the micro level, one is Wolpert’s stress-threshold 
model (1965) and it describes the behaviour of internal migration, similar to a cost-
benefit analysis, but it assumes that individuals intend to be rational ex-ante, whilst 
                                                                                                                                                            
the community of origin (observed earnings there multiplied by the probability of employment) and 
the difference is summed over a time horizon from 0 to n, discounted by a factor that reflects the 
greater utility of money earned in the present than in the future. From this integrated difference, the 
estimated costs are subtracted to yield the expected net return to migration (Massey, 1993).  
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they are not necessarily so ex-post. Accordingly, individuals have a threshold level 
of utility they aspire to. They compare place utilities to this threshold in order to 
decide whether to migrate or not and to which place. Place utilities for the current 
position are based on past and future rewards, whereas those for possible 
destinations depend on anticipated rewards. A lot of factors, such as knowledge 
(perfect, imperfect information) and action are subjective and depend on the personal 
characteristics or even on the variability of the environment and life-stage of the 
individual. Obviously, this makes it very hard to measure or generalise. It has not 
much significance in the literature of migration theories, similar to the Human 
Capital Theory. 
1.3.3.4 Value-expectancy model 
Another behavioural model, the value-expectancy model (Crawford, 1973), is a 
cognitive model that holds that migrants make a conscious decision to migrate based 
on more than economic considerations. That is, the potential migrant’s strength of 
migration intention depends on the multiplication of the values of migration 
outcomes and expectations that migration will actually come to pass. 
Values/expectations are specific goals, e.g. wealth or autonomy, being dependent on 
personal and household characteristics (e.g. education level) and societal norms. 
These values do not necessarily need to be economic, for example, security or self-
fulfilment can also be important to potential migrants. Migration depends on the 
strength of migration intentions, indirect influences of individual and societal factors 
as well as the modifying effects of constraints and facilitators. This perspective is 
similar to the place-utility approach of Wolpert and again it contends that migration 
choices are subjectively made. There are also other similar micro-based individual 
behavioural decision making models, e.g. work by de Jong & Fawcett (1981) or the 
adjustment-to-stress approach of Ritchey (1976). In sum, whilst the behavioural 
approach also considers non-economic factors and societal influences, it is very 
vague and rational decision-making is still assumed. 
1.3.4 Meso-level theories 
As Massey (1990) argued, the factors that influence migration to start with could be 
very different from the conditions that make migration continue, i.e. perpetuate. 
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After an initial phase of pioneer migration, it becomes more common in the 
community, with more and more people imitating current migrants and being helped 
by them until it becomes self-sustaining. There are different aspects of the 
perpetuation of migration, including social capital, social networks, migration 
institutions as well as cumulative and circular migration, which are discussed below.  
In between the micro and macro level exists the meso level, developed by sociologist 
Thomas Faist (1997, 2000), which comprises linking the rational individual 
migration decision models to the structural macro migration models. The resources 
and the feed to the meso level are social relations and social capital in households, 
neighbourhoods, communities and more formal organisations. Through the use of 
concepts like social capital, the mechanism with which macro factors shape micro 
decision-making is made clearer. One example of social ties and social capital in 
practice is the network theory.   
1.3.4.1 Perpetuation of migration: Network theory  
The economic theory models are considered insufficient and some scholars have 
complained that these “alone cannot explain the actual shape of migration patterns” 
(Salt, 1987, p. 243; Schoorl, 1998). Hence, the network theory was introduced, 
which entailed a dynamic dimension. Under this lens, it is argued that when wage 
differentials or recruitment policies cease to exist, migrant networks, often evolving 
into institutional frameworks, help to explain why migration continues. The network 
theory draws attention to the role of nation states, geographical proximity, 
institutions, social networks and cultural factors in creating new migration patterns. 
Rather than looking at the ‘determinants’ that are generally considered as being 
responsible for the movement, the network theory is concerned with what 
‘perpetuates’ migration in time and space (Massey et al., 1993). Networks, in this 
context, are defined as a “set of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former 
migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through bonds of kinship, 
friendship, and shared community origin” (Massey et al., 1993, p. 448). Massey 
(1989) contends that once the number of network connections in an origin area 
reaches a critical level, migration becomes self-perpetuating, because it creates the 
social structure to sustain the process. Thus, network effects explain the (often 
unintended) perpetuation of migration, often over formally closed borders, 
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irrespective of its original causes (Waldorf, 1998). Lee (1966) argues “migration 
facilitates the flow of information back from the place of destination to the origin, 
which facilitates the passage for later migrants” (p. 54-55). Böckner (1994) further 
adds that the already settled migrants function as ‘’bridgeheads’’, reducing the risks 
as well as material and psychological costs of subsequent migration. Specific to 
these situations, friends and relatives are regarded as helpful in assisting and helping 
the new migrants to find new employment or a place to live, which will increase the 
likelihood of subsequent migration to that particular place (Appleyard, 1992). This 
exactly is the point where the network theory comes into force10 and the existence of 
a diaspora or networks is likely to influence the decisions of migrants when they 
choose their destinations (Vertovec, 2002; Dustmann and Glitz, 2005). The larger the 
network, the lower the cost and risks of migration and the higher the net returns and 
likelihood of making the decision to migrate. Networks in migration decision-
making are considered important as they ensure that potential migrants connect with 
the relevant sources of information that can help to inform their decision to migrate. 
Equipped with some positive and negative information, the potential migrants can 
prepare for the new destination. The network theory has been tested in the works of 
Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994), Winters, de Janvry and Sadoulet (1998), Reynolds (2002) 
as well as Curran and Rivero-Fuentes (2003).  
Networks have played a vital part regarding labour movement in Europe. Since the 
beginning of the signing of the bilateral agreements in the 1960s, a multitude of 
communities from different ethnicities has been evolved and this has persisted up to 
the present today (e.g. the Portuguese, Greek, and recently the rapid increase in the 
Polish community in the UK). In general, the network theory certainly has 
explanatory power in relation to EU migration, especially when it comes to migrants 
from the lesser-developed countries, but has not been used frequently in the studies, 
particularly not when explaining migration between converged regions. The 
applicability of this theory will be tested in this research study for both types of 
migration, namely high levels as well as low levels of migration. A further 
theorisation at the meso level is Guilomoto & Sandron’s (2001) study, in which it is 
proposed that migrant networks perpetuate themselves due to institutionalisation, 
                                                        
10  The network theory also helps to explain the reasons why migration patterns are not evenly 
distributed across countries, but rather, tend to form so-called migration regimes (Faist, 2000). 
 41 
path dependency etc. and are also affected by external factors e.g. labour market 
changes. The institutional part of a network refers to the rules and norms governing 
it that reduce the transaction and migration costs (e.g. children sending home 
remittances to their parents), whereas the organisational aspects pertain to the 
practical help given to pioneers within the network.  
1.3.4.2 Cumulative and circular causation 
Last meso level theory of migration considered here is cumulative and circular 
causation (Massey (1990), under which it is contended that migration becomes more 
and more common once it has started, by sustaining itself. Past migration alters the 
context in which current migration decisions are made by changing the 
socioeconomic context and macro environment of migrant households that then 
affect the migration decisions of future migrants. Networks expand, migration 
becomes part of local culture and this makes migration increasingly accessible to all 
levels of the population. There is likely to be lower labour demand in the areas of 
origin due to new, less labour-intensive agricultural production methods brought 
home by migrants and land left empty by them. If more educated people leave, the 
source regions stagnate, thus increasing the returns from migration. Migration can 
also change the local income distribution, again increasing the returns from 
migration. Thus, according to this theory, the more migration there is, the more there 
may be in the future. Of course, migration does not continue indefinitely, for at some 
point migration networks become saturated, labour scarcity in the source country 
increases and migration potential is very low with only old people or children left to 
migrate. At this stage, migration might start to decrease, which makes the overall 
migration curve an inverted u-shaped. This theory whilst being very straightforward, 
is still too broad as an approach.  
1.3.5 Further relevant theories  
1.3.5.1 Family decision-making theories (The New Economics of Labour Migration 
(NELM)) 
The more traditional migration approaches focus either on aggregate migration 
movements or individuals making migration decisions. They, thus, assume that 
 42 
individuals independently make the decision to migrate. Some of the migration 
literature includes a seemingly wider decision-making framework, for example, 
Harbison’s (1981) paper is entitled “Family Structure and Family Strategy in 
Migration Decision Making”. However, the migration decision is still not seen as a 
strategic family decision as the paper only acknowledges that families can influence 
the individual migrant’s decision, e.g. through the demographic structure. When 
looking at migration from a gender perspective, family structure can influence the 
migration decisions of women in particular. As Morokvasic (1984) pointed out, 
women migrate not only for economic motives, but also, to get married, due to social 
constraints, low rights and lack of protection against domestic violence. Sandell 
(1977) and Mincer (1978), on the other hand, viewed migration as a family decision, 
whereby the family as a whole migrates if their net gain is positive. If only one 
partner finds a (better) job at the destination, the family only migrates if the gains of 
one family member outweigh the losses of another family member. Under this lens, 
the family migration decision is thus in essence, an aggregation of individual 
migration utilities. Bigsten (1988) also considered migration a household decision in 
which a family allocates labour to the urban or rural sector depending on the 
marginal products of combined wages. 
The 1980s and 1990s represent a paradigm shift concerning the debates on migration 
from individual dependence to mutual dependence (Stark 1991). The new economics 
of labour migration (NELM) emerged as a response to the neoclassical theory of 
migration, criticising the very methodological design of most prior migration 
research, but in particular, the neoclassical models for being “too individualistic and 
rigid to deal with the complex and diverse realities of the migration and development 
interactions” (Haas, 2008, p. 34-35). Thus, rather than considering income 
maximisation as the most influential factor in the migration decision-making 
process, the NELM places the behaviour of individual migrants in a wider societal 
context and considers not the individual, but the family or the household, as the most 
appropriate decision-making unit (Haas, 2008, p. 35.) As Stark (1991) emphasised 
“the problem of defining a supra-individual decision-making unit is partly remedied 
by the ‘new economics of migration’”. Taylor et al. (1996) noted that “prior work 
has been unduly pessimistic about the prospects for development as a result of 
international migration, largely because it has failed to take into account the 
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complex, often indirect ways that migration and remittances influence the economic 
status of households and the communities that contain them” (p. 402). The 
fundamental assumption of the new economics theory is that households and 
families primarily pursue minimisation of the spread of risk, rather than income 
maximisation. On the basis of a mutual consensus among the household members, 
they send one or more off as migrants, in order to ensure the wellbeing of the family. 
Migrant remittances hereby provide income insurance for the original households, 
being considered as a risk-sharing behaviour of families and households (Stark, 
1991). Consequently, migration (internal and international) is perceived as a 
household response to income risk and households seem able to diversify their 
resources, such as labour, in order to minimise income risks, better than individuals 
can (Stark & Levhari, 1982). While remittances do not play a role in neoclassical 
migration theory, within the NELM they are perceived as one of the most essential 
motives for migrating. Within the context of EU migration, the argument with regard 
to remittances is observable to some extent and has led to the production of a 
considerable amount of academic research (e.g. Hussain, 2005; Jimenez-Martin et 
al., 2007), especially in relation to migrants from the Mediterranean regions. 
However, the NELM theory has not been afforded much attention in regard to 
mobility in the EU.  
The NELM theory has not gained sufficient attention in the academic world and 
there have only been a few empirical tests regarding it, because of its limited 
applicability, as it isolates the effects of market imperfections and risks from other 
income and employment variables. Also, its proponents have been frequently 
accused of possessing sending-side bias, overlooking dynamics within households 
(i.e. gender roles) and being too heavily future-oriented (Faist, 2000). Theorists have 
also ignored or oversimplified the relations between family members, i.e. the social 
ties that bind or separate family or household members. If basic social relations are 
disregarded in this way, power and authority relations, (mis-) trust and solidarity 
cannot be understood in the migration context. For example, the theory does not 
consider who decides which member(s) migrate(s) and for what reason?  
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1.3.5.2 The social systems theory  
A sophisticatedly elaborated concept in explaining the phenomenon of migration was 
developed and presented by Hoffmann-Nowotny (1970 and 1973), which 
encompasses four levels: individual, national subsystems, national societies, and the 
international society. The fundament of his theory is based on the two factors 
‘prestige’ and ‘power’ in a society, with prestige legitimising power. The factors in a 
social system are determined by the position and by the status attributed to them 
(Faist, 1997, p. 192). Due to ‘structural tensions’, which arise from inequalities and 
status inconsistencies in the sending country, an imbalance between power and status 
is generated. In order to address this tension, action is taken in form of social 
mobility, which means giving up the social position held or emigration to a country 
where status aspirations can be attained (Hoffmann-Nowotny 1973, p. 11-14). In 
essence, for Hoffmann-Nowotny, (international) migration constitutes an 
“interaction between societal systems geared to transfer tensions and thus balancing 
power and prestige” (Hoffmann-Nowotny, p. 1973, p. 19). Despite social systems 
theory having rarely been discussed in relation to the classical theories of migration, 
it does introduce two variables, namely, power and prestige, which are deemed of 
relevance in the context of the current research. 
These are some of the most prevalent theories of migration in the literature, whilst 
there are others, which are not considered at this point as they irrelevant for the 
framework of this research.  
1.3.6   Recap of the theories  
This section contains a summary the migration theories along with their associated 
determinants and variables. The neoclassical theorists, the forerunners of all the 
migration theories, argued that income differentials are the main cause for migration. 
Later, the ‘variable’ employment (unemployment) was added by Todaro (1976), who 
Argued that “much of the previous research on migration tended to focus on social, 
cultural, physical, demographic, communication and psychological factors (non-
economic)” (Todaro, 1976, p. 28) and consequently, the importance of economic 
variables was neglected. He even contended that, even though the noneconomic 
influences are relevant, migration can be explained primarily by the influence of 
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economics (Todaro, 1976, p. 26). Standing distinctly apart from this model of 
individual rational choice is the dual labour market theory, which sets it sights away 
from decisions made by individuals to the perspective that international migration 
stems from the intrinsic labour demands of modern industrial societies (Massey et 
al., 1993, p. 28). In contrast to neoclassical theory, since the demand for immigrant 
workers grows out of the structural needs of the economy and is expressed through 
recruitment practices rather than wage offers, international wage differentials are 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for labour migration to occur. In fact, 
employers have incentives to recruit workers while holding wages constant (Massey, 
1993). Thus, earning differences become less pivotal, instead, the (characteristics of) 
labour market becomes a decisive determinant.  
In contrast to the neoclassical equilibrium model, the new economics labour model 
(NELM) framework treats migration as a complex phenomenon that involves both 
economic and noneconomic factors. While it does not dismiss the role played by 
wage differentials between geographic locations, the conclusion under this lens is not 
that these are the only trigger for an initial wave of immigration. Moreover, 
regardless what sets in motion the initial impetus to migrate, the establishment of 
migratory networks serve to perpetuate migration, because ‘they lower the costs and 
risks of movement and increase the expected net returns’ (Massey et al., 1993, p. 
448).  
Under the human capital theory, sociological, as well economic factors are 
significant, according to which: international movement stems from international 
differentials in both earnings and employment rates, which determines expected 
earnings (the prior model, downplayed employment rates, especially at migrant 
destinations). International movement does not occur in the absence of differences in 
earning levels and/or employment rates between countries. In addition, under this 
lens, migration continues until expected earnings have been equalised 
internationally. The size of the differential in expected returns determines the size of 
the international flow of migrants between countries. In parallel, individual human 
capital characteristics increase the likely rate of remuneration or the probability of 
employment in the destination relative to the sending country (e.g. education, 
experience, training, language skills). Thus, personal traits may contribute to an 
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increase regarding the likelihood of international movement, other things being 
equal.  
Massey et al. (1993) contributed to the new economics of migration by introducing 
the network theory. They provided an entirely new concept, in which there is a 
distinction between individual decision making, on the one hand, and household or 
family decision making, on the other. Sociological studies have frequently found that 
migration decisions are taken in social units, such as the family, extended families, 
etc. (Faist, 1997, p. 191). As Massey explained, migrant networks are sets of 
interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin 
and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community 
origin (1994, p. 28). The existence of these ties is hypothesised to increase the 
likelihood of emigration by lowering the costs, raising the benefits, and mitigating 
the risks of international movement. Network connections constitute a valuable form 
of social capital that people draw upon to gain access to foreign employment and 
high wages. Charles Tilly (1990) contended that “networks migrate” (p. 84), by 
which he meant that the network rather than the individual is the correct unit of 
analysis. “In the end, the network can sustain substantial migratory flows even when 
economic conditions would suggest that migration should either be declining or 
cease altogether” (Faist & Kivisto, 2010). In brief, families, households, or other 
defined units of production and consumption, not the autonomous individual, are the 
appropriate units of analysis for migration research. A wage differential is not a 
necessary condition for international migration to occur; households might have 
strong incentives to diversify risks or accumulate capital through transnational 
movement even in the absence of wage differences. Lastly, to put it brief, the general 
systems theory has shown how prestige and power can play a significant role.  
1.3.7 Current migration trends in the EU and Intra-EU labour migration and their 
determinants: A literature review  
The major theories of international migration and their determinants have been 
presented. The following paragraphs will provide a literature review on intra-EU 
migration. 
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A survey of the literature on intra-EU migration reveals a particular predominance, 
whereby most research studies have addressed the results of EU enlargement, 
especially with regard to the addition of the 12 accession countries from the years 
2004 and 200711 mainly from the East. The researches largely comprise studies that 
either attempt to provide predictions about the expected migration propensity from 
Eastern EU pre- and post enlargement 12  (e.g. Fassmann and Hintermann, 1997; 
Krieger et al., 2003; Boeri & Brückner, 2001) or that seek to find out the underlying 
causes and determinants leading to the massive labour movements immediately after 
the enlargements (e.g. Heinz & Warmedinger, 2006; Kahanec & Zimmermann, 
2010). Regarding which, in relation to the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, which are 
considered as the most significant in the history of the European Union, the mass 
migrations from East to West Europe have primarily been explained by economic 
variables, such as the wage and income differentials, GDP differences or the 
probability of employment. As proposed in the neoclassical theory, the proposition 
of these studies is that income differentials play a substantial role in functioning as a 
stimulator to move. Next, some of the extant studies are briefly outlined and it is 
demonstrated how economic determinants are used to explain labour movement in 
the EU and how the theories are employed in the studies to explain migration.  
Heinz and Warmedinger (2006) produced extensive research on labour mobility, 
which exclusively addressed the Eastern-EU enlargement, with the focus being on 
the key ‘economic’ determinants of labour migration in the EU. In their analysis, 
they examined wage and income differentials and elicited that labour migration is 
positively related to these. The study affirmed that both the absolute wage gap as 
well as the absolute gap in per capita income was high between the EU-813 and the 
EU-1514 in 2004. To exemplify this, wage levels converted at market exchange rates 
ranged between 54% of the EU-15 average in Slovenia, to only around 17% in 
                                                        
11  The 2004 accession countries were the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia (EU25). The EU was joined by Rumania and Bulgaria 
in 2007 (EU27) 
12 The majority of the forecasts of East-West migration are based on econometric estimates of macro 
migration models, which explain migration flows or migration stocks by economic variables, such as 
the income differential as well as the (un-) employment rates in the sending and receiving countries. 
Although most studies employ the same set of explanatory variables, the estimates of the parameters 
and hence, the migration predictions differ considerably in the literature (Boeri and Brückner, 2001). 
13 The EU-8 are the 2004 accession countries except Malta and Cyprus 
14 EU member states up to 2004 
 48 
Latvia and Lithuania in that year (Heinz and Warmedinger, 2006). Despite the 
literature on the economic determinants of labour migration not offering a consensus 
on the most accurate measure for wages, most employ wage levels converted at PPP 
(purchasing power parity) as the most appropriate indicator, as “this measure 
accounts for differences in price levels in the home and host countries” (Heinz & 
Warmedinger, 2006, p. 16). At PPP exchange rates, the degree of wage convergence 
is larger, with 34% for Latvia and 35% for Lithuania. However, according to Heinz 
and Warmedinger (2006), the difference is still substantial, thus suggesting a large 
labour migration potential. In order to substantiate their findings, they further looked 
at the absolute gap in per capita income levels in 2005, eliciting that PPP ranged 
from 44% of the EU-15 average in Latvia to 74% in Slovenia. The mass migrations 
immediately after the enlargement, combining the new with the old member 
countries, thus can be ascribed to the economic differentials between the old and the 
new member countries (Heinz and Warmedinger, 2006). 
Similar findings are shared in a study by Galgoczi et al. (2009), also in the context of 
the post-enlargement, who scrutinized the main macro drivers responsible for labour 
migration, namely, wage and income differentials. In their paper, they outlined the 
macroeconomic indicators for A8 and EU 15 for the time before and after 
enlargement. The outcomes of their study confirmed Heinz &Warmedinger’s (2006) 
findings, namely, that the wage gap between the accession countries and the EU-15 
was very wide prior to enlargement (especially when calculated at market exchange 
rates), thus functioning as an important migration driver (Galgoczi et al., 2009). 
They argue that basically, with the eastern enlargement in 2004, diversity within the 
EU in terms of GDP per capita and wage levels grew enormously (Galgoczi et al., 
2009, p. 15). According to their findings, when GDP per capita levels were measured 
at PPP, they ranged from 38.8 per cent (Latvia) to 73.6 per cent (Slovenia) of the 
EU-15 average in 2003 (the year before accession). The average wage in Latvia, the 
poorest among the A8 countries, was just one eighth of the EU-15 average in 2003 
and hence, the statistics seemed to justify the fears of mass migration, if free 
movement of labour was permitted. Their conclusion was that if they “were to ignore 
geographical, cultural and political factors”, it would be fair to assume that on the 
basis of these macroeconomic drivers alone then a substantial (but declining) 
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propensity to migrate from the new to the old member states would occur (Galgoczi 
et al., 2009).  
The significant differences of wages and their positive effects on the mobility levels 
of EU citizens are supported by further various studies, thereby confirming wealth 
differences as an important driver. Tassinopoulos and Werner (2009) noted that two 
decades ago the wage ratios between the then richer countries in the northern 
member states of the European Union, such as Germany and France and the poorer 
ones in the south, such as Spain, Portugal and Greece, were around 6 to 1, whereas 
this stands at 3 to 1 nowadays (Tassinopoulous & Werner, 2009, p. 7-8). In 
Maddison’s study (1995), it was contended that the income gap between the 
Southern and the Northern European countries in the 1960s (i.e. during the period of 
intensive guest worker recruitment in Germany, France) was “similar to the gap 
between the EU-15 and the accession countries” (Maddison, 1995). Looking 
retrospectively at the history of labour migration, the less developed states in the 
south of the European Union constituted an eminent source of labour migrants; 
serving as sending countries (see for example Salt & Clout, 1976). Spain, Portugal 
and Greece were prominent sources of labourers exposing considerably high 
numbers of labour migrants. Their economies have experienced convergence15 (to 
some extent) (Layard et al., 1992; Bauer and Zimmermann, 1999) and the numbers 
of labour migrants from the southern countries has been decreasing in recent years. 
Zaiceva (2008) confirmed that GDP differences result in migration and that a gross 
income advantage of the receiving country over the sending country is a pull factor, 
whereas individuals in higher GDP countries are less willing to migrate (Zaiceva, 
2008). Zaiceva (2008), Galgoczi (2009) and Boeri and Bruckner (2001), moreover, 
found evidence that when the income differentials between the sending and receiving 
countries become smaller, potential emigration is negatively affected. As put forward 
by Alvarez (2003), the income gap between the EU and the accession candidates 
                                                        
15 Kahanec (2009) went one step further and looked at convergence levels, discovering that this took 
place regarding the new accession countries, with a subsequent decrease in migration.  
17 Further studies that advocate the same view are Piracha & Vickerman (2002); Pedersen et al. 
(2004); Alvarez-Plata et al. (2003); Boeri and Brücker (2005); Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008); 




from Central and Eastern Europe is hardly a new phenomenon compared to other 
migration episodes in Europe after World War II. The above studies are only a few 
examples of a broad strand of literature 16  affirming that macroeconomic 
determinants, as in the neoclassical theory, are explanatory regarding the pattern of 
migration flows in the history of European labour migration. 
Hence, the preliminary conclusion that can be drawn is that, as evident by the 
presented studies, at the time of the accession of the new member countries, there 
always existed considerable economic differences (such as wage or income level 
differences) between the old and the new acceding member countries. Consequently, 
immediately after the accession, there were mass migration flows recorded from the 
newer to the older EU member countries. The occurrence of massive migration flows 
is often observed after an enlargement, such as after the accessions of Spain and 
Portugal in the 80s and particularly, in the case of the eastern enlargement in 
2004/2007. These highly significant labour migration streams are explained in the 
literature on the basis of the neoclassical theory. In addition, the migration streams 
have followed a clear direction, namely, from the southern or Mediterranean parts to 
the mid-European countries and never vice versa.  
Despite the abundant studies on migration within Europe on the (macro-) economic 
determinants, the conceptualisation of the neoclassical theory has been subject to 
severe criticism. That is, the simple wage-movement explanation has been 
considered far from satisfactory in explaining the phenomenon of migration by many 
scholars (Nugent, 2003; Rosamond, 2000). In particular, it can be said that it has 
been critiqued for being insufficient in explaining the cause of the low labour 
mobility levels within Europe. Regarding which, Lalonde and Topel (1997) stated 
that “wage differential in reality as noted by Ravenstein (1986) does not provide the 
only reason for migration. Sometimes migration fails to occur even in the presence 
of substantial earning differentials” (pp. 805-80). Developments in the field of 
transnationalism led scholars to arguing that simply placing emphasis on economic 
motivations is no longer sufficient to give the full picture (e.g. Lewer et al., 2009). 
For instance, the extant theories are unable to explain the low, but still significant, 
migration between the wealthy EU member countries. In response to this, in addition 
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to analysis on migration inherent to macroeconomic variables, there is a growing 
strand of literature that seeks to explain labour migration by integrating 
socioeconomic factors, some of which is briefly discussed below.  
Van Wissen and Visser (1998) analysed the causes of international migration 
between 16 Member States of the EEA (15 EU Member States and Norway) by 
testing economic and social network hypotheses in relation to international 
migration. Using the data on gross migration flows between those countries, the 
authors found that economic factors, such as the difference in GDP and 
unemployment rates, in contrast to the preceding studies, have no significant 
influence on the size of migration flows between the countries of the EEA. In their 
analysis of intra- EEA migration flows, these authors showed that the variables 
indicating past migratory movements are very important for the predictions of future 
flows. That is, their argumentation goes along the lines that network effects are 
responsible for the movement within the EEA area (Van Wissen and Visser, 1998). 
The presence of network effects for these states is also supported by Sprenger’s 
(2013) study. Belot and Ederveen (2011), additionally, argue that the cultural 
approach works better in explaining migration patterns between developed countries 
than the traditional economic approach. They complied with the view that traditional 
economic variables, such as income and unemployment differentials alone, provide 
little explanation for migration patterns in general. Their study involved using a data 
panel of 22 OECD countries over the period 1990–2003 to investigate the role of 
cultural, demographic and economic determinants of international migration as well 
as the role of social networks in explaining mobility patterns between the countries. 
Specifically related to the EU, the authors showed that in case of the EU-15, cultural 
variables play a fundamental role and economic variables alone are not sufficient to 
explain migration in this region. Likewise, within the framework of the 
Eurobarometer 2007, EU15 and EU12 member states were asked in a comprehensive 
survey, which factors would influence the decisions to move. When asked “What are 
the factors encouraging a future move”, according to the survey, income related 
motivations were especially strong in the New Member States (EU12). Almost 60% 
of past movers in these states changed their location as a result of job related reasons, 
whereas only about 40% of the movers in the EU-15 mentioned the job factor. In a 
different interpretation, more than four in five respondents in the New Member 
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States claimed that work and income related factors could encourage them to move 
in the future. This answer is given only by one in two EU-15 citizens and the 
prevalent answers that were responsible for the movements of these citizens, were 
factors such as ‘social network’ or ‘housing and local environment’. These two 
factors were in comparison less relevant to EU citizens from the EU12 member 
states (Bonin et al., 2008, p. 71). 
The majority of intra-EU migration studies are dedicated to the exploration of the 
determinants to migration. The exploration of the literature has revealed how there 
exist no migration theory or framework, which explains the lower, but still 
significant levels of mobility, namely those between the wealthier regions. Where 
large streams of migration are explained, e.g. on the basis of the neoclassical theory, 
such a migration framework is missing when scrutinizing mobility the older EU 
member states, although the reasons behind the determinants are stated in some of 
the researches, such as e.g. ‘friends’. This may be due to the fact that as these 
mobility levels are perceived as ‘low’ or close to inexistent, which will be discussed 
more in detail in the forthcoming chapters. This research study will address this gap.  
1.3.8 Defining migration, mobility, and movement of workers within the EU 
Before turning to the discussion of the theories of migration, the next sections 
contain an overview the various definitions of migration and migrants. According to 
the Oxford English Dictionary, the term migration refers to the process of 
“movement of people to a new area or country in order to find work or better living 
conditions’’, 17  and a migrant is defined as “a person that travels to a different 
country or place, often in order to find work”.18 Based on this interpretation, the act 
of moving is inherently linked to ‘finding work’; specifying movement for the 
purpose of ‘work’. UNESCO relies on the interpretation provided by the council of 
Europe, which states that a migrant is ‘any person who lives temporarily or 
permanently in a country where he or she was not born, and has acquired some 
significant social ties to this country.’ 19  Another highly relevant source for the 
                                                        
17http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/migration (accessed November 2015) 




definition of the term is the UN Convention on the Rights of Migrants, which defines 
a migrant worker as a person “who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged 
in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national”.20 It further 
notes that ‘the term 'migrant' in article 1.1 (a) “should be understood as covering all 
cases where the decision to migrate is taken freely by the individual concerned, for 
reasons of 'personal convenience' and without intervention of an external compelling 
factor”.2 In both of the latter definitions, the status of a migrant is unrelated to 
‘finding work’ or ‘employment’. Internal migration refers to the movement from one 
area (a province, district or municipality) to another within one country, whereas 
international migration is a territorial relocation of people between nation states. 
Moreover, the most common forms of migration can be distinguished according to 
the motives (economic, family reunion, refugees) or legal status (irregular migration, 
controlled emigration/immigration, free emigration/immigration, voluntary or 
involuntary migration). Most countries distinguish between a number of categories 
in their migration policies and statistics. The multitude of the existing variations 
between countries indicates that there are no objective definitions of migration.  
What follows is one categorisation of international migrants. ‘Irregular 
migrants’ (or undocumented / illegal migrants) are individuals who enter a country, 
usually in search of employment, without the necessary documents and permits. 
‘Forced migration’ refers not only to refugees and asylum seekers, but also to people 
forced to move due to external factors, such as environmental catastrophes or 
development projects. ‘Family members’ (or family reunion / family reunification 
migrants) are people sharing family ties joining people who have already entered an 
immigration country under one of the abovementioned categories. In the history of 
EU migration, the most prominent examples of family reunion are the family 
members of the guestworker schemes in the 1970s from EU member states and third 
country nationals. The large numbers of the latter initially led to a halt in the 
recruitment of guestworkers and subsequently the influx of non - EU migrants tailed 
off in the 1980s owing to legislation restricting their numbers. Whilst many countries 
recognise the right to family reunion for legal migrants, others, especially those with 
                                                        




contract labour systems, deny this right. ‘Return migrants’ are those people who 
return to their countries of origin after a period in another country.21 An economic 
migrant is someone who emigrates from one region to another to seek an 
improvement in living standards, because the living conditions or job opportunities 
in his/her own region are not stable (Oxford English Dictionary). The United Nations 
uses the term migrant worker.22  Social migration is the counterpart to economic 
migration and is less clearly defined or straightforward than economic migration. 
However, generally, under social migration any type of economic related activity is 
excluded and the main attraction of interest is the ‘quality of life’ as opposed to 
‘standard of life’. The improvement of quality of life can relate to various factors, 
such as the endowment of more free time, the proximity to social circles, such as 
family and friends, or the social attractions of e.g. a large city. Social migration is 
similar to lifestyle migration, though not exactly the same, for the latter is defined as 
a “relatively affluent individuals moving (…) to places which, for various reasons, 
signify for the migrants something loosely defined as quality of life” (Benson & 
O'Reilly, 2009, p. 621). They are people who have made a conscious choice not only 
about how to live, but also about where to live (Hoey, 2005). Whilst the lifestyle 
orientations and motivations of these migrants might differ, perhaps the one unifying 
factor of this group is their belief that a change of residential place will lead not 
simply to better opportunities in life, but rather to something that might be described 
as a better lifestyle and/or a more fulfilling way of life. One important characteristic 
that distinguishes social migrants from the profile of lifestyle ones is that “Lifestyle 
migrants can be any age, but they tend, on average, to be older and many are retired 
or semi-retired. They sometimes move permanently and sometimes only semi-
permanently, to their new, or second, home.’’ (Benson & O’ Reilly 2009. (They are 
not tourists though).  
For this research study, the migrants of interest are economic and social ones under 
the umbrella of ‘labour migrants’ as will become apparent in the forthcoming 
chapters. In a recent report, the EU chose to treat the terms ‘mobility’ and 
                                                        
21  For more on this, see International migration at the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
International Social Science Journal, Vol. 165 (Castles 2000). 
22 ("United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families". United Nations. Retrieved December 29, 2014.) 
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‘migration’ interchangeably, although in the EU policy context, mobility often refers 
to movements within the EU and migration to movements between EU and non-EU 
countries. “Mobility across the EU has been increasing over the past two decades, as 
measured by the share of EU population born in a different EU country. The increase 
is particularly evident when looking at data for the post-enlargement EU” (EU 
Commission, 2015). Whether temporary mobility or long-term migration, skilled or 
unskilled; the EU uses both words interchangeably.  
In the datasets, the definitions of ‘migrant’ can differ according to the analyses, e.g. 
in terms of country of birth of nationality, or length of stay. In its analyses of 
migration flows into and out of Britain, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) uses 
the UN definition of ‘long-term international migrant’: “A person who moves to a 
country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year 
[….] so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of 
usual residence”. The main source of data on this is the International Passenger 
Survey (IPS), which is in turn the basis for ONS estimates of net migration. No other 
dataset presently available in the UK measures migration by the UN/ONS definition. 
Thus, other counts inevitably include people who live in the UK for less than 12 
months, and do not qualify as migrants by this standard. In this study, it was ensured 
that all the ‘movers’ were qualified as ‘migrants’, i.e. those people who had been in 
the UK for more than 12 months. The definition of ‘migrant’ is not simply a 
technical problem, for it has an important effect on migration data and the analysis 
generated from such data. This in turn has an impact on public understanding and on 
policy debates. In this research the statistics are used just for descriptive purposes, as 
the main focus is on scrutinising the motivations prior to the decision-making 
process to migrate according to regional differences.  
1.3.8.1 The use of the terms migration and mobility within the EU context 
For clarification purposes, a brief remark on the terms migration and mobility is 
considered to be useful at this point, as it will help to avoid possible 
misunderstandings during the course of the presenting research. Within the concept 
of free movement in the EU, the most common terms describing the act of 
movement in conjunction with work (in order to work) are the two terms migration 
and mobility. The various categories of people that can be associated with the term 
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‘migration’ have been described above. But what about ‘mobility’, which is the other 
predominant word used in studies relating to the free movement of people in the EU? 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, mobility, as opposed to migration, 
refers to “the ability to move or be moved freely and easily’ and also, “the ability to 
move between different levels in society or employment”.23 When comparing this 
with migration, the terminology focuses on the ‘ease’ to move and secondly, on the 
movement ‘between employment’. ‘Movement between employment’, and moving 
in order to work as in migration, might not pertain to the same purpose for 
movement and could easily describe two fundamentally different actions owing to 
different motives. The differentiation and interpretation of these two terminologies 
are highly significant for this research, as a misconception of the two different 
concepts of movement can influence the hypothesis and the research question 
outcomes and thus, there needs to be clarification before proceeding further. In this 
research it is proposed that both terminologies can be used interchangeably, as 
ultimately, both, mobility and migration are driven by an underpinning motivation. 
Also, in this thesis it is argued that the EU Institutes are in search of ways to 
‘increase’ the mobility levels, i.e. they do not merely wish to ease or facilitate 
mobility, as one of the interpretations in the Oxford English Dictionary puts it. That 
is, they seek ‘higher’ mobility levels (regardless of whether high mobility levels an 
end in itself or as a means to another end). Easing movement, and increasing 
movement are not quite the same. By lowering the barriers, the EU Commission is 
not only trying to ‘facilitate’ movement, for more than that, it clearly states that the 
main object (particularly after the introduction of the SEM) is to ‘increase’ mobility 
levels.  
After having analysed a large strand on literature on intra-EU migration, it emerges 
that studies referring to labour movement within the mid-European member states 
predominantly use the term ‘mobility’ in relation to highly skilled and business 
migrants. These are often people with qualifications as managers, executives, 
professionals, technicians or similar, who move within the internal labour markets of 
transnational corporations and international organisations, or who seek employment 
through international labour markets that are searching for scarce skills. Many 
                                                        
23 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/mobility (accessed November 2015) 
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countries welcome such migrants and have special 'skilled and business migration' 
programmes to encourage them to come. Labour migration, on the other hand, is 
almost exclusively used to describe the massive streams of labour migrants from the 
new accession countries (the Eastern EU countries). It is noticeable that there has 
been a change in the terminology regarding the integration process and accordingly, 
in the language used by the EU. For, whereas once everything referred to the ‘free 
movement of workers’, more recently, the discourse has changed to intra-EU 
migration / labour mobility or even mobility ‘levels’.  
1.4 Conclusion  
According to the theories of migration, the reasons behind the movement of 
individuals are based on manifold determinants and there are a variety of theories 
that have attempted to explain this complex phenomenon. The mass migrations from 
east to west Europe as a result of the enlargement have been explained based on 
macro economic factors and on the premises of the neoclassical theory of migration. 
According to the latter, wage differentials are the explanatory variables for the 
movement of people and this is, undoubtedly, the most popular narrative in EU 
migration studies. However, the movement of EU citizens between converged 
regions has not been well researched. In the literature, this is considered as ‘low’ in 
volume, which could explain the lack of the theories regarding this type of 
migration. The current research is salient in this regard as it takes into account the 
level of convergence between certain countries when investigating the motivations 
underpinning migration. It involves, firstly, seeing the findings from the extant 
research can be corroborated via the use of qualitative data, given that most 
investigations have employed quantitative analysis. Further, through the use 
qualitative interviews, the aim is to test the importance of social determinants and 
whether or not and if so, to what extent they are applicable. To the best of this 
researcher’s knowledge, there is no literature that has focused on the social 
determinants of Polish labour migrants. Moreover, the migration theories are also 
tested on a German sample for this work. The extant studies pertaining to Europe 
have primarily focused on explaining mass migration in the context of wealth 
differentials. As a consequence, the theories are incapable of explicating why low 
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level migration occurs between countries with high levels of convergence and hence, 
one of the key aims of the current research is to address this gap.  
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Chapter 2 Placing the concept of ‘free movement of workers in the EU’ in 
context: Intra-EU migration and labour mobility in the EU 
2.1 The emergence of the concept of free movement of workers in the EU: The 
first blueprints  
Before commencing with the exposition of the subject matter, this section, firstly, 
provides an explanation regarding the historical concept of the free movement of 
workers in the EU and reasons behind the creation of the concept of free workers. 
The roots of the rationale of ‘free movement of workers’ are deeply entrenched in 
the very principal constitutional form of the EU and thus, present a highly 
fundamental, even quintessential component within the conceptualisation of the 
European Union framework. A profound exploration of its historical origins reveals 
how the concept of free movement of workers had a decision-making effect on the 
establishment of the European Union in its nascent years when the EU became an 
official institution. Nowadays, the idea of free movement is usually taken for granted 
as an essential element regarding what is understood as being an economic Union 
today, without questioning its benefits. The free circulation of people in integrated 
unions, however, was introduced initially for very specific reasons. 
In the history of the European Union, ‘free movement’ was officially proclaimed for 
the first time at the Hague Congress in 1948, 24  the first federal movement of 
European history. The congress brought together representatives from across a broad 
political spectrum25 and was assembled in order to discuss the establishment of a 
European political co-operation, with the principal motivation being to ensure 
diplomatic as well as economic stability in Western Europe after the Second World 
War. The outcomes of the congress lead to the formal establishment of the first 
supranational institution of the European Union, the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC). The Treaty of Paris was signed in 1951 between France, West 
Germany, Italy and the three Benelux countries Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, which formally established the ECSC and came into force the year 
after, in 1952. In order to ensure the economic ties, its main actors, France and 
                                                        
24 Alpert (1951) 
25 The Congress brought together 713 delegates from 13 countries 
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Germany, who were previously arch enemies during the war, now agreed to share 
the production of coal and steel. The most effective way to achieve this would be by 
pooling together their regional economies and by allowing workers in this industry to 
move freely between the member states. 26  Henceforth, the first version of ‘free 
movement of workers in the EU’ was born and one can, thus, argue that this legal 
conceptualisation of ‘free movement’ played a highly crucial role when establishing 
the EU.   
Back then, the host countries were very sensitive when it came to the selection 
process and acquisition of their workers. Special regulations were applied, e.g. the 
workers were not allowed to receive benefits or were expected to return once the 
work ‘was done’ (Mei, 2003).27 The recipient countries were well aware of potential 
high levels of influx of migrant workers from the economically weaker countries. 
Free movement, hence, was a carefully ‘controlled’ process in the initial phases of 
the EU and depended purely on the needs of the recipient countries.  
The contextual revision of free movement of workers with the signing of the Treaty 
of Rome in March 1957 added a new dimension to its conceptualisation. 28  It 
prescribed the implementation of a common market of goods, workers, services and 
capital 29  within the EEC's member states as well as a progressive reduction 
of customs duties and the establishment of a customs union, 30  which brought a 
significant change to the notion of ‘free movement’. The most significant underlying 
difference between the Treaty of Paris in 1952 and the Treaty of Rome in 1957 in 
                                                        
26 The Treaty of Paris prescribed that this only allowed for coal and mine workers to move freely. 
Others were excluded from this privilege. 
27 In fact, the immigration of labour was controlled fiercely by the EU member states and the labour 
force was acquisitioned only on the basis of needs and under strict regulations, i.e. foreign workers 
were invited merely to fill the job vacancies for which no national workers were available; they were 
not entitled to bring their family members and after the ‘job had been done’ the workers were 
supposed to return to their country of origin. They were not entitled to receive social benefits etc. 
(MEi, 2003) 
28 It was signed on 25 March 1957 by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West 
Germany. The word Economic was deleted from the treaty's name by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 
and it was repackaged as the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union with the coming into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. According to article one of the current Treaty of Maastricht, 
the European Union is the successor of the European Community. 
29 The SEM was ought to be completed by the end of 1992.  
30 More renewals that came with the Treaty of Rome, such as the creation of common transport and 
agriculture policies and a European social fund, can be read about at europe.eu. 
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relation to free movement was that with the introduction of the new treaty, the right 
to move freely was further expanded at the EU level (originally Article 48, now 
Article 45 TFEU). In other words, the right of free movement was no longer limited 
to coal and mine workers, for it was now granted to all nationals of the EU member 
states and to all categories of work.  
A major reason why community law advocates free circulation is grounded on an 
economic explanation, and is often referred to the Spaak report. The Spaak 
Report or Brussels Report on the General Common Market is the report drafted by 
the Spaak Committee in 1956. It concluded that a sector-by-sector integration of the 
European economies would be difficult and instead, a horizontal integration of the 
economy by the gradual elimination of trade barriers was considered as being more 
beneficial. The intended way to achieve this specific goal was by creating a customs 
union. The report was based on macroeconomic theories and demonstrated that 
integration of national markets could be best achieved if both products (goods, 
services) and production factors (labour, capital) could move freely across member 
states. Consequently, it was decided that Article 48, which prescribed the free 
movement of workers in the EU, had to be included in the EU Treaty so that free 
circulation of the production of factor ‘labour’, i.e. the free movement of workers, 
would be enabled. 
Another ‘active’ contributor to the establishment of the free passage of workers was 
Italy. It had a profound interest in introducing free movement for workers, seeing it 
as a means to solving its unemployment problem and thus, it pressurised the 
remaining EU member states to agree to a political compromise that included 
workers’ free movement  (e.g. Romero 1993, Mei 2003). In today’s EU, the high 
numbers of south-north labour migrants after the EU crisis as a result of high 
unemployment in Portugal and Spain are a repetition of this history. The only 
difference is that the borders for their workers are already open. Back then, the other 
member states were rather reluctant to the idea of free circulation of workers (let 
alone high mobility levels), for as Mei (2003) noted in his work: 
It does not seem very likely that the Member States which signed and ratified 
the EEC Treaty ever intended to translate the theoretical notion of a free 
factor mobility into practical reality. In fact, when they included Article 39 in 
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the Treaty, the six States did not seem to have had any theoretical notion in 
mind. Probably, Article 39 was not much more than the product of a political 
compromise, which implied that ‘the five’ would gradually soak up the 
Italian labour surplus during a transitional period of twelve years (p. 25). 
Mei (2003) confirmed that the member states “feared free labour mobility; and that a 
liberalization of labour market admission rules ran counter to the interests of most 
States” (Mei, 2003, p. 23). Patently, the majority of the member states held the view 
that labour mobility should continue to be determined by the needs of the national 
labour markets only (Mei, 2003). From a supranational perspective, this view rather 
counters the idea of the EU Institutions on free movement of workers today.  
Regarding the long-term perspective, the EU advocates free and unregulated 
movement for all workers within the borders of the EU, who are citizens of the 
union. What has changed, however, is the view on the numbers of people, 
particularly within the converged regions. The idea today of the EU Institutions is far 
from what they had in mind in relation to labour mobility at the beginning of the EU. 
Whereas at that time, facilitating workers movement so as to meet the needs of the 
labour markets’ was the main objective, which was a carefully and monitored 
approach, today, the EU Institutions aspire to complete free circulation and not just 
merely according to the needs of the labour markets. Moreover, the main agenda is 
based on the idea of ‘increasing’ mobility levels (in order to make the EU labour 
market more competitive), which can be said to be a relatively new concept in the 
European Union. Before the Single European Act of 1986, the aspiration for ‘higher’ 
mobility levels (due to economic reasons) was not really emphasised or highlighted. 
Despite the Spaak report advocating free movement for economic benefits, the 
economic benefits of labour mobility have never been assessed in terms of whether 
high or low levels of mobility are more desirable, i.e. whether there is an optimal 
level. Instead, the main idea was that free circulation would simply be beneficial, as 
opposed to no circulation at all.   
To summarise, the very first version of the concept of free movement, the free 
movement of workers, was regarded primarily as an economic activity and played a 
crucial role in enabling steel and coalmine workers to move freely. The economic 
benefits envisaged were that it would allow for a controlled level of movement for a 
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specific purpose and within a limited sector of workers, for the sake of increasing 
economic strength in the EU. This vision led to the creation of today’s EU’s 
forerunner, the ECSC and the free movement of this sector eventually led to it being 
extended to all other sectors. However, the nature of the concept of free movement 
of workers within the EU has changed gradually. Born out of the idea of economic 
reconstruction and political stabilisation through the free circulation of mine and coal 
workers, it was decided that free movement should be granted as a fundamental right 
for all workers within the borders of the EU and this was set out in the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957. However, increasing mobility levels or seeking high levels of 
mobility was not on the agenda at that time. It was only after the introduction of the 
SEM, when these issues gained more attention and ideas about mobility levels 
changed, as is shown next.   
2.2 The Single European Market: The revival of integration and liberalisation 
of the labour markets  
The focus now moves on to the practical side of migration and mobility and their 
implementation in the EU. With the introduction of the Single European Market, the 
concept of free movement of workers experienced a watershed. This section 
discusses free movement as part of the rejuvenation process of integration in the EU. 
It, in particular, underlines how, with the introduction of the SEM in the 1980s and 
the removal of internal barriers, labour mobility regained immense importance and it 
is explained why this is the case. ‘Free movement of workers’ was laid out in the 
Treaty of Rome of 1957 as one of the core pillars for the first time; however, this 
was never fully accomplished until 1993. As a result of the oil crisis shock in the 
beginning of the 1980s, the EU experienced an economic slowdown and was facing 
economic collapse. The economy started to stagnate and was marked by 
outstandingly high levels of unemployment. This period, when the “EC lacked a 
clear vision about its future” (Jovanovic, 2013, p. 23) soon became known as that of 
‘Eurosclerosis’, which referred to a halt in the European integration process. 
Evidently, the Treaty of Rome was not the ideal blueprint for the future of the EC 
anymore, especially as the effectiveness of the European Union was threatened with 
a loss of economic power to the US and Japan. The still excessive national non-tariff 
barriers, despite a tariff and quota-free market existing within the EC, were still 
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segmenting markets within the EC, thus jeopardising the ability of its manufacturing 
and services industries to profit fully from economies of scale. This was hindering 
their international competitiveness in relation to both the US and Japan, as well as 
newly industrialised countries outside the EC (Jovanovic, 2013). The only way of 
economic integration through tariffs and quotas on internal trade expired in 1968. 
The objective was to oust NTBs and create a genuine and homogenous frontier-free 
market, with the way to achieve this ideal being to free internal barriers within the 
EU area. This marks the main difference from the transition from the Treaty of 
Rome to the SEA/SEM. With the implementation of neoliberal policies and a freer 
market where capital, services, labour and people could move between the EU 
member states by removing physical, technical and fiscal barriers, the main intention 
was to increase the competitiveness of EC goods, services and factors in relation to 
the principal foreign rivals, though a change in internal rules, rather than subsidies. 
The EU was left with no choice other than introducing new strategies to revive the 
economy, which became even more evident with the oil crisis of the early 1970s. It 
was held that the pessimistic years should be brought to an end with the 
implementation of a Single European Market, which promised a liberalisation and 
unification of the factor markets (labour and capital) through mobility across the EU. 
From 1986, the year of the introduction of the Single European Act, until the 
establishment of a single market on 31 December 1992, is referred to in the literature 
as the era of‘ “rejuvenation or the revival of the integration process” and involved 
“the biggest boost in the integration process” (Jovanovic, p. 26, 2013) in the history 
of the EU. The programme was widely accepted throughout all segments of the EC 
and represented the end of the lethargy and eurosclerosis. With the framing of the 
SEM – Europe’s new forceful tool to ensure deeper integration – labour mobility 
regained significance and has remained salient up until today. The Single European 
Union came along with four freedoms that were expected to boost the economy and 
increase the competitive quality of the EU: the free movement of goods, services, 
capital and labour (the principle of free movement of workers was extended to 
everyone with the Maastricht Treaty). From now on, the freedom of workers was not 
merely an existing paragraph in the Treaty with no further implications (as in the 
Treaty of Rome), but it became one of the priorities on the political agenda of the EU 
and was actively promoted.  
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While the free movement of labour was intended to support both cultural and 
economic development between the new member states and the old ones, initially, 
limitations did exist for those interested in migrating within the EU for labour 
purposes. As an example, from 1990-1993, the EU migrant was expected to be in at 
least part-time employment in the settlement location, which then allowed a five year 
right of abode that was renewable (Fevre, 1998). In 1993, with the Treaty of 
Maastricht, this limitation was removed, thereby allowing for a truly free movement 
of labour within the EU member states. This also included the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) immigrants as they were no longer required to register for a 
visa. In 1997, the Schengen Agreement (1985), which allowed completely free 
movement, devoid of any passport checks, between 13 of the 15 EU member states, 
not Ireland or the UK, was adopted in the Amsterdam Treaty. This treaty made the 
Schengen Agreement a part of EU law that new EU members would have to adopt. 
More recently, in 2004, the Free Movement Directive, the core legislation on free 
movement of labour in the EU, was constructed. This allows for the free movement 
of labour, but if the ‘EU citizen’ in question does not have a job or means of 
financial support in the destination country, then he/she must return migrate after 
three months and if he/she intends to stay beyond three months, then he/she could be 
required to register with the host member state. Under this scheme, it is difficult to 
track intra-EU migrants and it is equally difficult for the destination country to have 
them removed after the three month period. 
2.3 Deepening integration 1:  SEM and increased mobility levels – From free 
movement to high mobility levels 
This section probes the stance of European Union Institutions on labour mobility, i.e. 
inquiring into the ‘type’ that the EU Commission wants. As it will become apparent, 
the key issue is less about whether labour mobility leads to more (social) cohesion 
and more the other way around, i.e. what leads to labour mobility in ‘converged’ and 
converging regions. Once the Single Market was implemented in 1992, the 
movement of workers regained focus and became an important matter on the policy 
agenda of the EU. It was not about ‘enabling’ or facilitating mobility anymore, for 
the Commission was interested in increasing mobility levels. Since then, with the 
deeper cohesion and integration through the liberalisation of the markets and the 
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reduction of barriers, the view that ‘higher’ mobility levels equates with a more 
competitive Union has come increasingly to the fore. In the last few years, a new 
strand of literature has emerged which intensely discusses ‘low’ mobility levels in 
the EU. Generally, the fundamental rationale behind the free movement of labour is 
that it would allow supplies of labour to move where a demand for labour exists as 
well as creating social cohesion amongst the EU member states (Fevre, 1998, 
European Commission 2002).    
To achieve higher mobility, in 2011, the EU Commission introduced the Single 
Market Act I (and adopted a second Act in 2012). The completion of the Single 
Market is a continuous exercise and constitutes a central element of the European 
growth agenda, thus requiring permanent attention and adaptations. In the 12 layers 
that identify the priorities for a strong highly competitive social market economy, 
point 2.2 is fully dedicated to the mobility of workers, stating the following: 
Mobility and workers' qualifications respond to the need to re-launch growth 
in Europe. Increased mobility of skilled labour will make the European 
economy become more competitive. Too many regulatory barriers still 
prevent Europeans from working wherever they wish in the European Union, 
whilst many highly skilled jobs remain unfilled. 
As pointed out above, not only does the EU want to facilitate or simply easy 
mobility for the sake of the EU citizen, for it is also seeking “higher” mobility levels 
in order to make the European economy become more competitive. According to the 
SMA (2011), “too many regulatory barriers still prevent Europeans from working 
wherever they wish”, which include language barriers, cultural barriers, lack of 
available information, legal and administrative obstacles, failure to recognise 
diplomas, heterogeneity of tax and social systems, accommodation barriers (tax 
treatment, affordability, eligibility for low-cost rental housing, etc.) and a lack of 
transport infrastructure (e.g. in Broyer et al., 2011; Janiak & Wasmer, 2008; 
Zimmermann, 2009). The common argument is that these factors prevent mobility.  
However, this stance could be too simplistic to explain intra-EU migration, 
especially when recognising that the decision-making process to migrate can be a 
complex process combining a multitude of factors, where the importance of such 
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barriers might be outweighed by other motivational factors. To argue simplistically 
that to be “mobile” is dependent on barriers, can mean that these are the only 
determinant of migration. So, if the barriers were removed, would mobility levels 
then increase? Barriers, thus need testing against the determinants of migration in 
order to find out their influence on the decision making process and hence, elicit 
whether or not they prevent movement. Moreover, how are the high mobility levels 
of the East-West migrants explicable if there are administrative and cultural barriers 
to accessing the labour markets?  
The Single Market Act I was soon followed by the Single Market Act II in 2012, 
which concentrated the 12 layers into four main points, with labour mobility being 
labelled as one ‘the drivers of growth’, thus being promoted as a key aim of the EU. 
This represented a new chapter in the process towards a deeper and better-integrated 
single market. As aforementioned, the completion of the single market is a 
continuous exercise, and this is why even after more than 20 years of the SEM, its 
quintessential components, the four freedoms are still important fostering growth 
and employment. Mobility of labour, or increased mobility is equated with being a 
catalyst for economic growth/promotion of competitiveness in the EU, which 
explains its importance.  
The Commission’s efforts to achieve higher circulation of workers are addressed in 
numerous other official EU technical reports, published by them, which underlines 
the seriousness of its efforts. For instance, in the proposal titled ‘REGULATION OF 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL a European network 
of Employment Services, workers' access to mobility services and the further 
integration of labour markets’, an official document that was forwarded to the 
Council as well as to the Parliament on the 17/01/2014, it states that “Mobility 
generates social and economic benefits. Increased intra-EU labour mobility will 
widen employment opportunities for workers and help employers fill job vacancies 
better and faster. This contributes to the development of a European labour market 
with a high level of employment (Article 9 TFEU).” According to the EU 
Commission, increased mobility levels are evidently regarded fundamentally as a 
good thing and the possible socioeconomic issues that could arise due to high 
mobility levels are not considered. The same document states “Intra-EU labour 
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mobility is relatively low when compared to the size of the labour market and the 
active population of the EU.” To provide further exemplification of its stance, a 
further document published on behalf of the EU Commission, under the title ‘Job 
creation, productivity, and more equality for sustained growth’, notes that the “EU 
suffers from low mobility levels”. The report states how there is evidence that the 
current levels “of mobility are below what could be expected from the EU as well as 
below the measured mobility intentions, especially as far as movements between 
euro-area Member States are concerned.” 31  In Mario Monti’s (2010) report, 
addressed to the President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso, ‘A 
new strategy for the single market’, low mobility levels are highlighted as one of the 
key market shortcomings. The matter was also raised in the European Parliament 
through Louis Grech's report ‘Delivering a single market to consumers and citizens’, 
subsequent to which an action plan was drawn up to “relaunch growth and 
strengthen confidence”.32 
If the EU Commission was speaking of the mobility of high skilled labour, then it is 
noteworthy to mention that mobility or lack of high skilled labour is currently and 
has been for the last few years a global issue, and hence, not a specific problem 
limited to European territory. The idea of increased mobility levels is also generally 
supported in the academic literature. In one research study, Zimmerman (2008) 
looked into the causes of labour immobility in Europe. The research team found that 
the single largest cause was a lack of language skills, with other major causes being 
rising female labour market participation and less mobile double-income households, 
an increase in the homeownership rate, still existing barriers to the transferability of 
social security entitlements, insufficient recognition of formal qualifications, 
insufficient transparency of the European job market and online search engines, 
persistent long-term unemployment leading to increased relevance of social 
networks for the individual, and cultural barriers. The study identified a low 
European annual interstate mobility (1%) in comparison with the United States (3%) 
and Canada (2%). The following policies to minimise labour market friction at the 
national and the trans-national levels were suggested: (i) strengthening the 
institutional preconditions of mobility on the labour market, (ii) developing mobility-
                                                        
31 European Commission (2013d) 
32 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209283%202011%20INIT 
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friendly educational policies, (iii) creating effective information and social networks, 
(iv) easing mobility barriers stemming from the diversity of national social 
protection and qualification systems, and (v) extending the knowledge base as well 
as evaluating mobility-related policies. Zimmerman, among others appears to 
assume that mobility is a good thing and hence, does not consider the possible 
disadvantages of high levels. It is arguable whether the comparison of mobility 
levels to those of the USA or Canada is relevant, as the institutional structures are 
entirely different to those of the EU (whether political, economic, or possibly even 
social), especially with regards to factors such as language or a common currency.  
In order to address the problem of low mobility levels “induced by the barriers” 
(European Commission, 2010), the Commission has undertaken various practical 
steps.  
In 2011, it announced the formation of a ‘High Skilled Task Force’, which was 
installed to mandate and identify the main drivers and characteristics of the ‘new 
labour markets’, particularly focusing on skills and mobility (European Commission, 
2011b). Then, in the Commission’s plan for Skills and Mobility’ (European 
Commission, 2002) from earlier, which built on the recommendations of the task 
force, information on qualifications and mobility was given a key role. Moreover, 
the introduction of the European Job Mobility Action Plan (adopted in 2007) and the 
announcement of the European Year of mobility, in 2006, followed. Both initiatives 
were launched to back up the strategies of worker mobility as part of the strategic 
priorities of the Lisbon Agenda in 2000, which failed to meet its target, namely to 
increase labour mobility.        
On the practical level, the Commission made arrangements, such as the recognition 
of diplomas and professional qualifications at the European level, which should 
facilitate the comparison between national education systems whose structures differ 
considerably from one country to another. In principle, the goal was to extend the 
principle of automatic recognition of qualifications that would, in turn, facilitate or 
even stimulate the movement of workers, e.g. thanks to the establishment of a 
European Qualifications Framework,33 the Europass,34 or the creation of a common 
                                                        
33 Which allows for comparison of the qualifications issued by the various European education and 
training systems; applying to higher education and vocational training 
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structure for university training (bachelors/ masters, PhD) as part of the Bologna 
Process, or even the setting up of a European employment agency. Regarding the 
lattermost, the setting up of EURES (European Job Mobility Portal) 10 was 
celebrated as ‘a major step forward’ (European Commission 2010) as it placed 
national employment services in a network, thus partially overcoming the obstacles 
due to workers' lack of information. 
The efficacy of the lowering of the barriers, however, is highly questionable. That is, 
despite the various initiatives at the different levels, the removal of the barriers has 
not led to any significant increase in mobility levels in Europe. Considering the 
statistics, without question, it can be said that all of the policy strategies have clearly 
been a failure: geographic mobility within the European Union has not increased 
(e.g. Zimmermann, 2011) at all or only minimally in recent years (EU Commission, 
2014), if the mobility caused by divergence (unemployment; Portugal or wage 
differentials; Poland) is excluded. Although it is said that mobility in Europe is 
difficult to measure due to incomplete and contradictory data or shortage of 
transnational surveys, Bonin et al. (2008) provided some data in their study on 
European mobility. According to these authors, cross-border mobility in the EU-15 
with regards to the population of the receiving country is 0.1% annually, whereas 
internally it is 1%. Broyer (2011) contended that only 2.3% of European citizens 
currently live in another EU member state (Broyer et al., 2011, p. 7). This low 
mobility at the aggregated level is ironic, because the great majority of European 
citizens consider that the free movement of people is the main achievement of 
European integration (Broyer et al., 2011, p. 7). Moreover, further weakening the 
barriers argument even more, the long-term predictions are that mobility levels in 
Europe will not increase, despite their removal (Janiak & Wasmer, 2008; Johns, 
2009). 
The EU recognised in a report that cyclical unemployment as well as GDP 
differentials lead to increased mobility rates (EU Commission, 2015). What follows 
from is that it has taken the view that people move due to unemployment and GDP 
differences. No significant increase of mobility levels is linked to removal of barriers 
in the reports of the EU, although it has been mentioned that mobility levels could 
                                                                                                                                                            
34 The single European framework for the recognition of qualifications and skills, established in 2004 
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have slightly increased in the last few years due to “social cohesion across the labour 
markets” (EU Commission, 2014). However, there is no evidence provided as to 
how the increased mobility levels have contributed to the cohesion of the labour 
markets or the other way around. It is worthwhile adding that in a speech by A. 
Laszio on divergence in the European Union at a Lecture at Helsinki University in 
2014, the European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, he 
stated that divergence has increased in the EU and possibly the rise in mobility levels 
can be attributed as the cause. What is clear is that the determinants of high levels of 
EU movers are based on divergence in wage or unemployment gaps rather than 
convergence. That is, deeper integration across labour markets has not, so far, 
resulted in substantial increases in migration.   
Clearly, the aim of the Commission is to seek ‘higher’ or ‘increased’ mobility levels. 
While after the inauguration of the SEM, policy was introduced with aim of 
removing barriers to the functioning of a fully integrated market economy in Europe 
and improving the matching of labour supply with demand, more recently, the 
debates about intra-EU migration have shifted to the issue of ‘higher’ mobility 
levels. In the next section, mobility is considered from the perspective of the EU 
Institutions. The stance in regard to increasing mobility levels has reached a 
consensus and is well supported by a range of sources, including much of the 
academic literature. However, several decades after establishing the idea and 
legislation for a Single European Labour Market, academic experts and policy 
makers agree that this goal is far from being accomplished. In addition, in order to 
deliver a barrier-free zone, it is crucial to understand “why” mobility levels are not 
increasing, how the decision-making processes in relation to moving are influenced 
and what the real motivations to do so are.  
2.4 Why free movement? The rationale behind the migration of workers 
One of the primary reasons and most prominent voices within the EU, why the (free) 
circulation of the workers should be promoted, is linked to idea of economic benefits 
that comes with it. In order to understand the use of labour mobility, it is helpful to 
acknowledge that in economics, human capital is known to be one of the ‘optimal 
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resources’35, as Simon Julian (1981) contended in his this book. This explains why 
China’s strong role as a magnet in the global market for human capital will soon 
challenge the position of the United States, leaving it up to Europe to strengthen its 
strategy in accessing the ‘ultimate resource’ so as not to fall behind in the race of 
nations (Migration Policy Practice, 2014). In today’s globalising context, the 
mobility of workers is inevitable. Global factors, such as climate change, natural 
disasters and the rise of the BIC countries (Brazil, India and China), pose additional 
challenges to the labour markets. Moreover, the rise in resources available to the 
developing world and the strong increase in human capital is inherently generating 
more opportunities for global mobility.  
In the European Union, made up of integrated markets, labour mobility, like trade, is 
considered as ‘welfare-enhancing’, although there could be significant distributional 
effects. With the creation of a free single market, where barriers are removed and 
trade and capital of goods, as well as labour can circulate freely, the allocation of 
lattermost between countries can subsequently become more efficient. The 
improvement of the circulation of the factor labour through the elimination of 
barriers creates a balance between labour surpluses and shortages and leads to 
increased economic output, thus fostering growth. (Zimmermann 2005). The 
President of the Commission, Juncker, has also acknowledged the fact that free 
movement is a key pillar in the Union, and needs to be promoted in order to address 
labour shortages and skill mismatches. A summary on how labour, like trade, is 
welfare enhancing, has been provided by Ozden (2015). 
Nevertheless, economic theorists do not have a consensus regarding whether factor 
mobility (in this context, the free movement of labour and capital) is a complement 
to or a substitute for free trade (the free movement of goods and services). Portes 
(2005) contended that “as in a standard Heckscher–Ohlin model, they are pure 
substitutes”. Either free trade or factor mobility will increase the efficiency of 
resource allocation and will maximise overall welfare; it is not necessary to have 
                                                        
35 In his legendary 1981 book, the U.S. population economist Julian Simon claimed that humans and 
human capital are – in his words – “the ultimate resource” . He was also a strong proponent of open 
and free labour markets. While Simon died much too young in 1998, his vision is still very much 
alive. Indeed, in this age of information and knowledge capitalism, human capital has become the key 
driver of economic growth. And - here is the important point to remember - it can be optimised 
globally through migration if and when it is well-conceptualised and not badly managed. 
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both, he argued, which supports the view that mobility is not required for enhanced 
welfare. He contended that capital mobility might, in some circumstances, be a 
substitute for labour mobility. However, in more recent, and arguably more realistic, 
trade models, the picture is much less clear (see Venables, 1999, for a review). 
Portes (2015) opined that so long as there are frictions, or increasing returns to scale, 
for example, free trade and factor mobility (of labour, capital or both) will have 
different impacts (normally both will increase welfare, although this is not 
necessarily the case, as it depends on the nature of the frictions). Also of note, is the 
fact that while the economic case may be strong in principle, other free trade areas 
(for example the North American Free Trade Area) or even customs unions do not 
typically involve the free movement of people. So, as Portes boldly argued, from a 
purely economic perspective, free movement was not a necessary part of the 
European project; it would have been possible to have a customs union and an 
integrated economic space without it. Hence, the decision to make it one of the 
founding principles was a political as well as an economic choice. That is, labour 
mobility was seen as complementary not just to the economic aspects of European 
integration, but also, to its wider political objectives, but the desirables levels were 
never specified. Nevertheless, the EU endorses labour mobility, as is demonstrated 
more clearly in what follows.  
According to labour economics, labour mobility affects workers on two levels: the 
aggregate level and the personal level. Regarding the latter, increased labour 
mobility gives workers an opportunity to improve their financial situation. If they are 
permitted to train for new jobs, move location or seek higher wages, then they are 
more likely to be happy working, which can have a positive impact on productivity. 
Workers who do not feel indefinitely relegated to low wages or jobs with few 
benefits will consistently seek better positions, which also makes it easier for new 
industries to attract the most qualified applicants by offering better perks. As in the 
micro level theories of migration, potential labour migrants weigh up the benefits 
and disadvantages when migrating for a job. In these circumstances, the motivations 
predominantly depend on personal situation, i.e. financial status, personal desire, 
preference etc. These are generally linked to the strength of the economy in which 
they live.  
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In order to raise awareness among EU citizens and to boost mobility levels, the EU 
Commission has implemented various programmes or so called ‘action plans’, as 
outlined in the section above, these, consequently, should have led to higher mobility 
levels. However, the outcomes were such that there were no increased levels at all 
(Zimmermann, 2012). As Baumer (2009) notes, although labour mobility is 
considered as a key component of European integration and is a valued and tangible 
right for EU citizens, the challenge for the EU is that this general enhanced welfare 
is difficult for individual EU citizens to perceive (Baumer, 2009). Portes (2015) 
supported the view that economic values need to be proved and presented 
convincingly to EU citizens in order to dispel the misinformation and myths 
surrounding them. That is, the advantages of mobility to the individual have not been 
clearly explained by the EU’s institutions, with the discourse, instead, being focused 
on the aggregated economic benefits.   
A further major reason why labour mobility and mobility levels are regarded as 
highly important within the framework of the integration process grounded in the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Labour mobility received attention in the 
early debate on the EMU. It was stressed that the reduced room for absorbing 
asymmetric shocks (economic shocks that affect some countries only) via 
macroeconomic policy tools in a monetary union required a sufficient degree of 
labour mobility as an alternative adjustment channel. Against this background, 
labour mobility would help in easing adjustment: it would permit a more moderate 
reaction of activity rates and part of the divergence in unemployment rates would be 
absorbed by mobility rather than real wages. 
Within monetary unions36, labour mobility is attributed a special function. The EMU, 
introduced in 1990s, represented a further tool of (economic) integration. In a 
successful monetary union, where according to Mundell’s (1961) standard theory of 
optimal currency areas (OCA), three market mechanisms operate to mitigate external 
                                                        
36 The EU Monetary Union that came into force in 1999. In March 1999, after years of controversy 
and often difficult economic adjustment, 12 of the 15 EU member countries took one of the most far-
reaching steps in the history of integration theory: the adoption of the euro with a fixed exchange rate 
- a state of total irreversible convertibility of currencies together with an irrevocable fixity of 
exchange rates with zero margins of fluctuations (Eijffinger & Haan, 2000).  
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shock: labour mobility37, the mobility of capital, and lastly, wage price flexibility. 
The costs of giving up the exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism (as a 
consequence of entering into an economic union) would be reduced if other 
adjustment mechanisms, in particular labour mobility, were able to operate 
(Mundell, 1961). Under this lens, the following is proposed: normally, under flexible 
exchange rates regimes, economic imbalances or ‘disturbances’ (Eichengreen, 1997) 
are reduced through the appreciation and depreciation of currency. However, as the 
EMU is a currency area without regional monetary and exchange rate policies, this 
mechanism is no longer available and other market adjustment mechanisms are 
needed instead. Considering that prices and wages are inflexible, the OCA theory 
states that labour mobility has to facilitate adjustments. Accordingly, migration plays 
an important role in increasing the efficiency of the labour market. In sum, through 
this optic, during asymmetric shocks, labour mobility would function as an 
adjustment mechanism, which makes it important for an EU that has adopted the 
EMU. Having discussed the theory, next, to what extent its functionality is justified 
in practical terms is scrutinised.  
In practice, as aforementioned, labour mobility has never increased, or at least 
considered to have sufficiently increased in order to function as an adjustment 
mechanism for correcting the imbalance created through asymmetric shocks (see 
European Commission 2014a for an expanded debate). Several researchers have 
studied the efficiency of labour mobility in an OCA and have concluded that the 
EMU is far from being one, as mobility levels have failed to increase. In Puhani’s 
study (1999), the first important one that focused on the euro area countries, the 
elasticity of migration was estimated with respect to unemployment rate and income 
changes on panel data sets for three countries: Germany, France and Italy. He found 
that labour mobility only had a small chance of becoming a sufficient adjustment 
mechanism in the event of asymmetric shocks. Another important feature of the role 
of labour mobility as an adjustment mechanism was offered by a study carried out by 
the National Bank of Netherlands (Cavelaars and Hessel, 2007). This addressed the 
question as to whether regional migration is an adjustment mechanism or a source of 
                                                        
37 To achieve optimality in a currency area, labour mobility has been advanced as a fundamental 
criterion (Buiter, 1998; De Grauwe, 1993, 2003). İnterestingly, as early as 1957, James Meade had 
argued in relation to adjustment mechanism of labour mobility that low labour mobility in Europe 
meant that exchange rates should remain flexible within that area (Meade, 1957)            
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disturbance. The results were even more controversial: the importance of migration 
as an adjustment mechanism was questioned; with the conclusion being drawn that 
migration in Europe is more an imbalance mechanism than an adjustment one. 
Another interesting conclusion is that the establishment of the internal European 
market and the euro’s introduction did not have a significant positive impact on 
labour mobility as an adjustment mechanism in the European Union. That is, the 
contribution of labour mobility between regions to economic adjustment in Europe 
has been almost negligible. Beetsma and Debrun (2004) added that whilst “Mundell 
argues labour mobility is an important criterion in judging whether a group of 
countries constitute an OCA” (p. 105) Obstfeld and Peri (1998) went further, arguing 
that a high degree of geographical mobility in the labour market is not cost-less, and 
can even be undesirable. The cost and benefit balance can be negative both for the 
regions of net emigration and for those of net immigration as well as for the workers 
involved. Bini Smaghi (1993) stressed that even if migration proved to be effective 
in absorbing shocks, this would not mean that it is an efficient adjustment 
mechanism, since it can be the source of interregional imbalances and welfare losses. 
Further doubts were put forward by Buiter et al. (1998), who questioned migration’s 
“usefulness as a substitute for a nominal exchange rate flexibility” (Buiter, 1998, p. 
192). Mongelli (2002) underlined that “while labour mobility could ease the 
adjustment to permanent shocks, EMU will not be able to significantly benefit from 
this attribute in the immediate future. In any case, labour mobility is no panacea 
either: it would be in any case low in the very short run, but possibly higher in the 
medium- and long-term, and it entails reallocation and/or migration plus retraining 
costs that could be quite significant” (Mongelli, 2002, p. 16). Further doubts on the 
usefulness of labour mobility as a substitute for a nominal exchange rate flexibility 
were put forward in studies by Buiter et al. (1998), L’Angevin (2007), Ricci (2008) 
and Beine et al. (2000). Di Genova (2004) and Ricci (2008) critically analysed the 
conditions for an optimal currency area and concluded that the EMU is far from 
being an OCA. In short, according to the critics in the literature, labour mobility has 
failed to function as a structural adjustment mechanism in the EU owing to the low 
levels of mobility, thus failing to deliver an OCA. 
By contrast, Pelkmans (1998) contended that is wrong to claim that labour mobility 
will not serve as a remedy due to it being notoriously low in Europe. He explained 
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that what counts for the effectiveness of exchange rates in a diversified economy, 
primarily, is “not labour mobility within countries but between sectors” (unlike 
Mundells simple example) as in case of price rigidities, sectors not hit by a specific 
shock will benefit (Pelkmans, 1998, p. 292). Bradley (2005) and Patterson (1998) 
shared the similar view, emphasising that especially job-related mobility will be 
more important for the working of the EMU in future than “geographic mobility” 
(Bradley, 2005, p. 332). Basically, some economic scientists indicate that there needs 
to be made a difference between labour mobility between sectors and labour mobility 
between regions, before evaluating the phenomenon as an adjustment mechanism in 
the EU. Notably, Patterson (1998) opined that less labour mobility in the Euro area 
does not mean an additional problem for EMU, because there was small 
interregional mobility in small-sized ‘monetary unions’ before its inception 
(Patterson, 1998, p. 20). In a recent report released by the EU, the Commission states 
that “Euro area membership does not seem to increase mobility per se, but it is 
estimated to make mobility more sensitive to unemployment differentials” (EU 
Commission, 2014). Another recent report by the EU suggests that “although the 
magnitude of mobility flows in the EU remains below what could be expected in a 
fully integrated monetary union, the responsiveness of labour mobility to asymmetric 
demand shocks has increased over time” (EU Commission, 2015). 
The low levels of mobility are not the only issue. There also exist inconsistencies 
regarding the causal relation between common currency and labour mobility. 
Whereas Meade (1974) argued that the foundation for a common currency does not 
exist, due to lack of labour mobility, and that a flexible exchange rate system would 
be more effective in promoting internal stability, Scitovsky (1976) took the opposite 
stance, favouring a common currency, as according to his belief, it would induce a 
greater degree of mobile labour when further steps were added. Both cases imply, in 
the first place, that an essential ingredient of a common currency area is a high 
degree of factor mobility. However, whereas Meade opined that the necessary factor 
mobility does not exist, Scitovsky argued that labour mobility must be improved and 
that the creation of a common currency would itself stimulate mobility. 
Consequently, among theorists, the causal relation is unclear, that is, whether a 
currency union will lead to higher mobility levels or whether high mobility levels are 
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required in first place in a common currency union. Thus, according to the literature, 
the role of labour mobility as a functional adjustment mechanism is fiercely debated.  
Moreover, Tavlas (1994) claimed that “countries with similar characteristics that 
respond in similar ways to external shocks will require less exchange rate adjustment 
between them”, which puts even more doubt on the usefulness of labour mobility in 
an OCA and thus, in a converged region. The Commission noted mobility levels 
responded more when compared to the earlier shocks in the last crisis (EU 
Commission, 2015). However, they also noted that wages had a starker effect as an 
adjustment mechanism: “The contribution of labour mobility to the overall 
fluctuations of unemployment remains low. When the analysis is extended to the 
response of wages, it turns out that real wages have become more responsive to 
labour market conditions” (EU Commission, p. 12, 2015).  
Portugal, as will be shown in the case study chapter, constitutes an EMU member 
states with high outward migration due to asymmetric shocks and divergence. 
Although most of its population primarily migrates to the UK, which is a zone 
outside of the EMU, still, it is interesting to find out how much labour migrants are 
affected by the impact of divergence.  
2.5 Different views on intra-EU mobility: Institutions and member states 
There is no consensus among the member states about mobility levels. Whilst the 
supranational institutions state that labour mobility leads to social cohesion (EU 
Commission 2002), the UK government has contended that too much inward 
migration leads to the opposite, i.e. to social divergence, thus creating tensions to the 
cohesion of society. For a few of the new member states, the right to free movement 
of labour did not come on the date of accession, but the barriers to trade and capital 
flows were lifted at this juncture (Guardia & Pichelmann, 2006). Historically, the 
stronger economies at the centre of the EU advocated controlled circulation of labour 
migrants, as has been shown in the previous sections. Today, some of the member 
states, especially those who have been receivers, still share the view that migration 
levels should be controlled. 
A report released recently published by the EU, positively promoted how “Mobility 
across the EU has been increasing over the past two decades, in particular following 
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the 2004 EU-enlargement” (EU Commission, 2015). Whereas the EU Commission 
evaluates the higher mobility levels resulting from the enlargement as a ‘positive’ 
sign, the UK, for instance, was not amused about the very high numbers of Polish 
labour migrants going there. Most of these migrants came to work in low skilled 
sectors, which was the key reason why they were considered undesirable. 
From the above discussion, it can be observed that even if free movement as a 
fundamental right is granted and despite the ambitious aims to meet the demands of a 
competitive Union at the leadership level, without the willingness and motivation of 
the individuals, the act of ‘moving’ will not take place. Consequently, the actors, in 
this case potential labour migrants, needs and preferences as well as their behaviours 
as homos economicus have to be considered as well. Migration in this case can be 
regarded as a personal choice and independent from economic implications other 
than for the individual migrant. The question then that arises is what can 
governments and EU institutions do to mobilize people to migrate, other than 
reducing barriers. As Bonin (2008) remarked, the social advantage of mobility or 
even its disadvantages in relation to the promotion of a EU identity, for instance, 
have been rarely discussed.  
2.6 Deepening integration 2: Integration through social cohesion and 
convergence 
The introductory chapter has portrayed how the European states, after WW2, were 
confronted with the arduous task of reconstructing their national economies; 
embarking on an entirely, but more than ever challenging course. As a collective of 
member states, which exhibit underlying differences concerning their historical and 
political background, the EU member states presented a composition of a mixture of 
differing strengths of the regional economies. The Central and Northern members 
generally were more powerful regarding their economic strenghts, whilst those to the 
South and East had less secure economies. The EU leaders were convinced that 
‘integration’ of the periphery with the core economies would be the best way to 
achieve a powerful, economically unified Union on a long-term basis, one of the 
core objectives of the founding members. In order to surmount the challenge of 
unifying economically different regions, the EU officials soon adopted the economic 
ideology of ‘integration/integrating the regions’. This approach is suggested by 
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growth models which promote the integration of economies for long-term for 
economic growth.  
The following subsections consider the concepts of cohesion and convergence as 
part of the integration agenda in the EU. Cohesion, in the context of European 
integration incorporates the belief that European economies can converge, that is, 
move toward similar levels of development and social well-being, by the principle of 
mutual solidarity. Moreover, it is grounded in the belief that collective action 
through a partnership between the EU and national/regional/local governments can 
play an important part in improving economic and social conditions.  
2.6.1 Convergence through cohesion in integrating economies 
The conceptual framework of convergence in integrating economies / and integration 
is most comprehensively discussed in Leonardi’s opus from 1995, in ‘Convergence, 
Cohesion and Integration in the EU’. In his book, Leonardi (1995) proposed a 
convergence model of European integration, whereby “integration can be seen as a 
multitier phenomenon affecting not only different levels of government (national, 
regional, and local) but also various sectors of society, such as economic, political 
and social systems” (Leonardi, p. 183, 1995). According to Leonardi (1995), whilst 
integration leads to the creation of supranational institutions, when it is combined 
with convergence it has a profound effect on the structure, decision-making 
processes and implementation procedures adopted by national and subnational 
governments for regulating economic and social behaviour. Regarding his 
conceptual framework, he explained that both convergence and integration take 
place, being achieved in three spheres/dimensions, namely, economically, politically 
and socially, through the act of cohesion. 38 In integrated economies, convergence 
provides one of the important precondition for integration.  
                                                        
38 Economically, the reduction of barriers to the circulation of information, goods, services, capital 
and persons within a single, unified market. This is will lead to an equalisation of factor prices in the 
various sectors. On a political sphere, transnational parties are created to take charge of candidate 
selection, political campaigns and coordination of legislative behaviour in European-wide elections, 
and intergovernmentalism is the standard form of decision-making in public administration and policy 
making. In social terms, the national societies operate as one cultural market, share common social 
values, and operate their social institutions in a coordinated and parallel fashion. (Leonardi, p. 189) 
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The premise of the European Community was that its people shared fundamental 
interests, and therefore progress should be measured in terms of lifting the entire 
community in a fair and equitable manner. “Imbalances”, the EC report on cohesion 
writes, ‘’do not just imply a poorer quality of life for the most disadvantaged regions 
...(but also) an underutilisation of human potential and a failure to take advantage of 
economic opportunities which could benefit the Union as a whole” (EU 
Commission, 2002). The operational definition of ‘economic cohesion’ was 
convergence of basic incomes, rates of employment and competitiveness. ‘’Social 
cohesion’’ could be measured in terms of universal systems of social protection and 
mutual support. This would mean a reduction in the incidence of poverty as well as 
improvements in productivity and the quality of life. As Taylor contended, the 
pursuit of cohesion represents a clear and strong commitment to the principle of 
solidarity or a “community of interests”, on the part of the more developed states in 
favour of the poorer and peripheral areas (Taylor, 1983, p. 167). 
2.6.2 Treaty-based origins and evolution of regional policy 
The application of convergence through cohesion is carried out under the regional 
policy in the EU and is also referred to in broader terms as cohesion policy as its 
overall goal is to strengthen what is known as ‘economic, social and territorial 
cohesion’ in regions qualifying for support. The European Union tackled the 
problem of reducing disparities within the Community at the very early stages. The 
Treaty of Rome had very explicit goals in regard to “laying the foundation of an ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe”: such as ensuring ‘the economic and 
social progress of their countries by common action to eliminate the barriers that 
divide Europe’, ‘to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their 
harmonious development’.39 
Two instruments that would define Europe’s initial approach to the problem of 
reducing disparities within the Community were referred to in the Treaty of Rome. 
Firstly, the European Social Fund (ESF), set up in 1958, was designed to invest in 
economic and social restructuring across the EU with the aim of reducing gaps in 
                                                        
39  Preambles to the Treaties Establishing the European Communities, in The European Union: 
Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, ed. Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-
G. Stubb, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.  
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development between European regions. The ESF would provide money for 
vocational training and for facilitating movement by workers into other areas or jobs 
(spur labour migration and training). It would invest in people, with a focus on 
improving employment and education opportunities. It was also aimed at helping 
disadvantaged people at risk of poverty or social exclusion. Adjacently, the ERDF 
was created with the same objective in 1975, to reduce disparity.40 ERDF has the 
purpose of strengthening regional economic and social cohesion by investing in 
growth-enhancing sectors so as to improve competitiveness and create jobs. The 
ERDF also finances cross-border cooperation projects and was the first institution 
that focused on the problem of regional disparities.  
2.6.3 Neoliberal policies and the re-strengthening of cohesion policies 
In 1986, the legal basis for regional policy was established in the Single European 
Act (SEA) of 198641, which aimed to eliminate roughly 300 intra-Union barriers by 
1992, thus moving towards more integration, convergence and social cohesion. It 
included a new perspective involving a more precise set of goals under the title 
“Economic and Social Cohesion” (Article 130A-E). With the introduction of the 
(SEA), the goal of reducing disparities in relation to the three dimensions, namely, 
economically, politically and socially, was rejuvenated and gained even more 
importance. European countries took major steps toward economic integration, 
including the liberalisation of the capital and labour markets, harmonisation of tax 
policy, and the foundation of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
One of the major reasons for focusing on the reduction of the regional disparities was 
due to the entrance of new peripheral states into the EU. In 2004, the Union 
experienced the largest enlargement process in its history, by absorbing eight Central 
and Eastern European countries (CEEC) countries. Soon thereafter, Bulgaria and 
Romania joined the EU on 1 January 2007, raising the number of former Communist 
Bloc countries among EU members to ten. Following successful transformation of 
their political and legal systems and the transition from planned to market economies 
                                                        
40 Article 130c discusses the role of the European Regional Development Fund in helping to ‘redress 
the principal regional imbalances in the Community through participating in the development and 
structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind’ 
41 The effort to reduce disparities had grown so great that the EU officials proudly compared it in 
scope and magnitude with the Marshall Plan, but being seen on a permanent rather than an emergency 
basis, as was the case with the latter initiative (source). 
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during the early 1990s, these countries were faced with the task of catching up with 
the economies of Western Europe (see e.g. Sachs, 1996). Economic convergence 
constitutes an essential ingredient for common structural and monetary policies, and 
there are good reasons to expect increased per capita real income convergence along 
the road to EU accession (Borsi & Metiu, 2013). This enlargement coincided with 
the leader of then President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, 
addressing the necessary task of creating convergence and social cohesion, arguing 
that additional funds should address the challenge of regional disparities. To make 
the Structural Funds spending more effective, the SEA initially introduced three 
objectives, which were later modified to 11 thematic objectives supporting growth 
for the periods 2014-2020. Currently, 81.5% (€283.3bn) of the EU budget is devoted 
to fulfilling this objective.  
Moreover, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty set an agenda for nominal and real 
convergence prior to entering the EMU, and the European Commission put forward 
numerous policy initiatives aimed at the reduction of regional economic disparities 
and improving competitiveness among EU members (Borsi & Metiu, 2013). The 
Delors II budget proposal, agreed in December 1992 at the Edinburgh Summit, 
carried with it a strong commitment to increase spending in the less developed 
member states by doubling the Structural Funds (Regional Fund, Social Fund and 
Agricultural Guidance Fund) and creating a new Cohesion Fund to operate over the 
next six years. The Maastricht Treaty created two more cohesion instruments: the 
Cohesion Fund for the four poorest countries – Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain 
– and the European Investment Fund for poor regions. The Cohesion Fund would 
also be used to help poor countries stabilise and converge their economies so that 
they might be able to qualify for economic and monetary union. The resources for 
funds now equalled a third of the budget. This clearly demonstrates the serious intent 
to reach convergence among all EU member states. 42 Today, it is laid out in the 
Treaty of Lisbon that “The Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the 
levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least 
favoured regions…” (Treaty of Lisbon, 2009).   
                                                        
42 The aim of the Cohesion Fund was to invest in green growth and sustainable development as well 
as improving connectivity in member states with a GDP below 90% of the EU-27 average. 
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2.6.4 What is convergence? 
Leonardi (1995), the pioneer of the convergence theory, defined convergence “as the 
end-product of socioeconomic policies designed to reduce socioeconomic disparities 
that exist among the regions and nations within Europe” (p. 34). The author 
continued, “the initially weaker economies benefit from appropriate economic 
policies designed to spur development, and if economies of the peripheral states and 
regions grow at rates faster than those in the core areas”, this leads to convergence 
between regional and national economies, via the application of cohesion policy, as 
outlined the previous subsection. Furthermore, he added that “as a corollary, the 
prospect of convergence is enhanced if former core countries undergo economic 
decline as part of industrial restructuring or even deliberalisation.” 
From a traditional or classical approach, one can say that the convergence hypothesis 
is based on the Solow-Swan exogenous growth model, a neoclassical growth model, 
which has dominated the literature since the 1950s. The model predicts that the gap 
between rich and poor countries will narrow, a process also simply known as catch-
up growth. In the European context, this is supported through the Structural Funds 
and the Cohesion Fund. Furthermore, it is distinguished according to two concepts or 
versions: beta and sigma convergence. Beta convergence refers to a process in which 
poor regions grow faster than rich ones and therefore catch up with them. The 
concept is directly related to neo-classical growth theory (Solow, 1956), wherein one 
key assumption is that factors of production, in particular capital, are subject to 
diminishing returns. (This also implies that the growth rate of poor economies should 
be higher and their income and/or GDP per head levels should catch up with those of 
rich economies.) While beta convergence focuses on detecting possible catching-up 
processes, sigma convergence simply refers to a reduction of disparities among 
regions over time.  
2.6.5 Measuring convergence 
Leonardi (1995) distinguished between four types of convergence (p. 205): physical, 
economic, political along with social and cultural. Physical convergence pertains to 
the reduction/bridging of physical distances, e.g. via the introduction of the European 
YGV network or the Eurotunnel. It also refers to integrating ‘electronic’ distance, 
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whereby electronic communication systems are used to eliminate the gap between 
the core and periphery as well as between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas 
within nation states. Economic convergence refers to eliminating production and 
monetary differences. Production differences pertain to the aspects of productivity, 
GDP, manufacturing, trade, investment and so on. Monetary differences comprise 
interest rates, exchange rates, size of public deficit, and savings rate. The first type 
can be addressed by stimulating the process of convergence through total elimination 
of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. Whilst monetary differences are currently 
being addressed by the creation of the EMU based on a common currency, 
institutions for regulating the fiscal and monetary policies as well as common 
budgetary discipline have also been put in place. Political convergence refers to 
closer cooperation on such matters as defence, joint planning and supranational 
legislation. Social and cultural convergence pertains to social policy, social 
standards, educational policy etc., which are being addressed by such as the 
introduction of the ERASMUS programme.  
The majority of the studies that have measured convergence in the EU are based on 
measuring GDP levels. The operational definition of economic cohesion was 
convergence of basic incomes, rates of employment and competitiveness (Leonardi, 
1995). Social cohesion pertains to universal systems of social protection and mutual 
support. Monfort (1999) explained how “in spite of the fact that Cohesion Policy 
aims at more than purely economic convergence, the reduction of regional disparities 
in the level of development has mainly been measured as the convergence of 
regional levels of GDP per head relative to the EU average. This type of 
convergence has even become a major aspect in assessing the effectiveness of the 
European Cohesion Policy.’’ Hence, real convergence means reduction of 
differences in the standard of living, and is commonly approximated according to 
GDP per capita or labour productivity. 
2.6.6 Convergence in the EU 
This section provides a brief overview of the progress of convergence in the EU. 
One of the possible effects of integration, economic convergence among 
participating countries, has been a recurrent theme in studies of European economic 
integration. Regarding which, whether economic integration among countries or 
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regions within a country leads to economic convergence has been widely debated in 
the growth and development literature over the last two decades. Real income 
convergence among a group of countries (regions) is understood as being the 
approximation of the levels of some measures of economic welfare, such as real per 
capita income, among those countries (regions), in the long run (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1995).  
A comprehensive and incisive study of the effect of regional and cohesion policies 
was carried out by Leonardi (1995), who elicited positive results among member 
states regarding these. Using regression analyses, he tested various explanatory 
variables, including distance from the core countries, foreign investment, level of 
industrialisation, unemployment, and EC funding. He found that the best predictor of 
convergence is distance from the core countries, and the best explanatory variable is 
EC spending.  
There is a general agreement in the existence of a decrease in regional inequalities 
(i.e. convergence) from the fifties to the seventies and a relative stagnation 
afterwards (Molle and Broeckhout 1995; Suarez-Villa and Cuadrado-Roura 1993). 
Armstrong (1995) observed ß and s convergence in the period from 1950 to 1990, 
but at a higher rate in a first subperiod up to 1970. Neven and Gouyette (1994) 
showed the insignificance of the s convergence process since 1980, in spite of a 
slight decrease in disparities since 1984. This latter work also demonstrated that 
homogeneity is higher among the Northern regions of the EU than among the 
Southern ones. The decrease and even stagnation in the regional convergence 
process from the late 1970s has also been observed in other economies. Sala-i-
Martin (1996) identified this pattern for the USA, Japan and some of the European 
national economies. Andrés and Doménech (1995) observed a similar trend for the 
OECD economies, while Mas et al. (1995) concluded there was temporal instability 
of the convergence process and the exhaustion of such a process from the early 
1980s among the Spanish provinces.  
2.7 Conclusion  
The convergence of European regions, which is the basic principle of EU regional 
policy, and one of the main objectives of the EU integration process, has become 
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deeply entrenched under what is known as the EU Cohesion Policy. In the treaties, 
cohesion is defined and is to be achieved mainly through the promotion of growth-
enhancing conditions and the reduction of disparities between the levels of 
development of EU regions and member states. They are being promoted through 
economic and political integration. For, it is perceived that if the dynamics of the 
single market and monetary union improve integration levels then the prospects for 
the weaker regions in the Community will improve. It is understandable that the 
more peripheral regions and countries are more supportive of the European 
Community, the integration process, and the pursuit of active regional development 
policies at the European level. This is because they are considered to be the net 
gainers from market integration due to spread effects. The idea of convergence 
gained further importance and strength with the rejuvenation of the SEA and the 
reduction of the barriers to move. The liberalisation of the markets should lead to an 
ever more converged EU. The significance of convergence is undoubted, as the 
Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund comprise one of the largest items of 
the budget of the European Union. Conclusively, since the introduction of the SEM, 
the EU commission has visualised both, a successfully converged European Union, 
hand in hand with high mobility levels. Whether these two concepts constitute a 
perfect duo, is investigated in depth in the forthcoming chapters. Also, whether the 
focal case study countries, particularly Poland and Portugal, have converged or 
diverged since membership and how the migration levels relate to the convergence 







Chapter 3 Methodology 
3.1 Research approach 
This research relies mainly on the tenets of social science, whose simple but 
profound statement of task is that research ‘needs to analyze the collective behavior 
of human beings and how this is linked to social instruments and institutions. . . . no 
social action can be understood without an understanding of the broader context in 
which it takes place’ (Castles, 2012, p. 123). Migration in this research is regarded as 
a response not only to institutional changes within the EU framework, but also to the 
changing social lives of migrants, as their social lives determine the needs and the 
perceived needs of the individuals. This understanding of migration highlights the 
importance of embedding micro-level studies in an understanding of the macro-level 
structural factors ‘that shape human mobility in a specific historical situation’ 
(Castles, 2012, p. 123).  
One of the preliminary criterions for conducting academic research is that the 
research methods need to be suited to fit the specific purposes of framing as well 
answering the research questions (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). The present 
chapter gives a description of the methodology and states the rationale behind the 
selection of the methods and their application. This research has chosen to test 
several hypotheses via qualitative methods. For many years, quantitative methods 
were dominant, but now critical thinkers (such as Mills) agree that although ‘such 
approaches may advance the description of social phenomenon’, they ‘do very little 
to increase understanding of the processes which bring them about or indeed to find 
solutions to the pressing dilemmas of society’ (Castles, 2012, p. 123). The act of 
moving from one place to another, i.e. migrating, should not be regarded as an 
impersonalised act isolated from feelings or from motivations. In an effort to avoid 
this trap, this research regards qualitative methods as the most suitable ones, as they 
include the individual and personalized feelings and perceptions towards external 
changes as well as needs.  
In research methods it is generally assumed that quantitative studies are positivist by 
nature, whereas qualitative studies are interpretivist and thus are used as two separate 
approaches in research. Nevertheless, sometimes, hypotheses are still tested via the 
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use of qualitative methods, as is the case in this research. It would not have been 
wrong to follow the positivist approach and employ quantitative methods in order to 
explain the relationship between migration and the changes in standards of living, 
namely the convergence or divergence between the two variables, as this relationship 
is the essential basis of this research. However, the nature of the positivist approach 
presents some limitations, as positivists believe that ‘there is a single objective truth 
or “reality” that can be found’ (Castles, 2012, p. 10). Considering the fact that 
migration is, ultimately, a social act, this research believes that the positivists’ belief 
is not entirely true, and that relying on figures may not present the best answers to 
the question ‘What are the determinants behind the different sizes of migration 
streams?’. The results from the narratives in the interviews will reveal how more 
than one determinant can provide motivation, and how there is a relationship 
between the different types of variables, in this case, social and economic variables. 
In addition, the results help to explain how social facts, which are the ‘ways of 
thinking, acting and feeling’ (Durkheim & Catlin, 1985, p. 3), may in fact be more 
important than previously thought. These characteristics are hard to ‘measure’. 
Rather, the researcher aimed ‘to try to understand the “meaning” of social action and 
institutions for the people involved, leading to the idea of “interpretative sociology” 
(Castles, 2012, p. 123). Thus qualitative methods were employed for the analysis of 
the data.  
The apparent gulf between the positivism approach and interpretivism is said to 
reflect ‘the dual character of society’, leading to the central question, ‘How is it 
possible that subjective meanings become objective facticities?’(Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 17). After considering the advantages as well as limitations of 
both theories, this thesis selected qualitative data (instead of quantitative data) to 
‘test’ the hypotheses, thus providing a somewhat mixed use of both theories and 
consolidating the tenets into one framework. Generally, in hypothesis testing, the 
norm is to use quantitative methods. However, this research has employed a less 
traditional merger of the two methodologies in order to address the research 
question. Whereas quantitative research is generally said to be confirmatory, and 
therefore deductive in nature, qualitative research tends to be exploratory and 
inductive in nature (Yin, 2010). The inductive approach starts with many 
observations, but it is used to confirm very specific deductive hypotheses in this 
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research. The mixture of both has been used as well because migrants are social 
agents who react to changes; in other words, migrants display convergence levels 
and reactions to their social surroundings. Pure deductive method, in which logic is 
the authority, has therefore been dismissed as less appropriate for these targets of 
study.    
Semi-structured interviews, performed with participants representing each of the 
three case studies, and validation of the data via triangulation with secondary data 
were the methods selected as particularly appropriate to address the main research 
question and the hypotheses and sub-research questions for each of the three 
presented case studies.  
3.2 Local context 
London is one of the most vibrant and attractive cities in the European Union, with 
its post-industrial character and concentration of financial, legal, and business 
services; indeed, its characteristics have led to a high number of people living in the 
city and earning higher wages (Sassen, 1991). Being such a dynamic city, London 
boasts a labour market with a significant pull factor. Moreover, London can generate 
demands for labour so high that sometimes the demands cannot be met by natives, 
e.g. those in the low-skilled sector (May et al., 2005; Spence, 2005). London has 
currently the largest proportion of migrants in the EU, and recent estimates show that 
approximately 40% of all the migrants in the UK live in London; this makes up 
about a quarter of London’s population (26%) (MRN, 2011, p. 1). London is 
attractive to migrants for a variety of reasons (e.g. study, work, family, asylum), but 
certainly work is one of the most significant. The city’s expanded economy offers a 
variety of opportunities to enter the labour market for people with different skills, 
and is defined by Fielding (2007) as an ‘escalator region’ due to its nature as a socio-
occupational escalator. This particular characteristic or reputation certainly attracts 
lots of labour migrants. According to the figures of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
for 2009–2010, four out of every ten employed persons in London are migrants.  
A significant share of low-paid occupations in London is filled by migrants (Spence, 
2005). This established pattern is well visible among the participants in the first case 
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study group, i.e. the Polish labour migrants, who mostly had high educational 
qualifications but were employed in the tertiary sector.  
3.3 Research design 
In order to explore the motivations of labour migrant groups with different sizes of 
migration streams, the research selected three sample groups based on regional 
differentials. Whereas their similarity was based on the fact that they were all labour 
migrants, i.e. they had moved to the UK in order to work, their main characteristics 
differentiated them from each other. Their main characteristics included their arrival 
from different regions with different levels of convergence within the EU: Eastern 
Europe, Central Europe, and Southern/Mediterranean Europe. These regions are 
differentiated by the degrees of convergence and economic attainment migrants from 
them have achieved over the decades. Degrees of convergence and economic 
attainment in turn depend on the length of the membership in the EU (see later 
chapters on convergence for detailed analysis). In addition, each of the three 
countries is representative of one region: Poland (joined the EU in 2004) is 
representative of Eastern Europe; Germany, one of the founding members of the EU 
(joined in 1958), is representative of the Central European region; and Portugal 
(joined the EU in 1986) is representative of Southern/Mediterranean Europe. Each 
country is analysed in a case study. The following section portrays the suitability of 
each country in detail.  
3.4 Case selection criteria  
The selection of the countries, i.e. Poland, Germany, and Portugal, was based on a 
number of criteria, which classified them as suitable in respect to the research 
question.  
3.4.1 Poland 
3.4.1.1 Legal and historical background 
Poland, as part of the EU, provides a highly suitable foundation for the analysis of 
the two concepts – convergence and migration in the EU – under discussion for two 
reasons: its geographic and economic size and its rich migration history. Poland 
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constitutes the largest economy in Central Europe, and the sixth largest in the EU. 
Poland joined the EU in May 2004 as part of the largest enlargement in the history of 
the EU.43 Expectations of large numbers of labour migrants from the new accessing 
countries were not necessarily a secret. The only really surprising element was that 
they arrived in far greater numbers than expected, overwhelming all speculations and 
statistical forecasts. The gigantic migration corridor from EU8 countries to the UK, 
from Poland in particular, turned into ‘one of the most important social and 
economic phenomena, shaping the UK today’ (Pollard, Latorre, & Sriskandarajh, 
2008, p. 7). It still heavily influences the immigration debates today.  
The foreseeable mass migrations invoked a transition arrangement requiring visas or 
visa-like access. Some EU member countries even introduced a complete delay to 
access their labour markets to control the expected surge of labour migrants coming 
from the CEE countries. The arrangements were tailored according to the individual 
economic profiles. The majority of the EU-15 member states imposed a 2–4 year 
transition policy to protect their labour markets until the A8 member states had time 
to adjust their economies. Austria and Germany enforced stricter regulations towards 
potential mass migrations from the new EU member states and enforced the 
maximum transition time of 7 years. Others, on the contrary, allowed immediate 
access to the labour markets, as was the case for the UK, Ireland, and Sweden. In 
regard to intra-EU migration, some researchers argued that the distance between the 
sending and the receiving countries would influence social networks and potentially 
cause devaluation of qualifications, and hence may act as a deterrent to migration 
between places who are geographically farer from each other (e.g. Dobson, Latham 
& Salt, 2009; Fevre, 1998). This argument proved to be untrue. The UK was the 
largest recipient of Polish labour migrants. Obviously, particularly regarding the UK 
(which is one of the few islands on the European continent), the geographic distance 
as a potential hindrance to migration seemed to play no role at all during the east-
west migration. Possible explanations for the deviant predictions may be attributed to 
the past intra-EU migration history. In 2002, it was found that only 1.5% of EU 
                                                        
43 After a substantial negotiating period which started in 1989, then Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki expressed for the first time Poland’s interest in joining the EU in his speech in the 
European Parliament. Shortly after, Poland joined the EU together with 9 other states, known as the 
‘A10’ countries, namely Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Czech 
Republic, and Estonia. The EU henceforth opened a new chapter regarding the history of EU 
migration, and Poland has since held a special position in debates on intra-EU migration.  
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workers lived in different member states which, according to Recchi, Baldoni, 
Francavilla, and Mencarini (2006), was a statistic that had not changed in 30 years. 
When creating the transition arrangements, the UK government expected to receive 
inflows of between 5,000 and 13,000 A8 migrants (Dustmann, Casanova, Fertig, 
Preston, & Schmidt, 2003). In reality, estimates ranged from approximately 250,000 
migrants (Booth, Howarth, & Scarpetta, 2012) to one million migrants arriving to the 
UK from the A8 countries between 2004 and 2010 (UKBA, 2014). The UK, as a 
popular destination among EU migrants, thus provides a perfect base for the 
examination of Polish workers, and London in particular is known to be the home of 
a very large Polish community. Whether the UK would still have opened its borders 
immediately if the country had known that so many would arrive remains an 
unanswered question.  
3.4.1.2 Economic background  
Currently, the Polish economy constitutes the largest economy in Central Europe and 
the sixth largest in the EU (World Bank, 2015). Before the EU fell into recession in 
the late 2000s, the Polish economy was experiencing a yearly growth rate of over 
6.0% (Ram, 2007). Even after the global recession of 2009, Poland’s GDP continued 
to grow. At the high point of the crisis, in 2009, the GDP of the EU as a whole 
dropped by 4.5% while the Polish GDP increased by 1.6% (Faris, 2013). According 
to the Central Statistical Office of Poland, in 2010 the Polish economic growth rate 
was 3.9% despite the crisis, which was one of the best results in Europe. In 
November 2013, while the size of the EU's economy was still below the pre-crisis 
level, Poland's economy had increased by a cumulative 16% (Faris, 2013).  
The economic fluctuations did have an impact on Poland’s unemployment rate 
though, which reached around 11% in 2013 (Faris, 2013), which though still below 
the European average, was high. Just prior to its membership in 2004, in 2002 the 
unemployment rate in Poland peaked at 20%. It was only in 2008 that Poland’s rate 
dropped below the EU average (Faris, 2013).  
Although Poland has not been a member for very long, Poland has experienced a 
steep growth above the average of the EU. The convergence of Poland will be 
discussed in more detail in the evidence chapters (see chapter four), but it is visible 
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how the growth rates of the EU are above the average, hence Poland is experiencing 
‘convergence’.  
3.4.1.3 Migration of Poles to the UK: How many Poles came to the UK after 2004?  
The most notable sources, which captured the number of Polish who entered the UK 
include the Labour Force Survey (LFS), the International Passenger Survey (IPS), 
the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS), and the National Insurance Numbers 
(NINos) issued. Stock data generally measures only the first arrival (e.g. the WRS 
and NINos) or the number at any one time (e.g. the LFS or census). There is more 
data existent in the numbers and characteristics of migrants in the destination country 
(the UK) than the origin (Poland). The numbers are not definite. Linking different 
sources may help to make better estimates, but 100% accuracy is excluded.  
When surveying migration data, analysts distinguish between official emigration and 
temporary migration. ‘Official emigration’ constitutes the status of an individual 
who has cancelled his/her Polish domicile prior to the departure to be counted as an 
emigrant. Very few Polish comply with official emigration procedures. Thus, the 
numbers of ‘official’ emigrants are far from the real numbers. The latter, temporary 
migrants, are persons aged 15 or over whose duration of stay in a foreign country at 
the time of the survey was at least 3 months but did not exceed 1 year. Net migration 
presents the difference between immigration (i.e. people moving to the UK for more 
than one year) and emigration (i.e. people leaving the UK for more than 1 year). For 
instance, overall net migration increased from less than 100,000 in the mid-1990s to 
a preliminary estimate of 216,000 in 2011.44 In 2006, the Home Office stated that the 
Poles comprise almost 70% of all A8 migrants residing in the UK (Home Office, 
2006).  
The Labour Force Survey (LFS). The UK LFS provides data on the stock of the 
Polish population by nationality and is available after 2004 on an annual basis. The 
figures in Figure 3-1 below refer to nationality, not country of birth, and the data 
refer to England and Wales only. According to the LFS, which provides the number 
of people at one time prior to the EU accession, 24,000 Poles were in the UK. The 
2002 census provides similar figures, where 23,700 were temporary migrants in the 
                                                        
44 www.migrationobservatory.com , accessed 28. 07. 2015 
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UK (3.0% of the total). After Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004, there was a steep 
annual increase of migrants coming to the UK from Poland; the numbers doubled 
after the first year from 150,000 to 340,000. The number of Polish people living in 
the UK thus reached 690,000 in 2007. As visible by the table, 2007 was the peak. 
Afterwards, a smooth decline is visible regarding the numbers of Poles living in the 
UK. The decline stopped in 2010 at 580,000, and recovered after 2011. In 2012 it 
was at 637,000. Overall, the net increase in the stock of Britain-based temporary 
Polish migrants between May 1st, 2004 and December 31st, 2012 was between 
573,000 and 588,000. In general, after EU accession, in subsequent years, the UK 
came to occupy a much more dominant role as a destination, so by December 2012 
an estimated 637,000 had stayed in the UK for more than 3 months.  
 
Graph 3-1 Estimated stock of temporary migrants from Poland in 2002–2012 by major country 
of destination (UK) 
Source: Adapted from the data in LFS (2015) 
The Workers Registration Scheme (WRS). The two most used statistical sources 
for measuring the inflow of Poles are the WRS and the issued NINos. The WRS was 
set up on behalf of the UK government with the aim of gathering statistics on the 
inflow of A8 migrants. It was also set up in order to understand the type of work the 
migrants were doing or the location within the UK of the major inflows (UKBA, 
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arrangement. Nevertheless, migrants were expected to register. Incentives were 
introduced to encourage the incoming migrants to sign up, e.g. those who registered 
could claim benefits if working. It is noteworthy to mention that claiming benefits, 
such as job seekers allowance, could occur only after the migrant had worked in the 
UK for 12 consecutive months, with no more than a 30-day break (Gillingham, 
2010). The limitations of the WRS are manifold, and it misses several important 
points. For instance, there were high registration fees for migrants, so many migrants 
who were self-employed or students were not counted through  the WRS. 
Additionally, the statistics did not take into account return migration. Furthermore, 
the statistics were cumulative, rendering the accurate counting of migrants  who re-
enter and reapply problematic and preventing the regional count from reflecting the 
actual number of migrants in the area   due to intra-UK migration. Particularly, the 
inflated numbers as a result of the cumulative count of A8 migrants may pose a 
question to the validity of the statistics provided by the WRS. The registration 
scheme ended in April 2011.  
By the end of 2005, the WRS had registered 185,490 Poles. Over the next 3 years, a 
further 401,268 registered. By the time of its demise in April 2011, the WRS had 
registered 1.134 million A8 citizens, of whom 705,890 (62.2%) were Poles. As 
explained, WRS registrations undercounted the actual numbers coming to work, as 
those who were self-employed were not required to register. Others simply chose not 
to register, with surveys variously suggesting that the proportion choosing not to 
register was as high as 36% (CRONEM, n.d.) and 42% (Pollard et al., 2008). The 
likelihood of registering varied by geographical location and sector. More likely to 
register were people living in smaller towns, older workers, and those intending to 
stay for longer periods (CRONEM, n.d.). Construction sector workers were less 
likely to register since the majority of them were self-employed (Drinkwater et al., 
2006).  
The National Insurance Numbers (NINos). NINos record all newly entering 
foreign workers who go on to pay national insurance contributions. NINos do 
include the self-employed. Any migrants coming into the UK who already have a 
NINo from an earlier period of work are excluded from the data. NINos also allow 
migrants to access the benefits system.  
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The number of NINos issued was already beginning to rise before accession, but 
afterwards the number escalated rapidly, reaching almost a quarter of a million in 
2007 (see Figure 3-2). By 2011, one million NINos had been issued to Poles. By 
2013, the figure had risen to 1.164 million. As the recession took hold, the number 
fell, but from 2009 it was relatively stable each year at around 80,000 until 2013, 
when it rose to 111,000. Although after adjustments there is a broad consensus about 
the number of Poles coming to work, Harris et al. (2010) showed that discrepancies 
between WRS and NINo statistics vary geographically, being particularly great in 
London (55% difference) where self-employment is more likely. The differences 
between the aggregated ‘flow’ data from the WRS and NINos and the ‘stock’ data 
from the census and LFS give some indication of the scale of temporary migrations 
and the reasons behind them. NINos recorded a shift in the ages of those registered. 
The proportion of those aged 25-34 declined after 2002 while that of the younger 
18–24 population increased. This concurs with the Polish data and is consistent with 
a pattern of young people, probably single and willing to accept shared 
accommodation, moving temporarily as they come to find work after their secondary 
or tertiary education is complete or to pursue further or higher education in the UK. 
 
Graph 3-2 Comparison of NINo, WRS, and LFS Polish migration data 
Source: Generated based on data from LFS 2014 
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fluctuations and variances. Figure 3-2 visualizes the flow of migrants from three 
different statistical datasets, namely the NINos, WRS, and LFS. According to each 
dataset, Polish labour migration surges until 2007 and then experiences a drop 
afterwards. The decline of inward migration of Poles into the UK coincides with the 
Euro crisis. In the following chapters the migration rates will be compared with the 
indicators of economic convergence in the EU, UK, and Poland, and it will be 
discussed how the migration levels related to these support the quantitative data via 
the use of the qualitative data which was gathered as part of this research.  
3.4.2 Germany  
3.4.2.1 Legal and historical background 
Germany is one of the six founding members of the EU and hence is one of the 
oldest member countries. Today, it presents the largest national economy in Europe, 
the fourth largest by nominal GDP in the world and the fifth largest by GDP (PPP) 
(Chandler, 1990). It is has the largest population in the EU. Germany has always 
been an advocator of EU integration and acted as a key figure and catalyst in the 
forming the Single European Act (SEA) in the 1970s. The country is also a founding 
member of the Eurozone. 
3.4.2.2 Economic background 
Germany is in the top ranks and among the strongest countries in terms of economic 
power in the EU, with GDP per capita levels relatively close to those of the UK. 
There are no significant differences in terms of GDP per capita levels when 
comparing the level of convergence between the UK and Germany. The two 
countries share similar levels of GDP per capita and both have GDP per capita levels 
above the EU average. Figure 3-3 presents the GDP per capita of Germany, the UK 
and the EU from 2003 to 2014. 
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Graph 3-3 GDP per capita of Germany, the UK, the EU  
Source: Generated based on data from World Bank 
 
Figure 3-3 indicates how Germany’s and the UK’s GDP per capita levels are 
relatively close to each other, meaning that they have converged successfully. In 
2003, the GDP per capita levels were almost equal, with around 30,360 US Dollars 
in Germany and around 32,580 US Dollars in the UK. To compare, Poland’s GDP 
per capita was at only around 6,640 US Dollars in 2004. Additionally, over a period 
of 10 years, the GDP per capita has increased quite smoothly in both of the high-
income countries. In 2014, both GDP per capita levels were highly similar and 
almost equal at around 46,000 US Dollars. Figure 3-3 also shows how both countries 
were affected by the Euro crisis after 2007. The UK experienced a steeper drop in 
terms of GDP per capita than did Germany. All in all, Figure 3-3 effectively 
represents how standards of living, as defined by GDP per capita, are close to each 
other in Germany and the UK, meaning that the two countries have converged, and 
how in both countries the standards of living are above the EU averages.  
3.4.2.3 Germany and migration 
Although Germany has become to be known as an ‘Auswanderungsland’, or an 
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from it), their emigration rates compared to Poland’s are still far behind. In 2004, 
approximately 697,632 Germans migrated in total worldwide. This number is equal 
to the number of Poles who just came to the UK as labour migrants once restrictions 
to move freely into the UK for Polish citizens were lifted. For the years from 2009 to 
2013, the migration rate was -142,000, meaning that 142,000 more Germans 
emigrated than immigrated (SVR, 2015).45 This circumstance, however, is regarded 
as regular among high-income countries (Ette & Sauer, 2010, p. 64). Throughout the 
last 10 years, Germany’s migration levels have been quite constant worldwide, 
between around 600,000 and 700,000 yearly until 2012. Only in 2014 did the levels 
reach a peak for the first time with over 900,000. The UK was in the top five 
destinations of Germans as an emigration country and the number one country 
destination within the EU. The UK Census 2001 recorded around 266,136 people 
living in the UK who had been born in Germany. This made up the fourth-largest 
foreign-group after the Irish, Indians, and Pakistanis (UK Census, 2001). The UK 
Census of 2011, held 10 years later, recorded 262,356 Germany-born residents in 
England. In addition, 11,208 Germans were resident in Wales, 22,274 in Scotland, 
and 3,908 in Northern Ireland. As a result, over the 10 years, the figures have hardly 
changed.  
3.4.3 Portugal 
3.4.3.1 Legal and historical background 
Portugal became a member of the EU in 1986, together with Spain. Through their 
membership and the largely increased trade ties, as well as inflow of funds allocated 
by the European Union, both of the countries were able to enjoy a stable economic 
growth and development.  
Portugal experienced a recession in 1993, but after the recession the economy grew 
at an average annual rate of 3.3%, well above EU averages. Portugal qualified to join 
the EMU, but had to agree to cut its fiscal deficit and undertake structural reforms. 
The EMU brought to Portugal exchange rate stability, falling inflation, and falling 
interest rates. It continued to enjoy economic growth in 1999, with falling interest 
                                                        
45  Data on German emigration is more available and of better quality than data on German 
immigration (SVR, 2015).  
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rates as well as low unemployment. In the years of 2001–2002, the overall rate of 
growth slowed down. Portugal was severely affected by the financial crisis in the 
latter part of the fırst decade of 2000, causing a wide range of domestic problems.  
3.4.3.2 Economic background 
Portugal succeeded relatively well in raising its standard of living to that of the other 
EU member states. In terms of GDP per capita on a purchasing power parity, the 
basis rose from 51% of the EU average in 1985 to 78% in 2002 (World Bank, 2012). 
Figure 3-4 displays the progress of the GDP per capita in Portugal and in the EU 
over the years 1985 - 2014. When Portugal joined the EU, the GDP per capita levels 
were slightly less than that of the EU (about 9200 per capita in US Dollar) with at 
around 3 900 GDP per capita. In comparison to Poland, Portugal was doing better at 
the time of entry into the EU, as outlined above Poland had only about a fifth of the 
GDP per capita levels when it joined the EU. In the following years, a slight but 
constant rise at similar levels can be observed until the beginning of the 2000s. The 
figure shows how the GDP levels have always been below the EU average. 
Economic convergence in terms of GDP per capita is not necessarily visible, 
although Portugal has experienced convergence to some extent and is generally said 
to have caught up with its EU member states (see Chapter 2). Until the beginning of 
the 2000, no striking change can be observed regarding the convergence of Portugal 




Graph 3-4 GDP per capita in Portugal and the EU 
Source: Generated based on data from World Bank 
A striking change in the growth rates can be observed after 2003. The GDP per 
capita levels from 2003 onwards started to diverge. By 2005, the GDP per capita on 
a purchasing power parity dropped to 72% (World Bank, 2016). By 2006, GDP 
growth was at 1.3%, the lowest rate in all of Europe. Countries such as Malta or 
Slovenia overtook Portugal in terms of GDP per capita. A large gap started to 
emerge until it peaked in 2008 when the financial crisis started. In the same year, 
Portugal hit a GDP per capita of just 24,816 USD, compared to the 37,915 GDP per 
capita of the EU average. Divergence has not improved.  
 
In terms of unemployment, in 2001 the unemployment levels stood at 4.1% and were 
low compared to the EU average. In the following years, from 2002 to 2007, the 
unemployment rate increased by 65%, namely from 270,500 in 2002 to 448,600 
Portuguese citizens in 2007.46 Graph 3-5 below shows the unemployment levels for 
the years 2001–2015 based on Eurostat data. 
                                                        




































































































































Graph 3 – 5 Estimated unemployment rate in Portugal 2001- 2015  
Source: Generated based on data drawn from Eurostat, 2015 
The rise of unemployment is clearly visible. In last decade from 2001 until 2013, 
unemployment growth rates continuously rose. The peak was reached in 2013 at 
16.4%, but the rates especially grew after 2008. Graph 3 -6 depicts the inflows of 
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Graph 3 - 6 Inflows of Portuguese migrants into the UK in 2001 – 2013 
Source: Data retrieved from Factbook Portugal, 2014 
Inward migration into the UK increased after 2001. As mentioned above, 2001 
marked the year when unemployment levels began to grow in Portugal. The 
migration of the Portuguese continued to rise steadily, then stopped flowing into the 
UK in 2004. According to Eurostat (2016), at that point the flow of Portuguese 
labour migration shifted to other countries instead.47 Subsequently, inward migration 
into the UK regained strength, rising exponentially after 2001. The immense rise 
corresponds with the high rise in unemployment levels illustrated above. The 
previous section showed how Portugal diverged in terms of GDP per capita 
especially after 2011. The observations of the three indicators, GDP per capita, 
migration levels as well as unemployment rates lead to the understanding that 
migration levels increased in parallel with divergence. This relationship is validated 
in Chapter 6 through primary data. 
                                                        
47 www.ec.europe.eu/eurostat (accessed October, 2015)  
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3.4.4 Final explanation of case study selection 
In the first place, in the identification of countries for the case studies, the records of 
their economic development played a crucial role. At the point of their EU accession, 
both Portugal and Poland were far behind the EU average concerning their economic 
development (expressed by GDP per capita). Portugal, which entered the EU in 
1986, caught up in the economic adaptation process and thus experienced 
convergence ‘to some extent’, though within its own limits. Entering the EU only in 
2004, Poland is still exposed to the development and the adaptation process 
according to EU standards. Nonetheless, in just the first decade of membership, 
Poland’s economy has performed quite well, with growth rates well above the 
average; this is promising, as economic convergence between the member states in 
the EU is one of the fundamental aims of the EU integration process. Germany is one 
of the founding members of the EU and wealthier on average. The three countries 
from different converged regions provide a sound basis for a comparison regarding 
the differences in the attitudes of their citizen towards migration: namely in 
converged, partially converged, and non-converged/exposed-to-convergence regions 
in the EU.  
The three case study countries are in particular suitable for a comparison because 
their economic background allows for exploration of their tendency and intentions 
towards migration and for comparison among migrants from regions which have 
experienced economic advancement (e.g. Portugal) versus migrants from regions 
which have recently joined the EU and still are exposed to advancement (e.g. 
Poland). As Portugal has converged and the standard of living has improved in the 
last few decades, providing better well-being for citizens, Portugal presented a sound 
basis to find out about the motivations of the migrants, especially because their 
country has been affected by financial downturn in the last few years. The case study 
on the Portuguese migrants was analysed under the impact of the financial crisis, 
which opened a new migration corridor with thousands of migrants moving from the 
southern EU member states towards the northern EU states, including Portugal. By 
scrutinizing the determinants of migration, the aim was to find out how the 
Portuguese citizens responded to the crisis. The function of the German case study is 
to identify the motivational patterns of those migration streams, which are relatively 
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‘lower’ in the EU. Two of the regions, namely Southern/Mediterranean Europe and 
Eastern Europe, have a high record of labour migration (past and present). Germany, 
in contrast, has always been a migrant-receiving country. Historically, Portugal used 
to be a migrant-sending country, providing the western member countries with 
significant numbers of labour migrants. Poland’s current economic figures in terms 
of GDP levels are similarly low Portugal’s GDP per capita levels when it entered the 
EU. Scrutiny of Portugal may provide a projection of Poland, which is undergoing a 
similar cohesion process as Portugal did. Within the EU, so far, cross-border labour 
migration has occurred in large numbers from less developed to developed regions. 
Comparison of the determinants of motivations among groups of people with lower 
tendencies to migrate is also important. By scrutinizing the motivations of different 
groups and types of migrants, this study aims to provide a better foundation for 
understanding why people in the EU move – or do not move.  
3.5 Illustration of the empirical framework 
The ultimate aim of the thesis is to answer the research question, which asks whether 
the aims of the EU, i.e. to achieve convergence and to generate high mobility levels, 
are compatible. In order to answer the question, the research study has tried to show 
how economic convergence, i.e. the minimization of economic disparities in terms 
of, for example, wages or income levels, leads to less stimulation to move. This 
implicates a relationship between the variables ‘economic convergence’ and 
‘intentions to move’, whereas the latter forms the dependent variable. This 
relationship was examined via applying the theories of migration on the migrants. 
The determinants from the theories of migration were extracted and their 
‘applicability’ was tested on the migrants. In addition, the research and its empirical 
work also tried to determine the interaction of economic indicators with the 
motivations and to establish a relationship between the two independent and 
dependent variables. By doing so, in order to answer the main research question, a 
hypothesis or sub-research question for each case study was set. For the first case 
study, which examines migration after the enlargement process of 2004, the main 
hypothesis is that the determinants of large migration masses are based on economic 
indicators. This case study sought to identify the motivations behind as well as the 
impact of macroeconomic structures on the motivations of the labour migrants. The 
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second case study hypothesized that the main stimulants are non-economic related 
and primarily defined based on social variables. It was necessary to establish and 
prove this argument in order to show how social migration is the reason behind low 
levels of mobility. The third case study asked what the motivations to migrate behind 
medium-term converged countries are. At the same time, the third case study was 
performed in order to show how divergence, as opposed to convergence, leads to 
higher migration levels, motivating people to migrate. The hypotheses were tested 
through a multiple stage approach as illustrated in Table 3-1 below. The data 
extracted from the interviews was evaluated by focusing on the inclusion of the 
economic and social determinants, as well as their interrelation. The relevance of 
each variable is weighted according to the density in the responses based on their 
interpretation of the situation. In order to meet the tenets of the hypotheses, it had to 
be proved that the Polish population, which constitutes a ‘highly mobile group of 
migrants’, migrates in the first place for economic reasons only: hence economic 
variables for the Polish sample size are regarded as ‘highly important’.48 Parallel to 
this condition, economic determinants had to be tested negatively on the German 
sample size. This means that as long as the German workers in the UK confirmed 
that they did not come for economic motivations in the first place, but for other 
reasons, then the hypothesis of this thesis is supported by empirical evidence. The 
necessary conditions are marked in red in Table 3-1. Furthermore, as a second, but 
unnecessary condition, it had to be proved that social determinants such as prestige 
or acquisition of skills were not important for the Polish sample size, or at least not 
as important as the economic motivations. On the contrary, social (non-economic) 
determinants should be one of the main reasons why the Germans came to London, 
or more in general, why EU citizens move between economically similar (or 
converged) regions. According to the statistics, the percentage of German workers in 
the UK is very low compared to that of Polish labour migrants; this observation 
further indicates that mobility is only attractive when there are economic 
motivations. 
                                                        
48 See Table 3-1: Highly important = High Imp 
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Graph 4-7 The optimal / expected conditions for confirmation of theory (i.e. hypotheses) 
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Low mobility levels = 0 * economic + y * social  
High mobility levels = x * economic + 0 * social  
Imp = Important 
Source: own compilation  
Essentially, the aim of the empirical chapters (Chapter 4, Chapter 5, Chapter 6) is to 
compare the migration streams from converged and non-converged regions on the 
basis of their motivational background. The interviews sought to expose the different 
motivational attitudes between the comparison groups and to link the relevant 
observations to the levels of the groups’ economic development. Finally, the 
comparative approach was employed to expose how mobility of workers is largely 
related to the convergence levels. This thesis thereby aimed not only to provide an 
explanation as to why there exists no mobility between converged regions, but also 
to determine how mobility rates relate or even reach to the standard of living and 
how motivations to migrate interact with changes in standard of livings (convergence 
or divergence). The novelty of this research study lies in the synthesis of the 
convergence theory and migration theory in explaining labour migration via 
qualitative methods. The major outstanding characteristic, which makes this research 
especially interesting, is the fact that information was gained directly from labour 
migrants through face-to-face interviews. Whereas the majority of existing studies 
rely on estimations of quantitative analysis providing predictions and estimates, this 
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study gained direct responses from the people concerned. Another unique feature of 
this study is the differentiation and direct comparison between regions according to 
the degree of convergence. Additionally, the results of most of the migration studies 
are based on international studies, whereas this study will be EU-specific and 
concentrate only on the EU.  
As the main research question tries to find out whether one of the EU’s major aims, 
to achieve increased mobility levels as well as convergence, are compatible, the 
relationship between the two variables (i.e. convergence and high mobility levels) 
was analysed. As this thesis does not rely on quantitative analysis, the two variables 
of convergence and migration and their correlation were not measured via statistical 
methods, but examined via the motivations behind migration as variables and its 
linkage to convergence levels. Commonly, it is accepted and believed that through 
the use of sophisticated data analysis software and through feeding quantitative data 
(numbers) into a regression analysis package, one will obtain scientifically valid 
results (Castles, 2012, p. 14). However, issues such as mistaken or inadequate survey 
techniques may lead to poor quality of data, and the results henceforth may be 
misleading. Certainly, similar issues may apply to use of qualitative data too, e.g. 
biased sampling techniques can lead to questionable results. The next sections will 
discuss how these kinds of issues were addressed. The variables, consisting of 
determinants behind motivations, were dependent on the convergence levels, namely 
the economic convergence level, expressed in GDP per capita, and the migration 
levels. The variables have been ‘tested’ on the migrants. The major criterion was the 
migrants’ economic background and the history of labour migration.  
The interviews served as a tool by which to understand the individual circumstances 
and concepts that result in people migrating. The interviews allowed the collection of 
contextual information during investigation of emerging findings that came out of 
the qualitative analysis, and even permitted the researcher to go beyond and seek 
after extraneous variables. The interviews thus provided a more interpretive resource 
for understanding results. In quantitative research, although data may show that most 
people migrate for economic reasons, such data may not clarify the contexts within 
which migration decisions are made or the potentially unique meanings people attach 
to events such as finding a job (Morgan, 1998, p. 362). As Lyytinen (1987) noted, 
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because quantitative studies are ‘restricted to readily measuring static constructs, 
they neglect aspects of the cultural environment and social interaction and 
negotiation that could affect not only the outcomes, but also the constructs under 
study’ (cited in Kaplan & Duchon, 1988, p. 573). The qualitative research thus will 
help in situating the quantitative research in the context of people’s migration-related 
decision-making process and experiences. Interviewing as a methodology is 
considered for this research particularly appropriate as it seeks to trace the process of 
change and unveil actors’ motivations (George & Bennett, 2005; Hall, 2006). A 
similar methodology has been used in Leila Simona Talani’s book from Egypt to 
Europe: Globalisation and Migration Across the Mediterranean (2009). Her 
exceptionally successful studies served as an inspiration for the methodology of this 
research. The triangulation of the results with secondary data has served to trace and 
corroborate the findings from the qualitative data with quantitative data. As 
qualitative methods can help to understand the intentions and social meanings, but 
cannot give an accurate measurement of the frequency of certain attitude or 
behaviours (Castles, 2012, p. 15), linking the results with descriptive data and 
validating the relationship through triangulation with existing findings provided a 
good combination of methods to answer the research question.  
3.6 Strengths and limitations 
The data used to the test hypotheses was collected through 61 semi-structured open-
ended interviews with ‘labour migrants’, people who came to the UK to work. The 
interviews were guided interviews; therefore, although the interviews did have 
specific questions, the respondents had a lot of leeway in how they chose to reply to 
the questions. The questions did not always follow the outline of the interview guide 
or the exact list of questions. The flexibility during the course of the interviews was 
highly important in gathering the data, as the interviewees’ tendency towards 
specific issues based on their own judgment revealed the value and importance of the 
variables. For instance, the first response to the first question ‘Why did you come to 
the UK’ was highly important, as according to the tenets of this research study, the 
variable mentioned in the primary response would be categorized as the most 
important one among other possible variables which would come up during the 
course of the interview.  
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Fundamentally, this research did not directly ask about the importance of the 
determinants, but instead let the respondents determine the most important answer 
based on their own instinctive or intuitive thoughts. Other variables were only 
addressed directly if they were not mentioned at all in order to find out whether they 
were not important at all or if they were maybe simply forgotten or neglected for 
another reason. In their answers, the respondents could provide multiple answers, 
however they were provided in a sequence according to the importance of the 
variables. This flexibility was required in order to explore the underlying dynamics 
of preference formation regarding the determinants. Therefore, it was sometimes 
necessary or important to dig deeper into a certain topic or aspect, which may have 
come up unexpectedly or seemed important.  
Once the interviews were finished, the researcher was left to trust the participants 
and had to take their explanation of the events discussed at face-value. In order to 
verify the responses, the same or similar question were sometimes asked twice 
during the course of the interview, in order to increase the truthfulness of the 
responses, which is sometimes considered as a limitation in the employing 
qualitative methods. Validity is typically an issue in qualitative research, as the 
researcher is bound to rely on data, which may not always provide true information. 
However, this disadvantage were addressed by reiterating the question about the 
most important determinant behind the motivation to move during the course of the 
interview, and re-extracting the answers, which ensured the validity of the ‘intuitive’ 
answer in the beginning. The same strategy was used for all of the three case studies. 
In a field research study on the motivations of Polish migrants which was conducted 
in 2008 and was followed up in 2011, Porter (2012) found that, although the 
interview questions were not changed, the data in 2011 provided non-economic 
motivations which were not present in 2008 data. Although this is only a very vague 
indicator, one possible suggestion of this finding is that the migrants’ perception of 
their motivations changes with time. As mentioned, as time passes, the migrants 
become more socially aware and the change of their perceptions may influence their 
reflections on their motivation. As in Porter’s (2012) findings, the interviewees did 
mention social variables, but presumably, during the decision-making process, the 
value of the social variables may have been of lesser importance.   
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The primary data on the determinants of the motivations was triangulated with 
secondary data. The primary data was supplemented by scholarly literature of 
relevant fields. Moreover, the data’s relationship was analysed with the independent 
variable (economic convergence) via the use of descriptive data economic indicators 
(GDP levels, or data on migration levels). The qualitative data is thus basically 
supported by quantitative secondary data.  
3.7 Design and procedure of the interviews  
This section outlines the structural and procedural decisions related to the interviews 
and provides information about such as where the interviews were held, the length, 
and any other factors related to the interview procedure.  
3.7.1 Structure of the interviews 
The interviews for all groups were held in 2014 and were mostly conducted in cafés 
close to the participants’ workplace and frequently during participants’ lunch break 
or after they had finished work. For the German and Portuguese groups, incentives 
were sometimes given, e.g. an invitation for a coffee or cake after the interviews. 
The interviews were audio recorded via a hand recording device with the consent of 
the participants and were subsequently transcribed. During the interviews, notes 
were taken as well, in addition to the recordings. Only one participant did not want 
to be recorded; in that case, more detailed notes were taken throughout the whole 
interview. After the interviews, follow-up notes were made. In total, 69 interviews 
were held: 25 for the Polish case study, and 22 each for the German and the 
Portuguese case studies. While the Polish and Portuguese case study interviews were 
conducted in English, the German interviews were done in German, as German is the 
native language of the researcher. No translator was required, as the researcher also 
performed the translations from German into English afterwards. 
3.7.2 Procedure of the interviews 
As qualitative interviewing deals with the temporary relationship between the 
interviewer and the interviewee, problems related to trust, control, and expectations 
can arise (Bryman, 2008). Before commencing with the interviews, it was necessary 
to gain the trust of the participants. This was successfully achieved in part by 
 113 
addressing the potential participant by his or her name whenever possible at the first 
acquaintance. Before the consent was given, it was also made clear why this research 
was being done, what institution the research was associated with, and the fact that it 
would be strictly anonymous. Furthermore, it was explained what would be done and 
how the data collected would be handled.  
When posing questions, the researcher was very careful and objective particularly 
when asking the participants about their motivations for migrating and during the 
course of the decision-making process. The researcher stayed conscientious of her 
body, ensuring that any body language and tone of voice remained as neutral as 
possible. Such neutrality in an interviewer helps to prevent participants from 
attempting to give answers that they assume the interviewer wants to hear. In 
addition, limited details were shared about the precise content of the research thesis 
so as to avoid pre-made up responses toward to ensure the quality of the interviews. 
The interviews were stopped when the answers became repetitive.  
3.7.3 Design of the interview questions 
When selecting questions and compiling the interview guide a number of points were 
kept in mind. Bryman (2008) suggests asking oneself ‘what do I need to know in 
order to answer each of the research questions I’m interested in?’ as a guide to 
devising the list of interview questions (p. 442). Accordingly, the interview guide did 
not contain contextual introductory questions in order to prevent opinion building in 
the answers. Rather, the research aimed to identify the most appealing answer by 
relying on the intuition of the respondent. As the interview progressed, more specific 
questions digging deeper into the dynamics of the decision-making process of 
migrating were addressed. If an important thread emerged, follow-up and probing 
questions were asked to elicit more information about the relevant processes.  
3.8 Selection and accessing of the interviewees 
The random sample of interviewees more or less confirmed the data in existing 
literature about migrants’ characteristics: the participants were relatively young and 
well educated, where the majority hold a university degree. The majority came 
spontaneously, intending to stay only for a temporary amount of time, but then 
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happened to stay longer. This section outlines the interviewee selection methods, the 
participant makeup, and the challenges encountered in accessing the participants. 
3.8.1 Selection of interviewees 
The sample was based on random selection. This research study selected its 
participants using the methods of ‘purposive sampling’ and ‘snowball sampling’. In 
purposive sampling, the researcher strategically selects interviewees who are 
relevant to the research question (Bryman, 2008, p. 458). Purposive sample sizes are 
often determined on the basis of theoretical saturation. Snowballing is considered a 
type of purposive sampling. In snowballing, the social networks of the existing 
contacts ware used to refer the researcher to other potential contributors to the 
research study (Yin, 2010). Bryman (2008) defines snowball sampling as follows: 
‘With this approach of sampling, the researcher makes initial contact with a small 
group of people who are relevant to the research topic and then uses these to 
establish contacts with others’ (p. 184). In addition, Bryman adds theoretical 
sampling as a sub-group of purposive sampling, the main idea of which is that 
interviewees continue to be selected until a category has been saturated with data 
(Bryman, 2008, p. 426, 458).  
3.8.1.1 Parameters for selection of Polish participants 
The participants for the first case study group on Polish labour migrants working in 
the UK were in particular chosen upon pre-informed data. In total, 22 Polish 
migrants who came to London were interviewed. The literature has identified post-
2004 Polish migrants as possessing a unique set of characteristics. As a group, these 
Poles are characterised as being young, single, a combination of males and females, 
economically motivated and well educated (Anderson, Ruhs, Rogaly & Spencer, 
2006; Home Office, 2006; Pollard, Latorre & Sriskandarajah, 2008). For instance, 
Okolski (2014) found that the occupational ranges of Polish labour migrants stayed 
‘mainly at the lower end of the skill spectrum’ (p. 17). By 2011, the new arrivals had 
spread themselves widely across the main economic sectors. The largest group of 
these Polish migrants (27%) was in distribution, hotels and restaurants, followed by 
manufacturing (19.2%), business services (16.5%), and public administration, 
education and health (11.6%). The transport and communication industry hosted 
 115 
almost 10%, but only small numbers were in agriculture (1.3%) and public utilities 
(1.4%). The bulk of the new arrivals were economically active in employment 
(379,287 migrants, or 81.4%), a small but significant number were inactive (12.1%), 
and only a few were unemployed (3.5%). Of the inactive migrants, 3% were full-
time students. Of those employed (56,931 migrants, or 17.7%) were self-employed. 
(Okolski, 2014, p. 16)  
Existing literature has found that the young, highly skilled Polish migrants are 
commonly employed in the third sector in the UK (Anderson, Ruhs, Rogaly & 
Spencer, 2006; Pollard, Latorre, & Sriskandarajah, 2008). Accordingly, the sample 
size was based on a random selection of Poles working in the catering service, in 
restaurants and cafes, and as shop assistants. The sample comprised 22 people, of 
whom 8 worked in catering, 10 worked in cafés/restaurants, and 4 worked as shop 
assistants. Before commencing the interviews, the researcher ensured that the 
participants had been living in the UK for at least 12 months and otherwise satisfied 
the definition of a ‘migrant’.  
3.8.1.2 Parameters for selection of German participants 
The selection of the German participants included skilled as well as unskilled 
workers. The sample size comprised 21 participants. According to the literature (e.g. 
SVR, 2015), most of the German migrants are categorized as ‘highly skilled’. It was, 
however, in the interest of this research to explore the determinants of both types of 
groups. In total, 12 skilled and 9 unskilled labour migrants were interviewed. The 
participants were not selected based on their length of stay. This was because movers 
between skilled jobs seem to be more mobile (SVR, 2015), and the length of stay of 
participants at the point of the interview varied between 4 months and several years.  
3.8.1.3 Parameters for selection of Portuguese participants 
In the third case study, again the point of interest was to conduct a study on the 
determinants across both skilled and unskilled labour migrants. The total number of 
participants for the Portuguese sample consisted of 18 participants. 12 out of the 18 
participants were employed in the low-skilled sector, whereas the remainder of the 
group were employed in unskilled jobs. 
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3.8.2 Accessing the participants 
At the beginning of the field research, the researcher contacted a gate keeper for the 
Polish and the Portuguese group. Both of the gatekeepers were known to the 
researcher beforehand by direct observation. The gate keepers directed the researcher 
to other potential participants. Once the researcher had established an idea of where 
and in which types of works the interviewees were occupied and the sources for 
contacting more people diminished, the gate keepers were abandoned. The strategy 
was to visit the places where potential participants might be encountered based on 
previous information from other participants. Overall, there were no issues in 
gaining participants’ consent for interviews, especially after addressing the 
interviewees by their names at the first encounter; names were obtained from the 
referring participant. This was one of the advantages of the snowball system. 
Approaching potential participants by their names allowed the researcher to build an 
immediate relationship with the participants, thus making it easier to convince to sit 
for an interview. Regarding the German group (all types of participants) and the 
skilled Portuguese labourers, the participants were contacted through the use of 
social media such as Facebook or by relying on the personal social network of the 
researcher. Snowball sampling was employed to identify all relevant actors or 
respondents who could provide information about relevant actors.  
Language was not as serious a barrier as originally feared. The ability of the Polish 
migrants to express themselves in English was relatively good. Although the 
language skills were far from perfect, the impression of the researcher was that in 
general, the participants could say whatever they wanted to say. This surely has to do 
with the fact that the average age of the Polish participants was quite young. 
Regarding the second group, language barriers were eliminated entirely as German is 
the native language of the researcher and the interviews were held in German. 
Regarding the third group, the Portuguese group, the language skills were again quite 
good and thus in general no problems arose. Particularly with the Portuguese group, 
it was possible to conduct long interviews, as they could express themselves quite 
well and had much to tell. In short, translators were not required.  
The Polish sample group in this study was limited to migrants who work service jobs 
in the retail and restaurant / catering areas. This study could have widened among the 
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participants across the sectors. However, it did not for three reasons. First, the study 
was informed by and relied on previous information, which indicates that Polish 
labour migrants are mainly concentrated in the tertiary sector. Second, through the 
methods of snowball sampling, the researcher was most of the time automatically 
referred to friends or acquaintances working in similar sections. Third, it was much 
more convenient to identify migrants in the tertiary sector, as the potential 
participants were mostly quite visible immediately upon entering shops and 
restaurants. As a result, the samples in this research are limited to restaurant and 
shop assistants (which make up the largest working sector of Poles anyways).  
3.9 Potential weaknesses and strengths in the interview process 
As most migrants interviewed had been in the UK for a considerable amount of time, 
their responses during the interview may not have reflected exactly the exact same 
intentions and thoughts they had in mind at the point when they arrived in the UK, as 
perceptions may change over time. Most of the time, participants had stayed in the 
UK longer than they had originally planned. Polish migrants are subjects who 
migrated at a specific time with specific intentions. Those intentions are dictated by 
macro-level determinants. The exposure to details on the micro level, especially 
details experienced after arrival, may lead migrants to unconsciously modify their 
memories about their original motivations when answering the questions in the 
study. For instance, the participants quite frequently mentioned how spare time for 
leisure activities was important as well, but they might not have been aware of what 
to expect regarding social activities before their arrival to the UK. Their experience 
with the social activities after their arrival may have contributed to their 
understanding of their personal preferences; in other words, they may have started to 
value free time more once they had the chance to experience the social life in their 
new destination country. Nonetheless, even though micro-level details may have 
altered their perceptions, the likelihood of large modifications to memories of the 
original thoughts regarding their motivations is still not too high. In any case, the 
qualitative data has shown that economic motivations for the Poles were the main 
and most fundamental reason for migration, a finding which is validated via 
secondary material.   
As qualitative research is highly reliant on the researcher as the instrument for data 
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collection, reflexivity arises due to the relationship that is structured throughout the 
course of the research (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Assumedly, more similarity 
regarding the personal profiles between the researcher and the interviewees yield to 
more data in the participants’ response during the course of the qualitative data 
collection. While interviewing, personal biases and preconceptions may come into 
play that can affect the research (Bryman, 2008). Regarding this reflexivity and bias 
issue, the following circumstances certainly added to the ease of the interviews in 
terms of extracting answers from the participants: 1) the researcher is a kind of a 
migrant to the UK herself, 2) the researcher’s background or profile as a student as 
opposed to e.g. an authority group, which helped to generate empathy, 3) the 
researcher was in about the same age group as participants. In particular, the 
participants from the German group seemed to feel quite relaxed when answering the 
questions, as the researcher shared the same nationality. The participants may have 
felt more openness as the researcher had gone through or shared a relatable situation. 
The fact that there was no translator in the two other groups used may be of 
advantage as they may have felt their anonymity was more protected.  
3.10 Analysis of data 
The qualitative research software NVivo was used to analyse the data from the 
interviews. The content was coded according to themes that emerged while doing the 
research. As Bryman (2008) noted, coding is the starting point for analysing most 
forms of qualitative data (p. 550). The process of making sense of empirical data has 
been guided by some of the points that Bryman, with reference to Lofland and 
Lofland (1995), lists as a general guide to coding. These points advise the researcher 
to contemplate what general category each item of data falls into; what the item of 
data typifies; what query about a theme each item of data responds to; what sort of 
response to a question about a theme each item of data implies; and what kind of 
event is going on (Bryman, 2008, p. 550). The data was coded during the process of 
transcribing the interviews. The sequence of the sections in the evidence chapters 
(Chapter 5, Chapter 6, Chapter 7) evolved according to the importance of the codes, 
which in turn were based on the density and frequency of the answers. Codes were 
continuously reviewed in light of the developing conceptual framework and 
modified if necessary. Importantly, after the coding of the data, the findings were 
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interpreted in light of the research question and related to existing theoretical 
concepts. 
Criticisms of using coding as a tool for analysing qualitative data include the danger 
of losing the context of what is said, and the fragmentation of data leading to the loss 
of the narrative flow of what interviewees have said (Bryman, 2008, p. 553; Coffey 
& Atkinson, 1996, p. 23). These criticisms are addressed by keeping linking the 
codes thoroughly to each other section by section, so that the general context was 
kept in mind and did not get lost. Moreover, the triangulation of the information with 
secondary data and with other sources helped to keep the focus of the codes on a 
constant level. 
3.11 Generalisation 
The theoretical framework explains how migration levels respond to the standard of 
living defined by convergence levels based on economic indicators on the basis of 
the three case study countries Poland, Germany, and Portugal. In addition, this 
research study hopes that the findings elaborated for the three case studies can be 
generalized to other member states of the EU with the respective economic profiles. 
The remaining EU member states can be broadly categorized according to each one 
of the three case study countries. Although some variables when migrating may vary, 
and other variables which were not considered in this study may be added, for 
instance, external variables such as political factors, still, the fundamental tenet of 
this research study that labour mobility responds to convergence levels may not 
change in its applicability. The likelihood of the interference of other external 
variables such as political factors is not high, as by becoming a member state, 
entities undergo not only economic convergence, but also social and political 
convergence, which diminish the possibility of severe political frictions.  Other than 
variances in politically related variables, which may deter the interrelation of 
convergence–migration, other variables, which have not been mentioned, may turn 
up. However, the likelihood is low as the determinants have been extracted from 
multiple various theories of migration, and generally, these theories include all the 
variables, which are important within the context of migrating. In addition, the 
findings may also be considered in future policy proposals in the EU on migration 
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and mobility. So far, the attempts to increase mobility levels via the removal or 
reduction of barriers have been less effective (e.g. Zimmermann, 2011).  
As using qualitative methods traditionally involves smaller sample sizes, researchers 
are often cited for errantly generalizing their findings to a larger group of people by 
considering their sample to be representative of the larger population (Hume, as cited 
in Campbell & Stanley, 1963). This weakness makes the field of social science 
inherently limited. This particular issue, namely the generalization of findings from 
qualitative studies with small samples, has been the focus of extensive sociological 
research over time (Firestone, 1993; McGrath, 1982; Payne & Williams, 2005). For 
instance, using an approach similar to the methods of this research, Payne and 
Williams’ (2005) research established various conditions, which allowed qualitative 
data that was statistically not representative to be generalized. Therefore, whereas 
some social scientists may find that the results from a study with small sample sizes 
based on (semi-structured) interviews represent only one, unique case, other 
academic groups consider these findings as applicable to a larger group as long as 
the limitations are adhered to.  
The 61 interviews were held with migrants working majorly in the central parts of 
London only. London, being a highly cosmopolitan city, may be an attraction itself 
and thus a pull factor for people coming from abroad to work. For instance, the 
German sample group mentioned quite often that ‘attraction’ of the city was a major 
motivation. This particular feature of the city as an exogenous variable may have 
been influential over major motivations and may have contributed to the 
modification of the responses. At the same time, one must add that if people living 
interviewed were somewhere else, and if the exogenous variable ‘attraction of the 
city’ was non-existing, then, most probably, the replies would still revolve around 
the major determinants, namely economic motivations. One of the strengths of this 
research is that it pointed out the single ‘most important’ and predominant variables 
behind the migration process among many others, as opposed to studies who identify 
the importance according to the frequency of the same replies. The Polish did not 
cite ‘attraction to the city’ as a major reason, so the probability that the answers were 
affected by exogenous variables is less likely, as shown by the results. Henceforth, 
the characteristics of this sample may vary in comparison to the characteristics of 
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Poles from other samples in other locations and at the UK-wide level. However, by 
establishing the following specific requirements and guidelines, and by focusing on 
following these guidelines, these limitations were largely eliminated: 
- The researcher focused on Polish migrants who came to the UK in the post-2004 
period within the framework of convergence and social cohesion. 
- The researcher selected participants who came exclusively to ‘work’, and not to 
study. Indeed, sometimes labour migrants are disguised as, for instance, nannies or 
transnational migrants. However, as this research was interested in labour mobility, 
disguised migrants who had come for other reasons, but had used work as an excuse 
to come, were less important for this study. 
One of the advantages of semi-structured interviews was that it was possible to ask 
follow-up questions whenever necessary. If the participant veered too far from the 
main question, with the help of a guidance question, it was not difficult to guide the 
participant back to the right point. Semi-structured interviews allow the interviewer 
to dominate the interview when necessary. The questions were structured neutrally 
so that the answers to the questions would be as natural as possible, and the 
researcher made an effort to interpret the data as transparently as possible. The 
expectations of this research were around the baseline data that was needed to further 
the research, and the expectations were met thanks to the varying questions.   
3.12 Ethical considerations 
The study was granted ‘full approval’ by the King’s College Research Ethics 
Committee after being classified as a ‘not high risk’ project. The interviews were 
conducted in full compliance with the Ethics Panel’s guidelines. Before commencing 
with the interviews, the participants were given a sheet of information about the 
research project as well as the ethical standards and process of the interviews. The 
sheet of paper also contained the contact details of the researcher and the supervisor. 
The participants were informed about their rights and assured that the interviews 
would be handled in a confidential way. Once consent was given, the interviews took 
place. All interviews were anonymised by using pseudonyms, and the data was 
handled according to the ethical procedures. The details of the interviewees were 
kept safe and stored separately from the coded data. 
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3.13 Summary and conclusion  
This chapter established and discussed the methodology of the dissertation. In 
particular, it addressed the selection of the interviewees, the case study selection, and 
how the gathered data was used in order to answer the main research question of the 
thesis. The chapter showed that in order to answer the research question, the most 
appropriate method was to include data from participants with different economic 
backgrounds. Poland, Portugal, and Germany, countries with a substantial number of 
migrants in the UK, were chosen in order to increase the external as well as internal 
validity of the data. Their migration and economic backgrounds were contextualised 
in each case study and triangulated with primary data.  
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Chapter 4 Identifying the determinants behind high migration levels under the 
convergence framework: Polish labour migration into the UK after the EU 2004 
enlargement 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the application of the migration theories to the Polish 
participants, i.e. Polish labour migrants in London, described in the methodology 
chapter above. The results from the data are not itemized according to variables. 
Instead they are categorized into themes that evolved during the evaluation of the 
data and are sequenced according to their relevance. The first section below 
contextualizes and analyses Polish labour migration within the neoclassical theory of 
migration. The following section identifies the characteristics of the labour markets 
and the effect of those characteristics on Polish migrants. The third section 
scrutinizes the significance of network theory in this context, and the fourth section 
identifies and discusses the social factors and their relevance for Polish workers. The 
chapter will close with a brief summary and statement of conclusions. 
4.2 Application of the neoclassical theory of migration and post-2004 
enlargement: Migration to ‘search for a better life’ 
The core interest of this study is to investigate and define the primary factor behind 
the migration of labour migrants in the EU according to regional differences. 
Therefore, this section begins this chapter by analysing the motivations of the first 
sample group, namely the Polish labour migrants, whose country is still experiencing 
convergence. Existing statistical data indicates that the motivations of Polish labour 
migrants are mainly economic in nature (e.g. Heinz & Warmedinger, 2006; 
Durstwater, 2013). To complement this statistical data, the empirical aim of the 
study was to capture migrants’ most natural and intuitive answers through face-to-
face semi-structured interviews and to explore and elaborate on the migrants’ 
personal perceptions of their motivations. The study aimed to avoid making 
assumptions and diagnoses via the use of purely quantitative techniques. Before 
conducting the interviews, the interviewees were familiarized with the theme, but 
they were not informed about the questions in advance. This enabled the researcher 
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to collect data from unmodified and natural responses, as the participants were not 
given the opportunity to prepare their answers beforehand. For each group – the most 
quintessential query of interest was to learn about their very principal and intuitive 
motivation to migrate to another EU country to work. After some brief small talk, the 
researcher opened the formal interview by beginning with following lead question: 
‘What was the main reason for you to come to the UK?’ or ‘Why did you come to 
the UK?’ The intention of this question was to capture a ‘very instinctive’ chain of 
thought and to thereby reveal the principal motivation.  
Regarding the Polish sample, the principal motivation was income or work related. 
The answers to the initial question were straightforward and generally unanimous. 
The immediate response to ‘why did you come to the UK’ commonly was related to 
‘to have a better life’: 
I think the main reason was just to search for a better life I believe.  
(Milosz) 
To have a life (Ada) 
Polish migrants evidently came to seek a better life. The majority of the sample 
provided the same motivation by mostly using the wording ‘to have a better life’ or 
even just ‘to have a life’ in their responses. Whereas to have a life can be associated 
with an improved standard of living, to have a better life might be related to the 
quality of life. Nevertheless, in both phrases implicate ‘improvements’ in their lives 
through increased income, and thus will be regarded as similar motivations. Once all 
the answers to the first question were coded, after a thorough examination and 
detailed evaluation of the feedback to the opening question, the researcher found that 
although the answers naturally varied in syntax, the content of all answers implied 
pursuit of an ‘improved’ well-being, which at least enables them ‘to exist’ (Marta). 
London proved the migrants with a better alternative, and therefore making 
migration worth the risk:   
So I took the risk of just going abroad to see how it’s going in the other 
country because it’s always better there. (Milena) 
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Quite frequently, participants referenced a ‘better job’ and ‘more money’, and they 
rarely mentioned ‘no job’ or ‘little payment’. Relying on the contextual analysis, 
living a ‘better life’ was majorly dependent on the variable of ‘employment’, which 
is in turn is dependent on payment, i.e. ‘income’. In any case, the main argument in 
the answers was in some ways linked to determinants of an economic nature. As the 
following sub-sections show, the income variable was the most prominent one. The 
migrants were basically pulled to the UK due to the perceived strength of the 
economy. The initial results seemed to underline the data from the existing literature. 
Social reasons, or any form of linkage to a social activity, were never mentioned in 
their very first and intuitive response. This does not mean that social factors are not 
important at all, but they do not represent a major reason for migration. As outlined 
in the methodology section, this research determined the importance of a variable 
first according to the order in which it was mentioned in the initial response, and 
second according to the emphasis assigned to the variable during the rest of the 
interview. The next sub-sections of this section further unfold the various variables 
behind the determinant ‘a better life’. 
4.2.1 Work-life balance or the ability ‘to have a life’ 
The desire ‘to have a life’ was noted constantly throughout the whole of all the 
interviews. Therefore, this study considers this determinant as a highly significant 
element of migration, which requires detailed scrutiny. The notion of ‘having a life’ 
can be interpreted to as having a better social life, and often relates to having more 
free time for leisure activities, an improved work-life balance, and flexible hours and 
promotion at work. In the case of the Polish labour migrants, these final goals cannot 
be achieved through the availability of more income; the opposite was true for the 
final goals of the German migrants working in London, as will be shown in the next 
chapter. Henceforth, ‘to have a life’ is economically bound rather than socially 
related. The desire ‘have a life’ does not necessarily compose a determinant, but it is 
related to income through various channels. The remainder of this sub-section 
depicts how the synthesis of these multiple channels influenced the Polish migrants’ 
decision to migrate.  
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4.2.1.1 Unfolding the meaning of ‘to have a life’ 
Within the context of Polish labour migration, ‘having a life’ can be interpreted in 
terms of having shorter working hours with better pay and thus a specific minimum 
level of standard of life. In high-income nations in the EU, such as Germany or the 
UK, professionals commonly report having ‘no social life’ due to doing overtime to 
reach career aspirations. Polish workers, in contrast, feel obliged to work overtime 
due to lack of financial means. Hence the reason for working long hours is 
fundamentally different.  
By the exposition of the interviews, ‘having a life’ was detached from the idea of 
attaining an increased standard of life through financial means, which can be in turn 
linked to the neoclassical theory. While explaining her situation, Milena made a 
comparison between her previous life in Poland and her life in the UK. She 
underlined that back in her country, she felt that she existed merely ‘to earn money 
in order to pay the costs of life’. In contrast, her life in London allows her to spend 
more time on social activities, for instance going to the pub, something she was not 
able do in her origin country. She considered this freedom almost as a ‘luxury’.  
Here you earn money you can go to pub or stay around. In Poland it’s not, 
you only earn money and you pay for rent and nothing, that’s it. (Milena) 
Martyna added that back in her home country, she had no ‘flexibility’ at all, and she 
stated that she came to London not only to earn more money, but also in order to 
‘have a social life’, which she had not enjoyed at all in Poland. Mateusz, who arrived 
to London as a young graduate, chose to accept a catering assistant job. He was more 
concerned with his standard of life than with the job itself. Although being employed 
in the low-skilled sector is in contradiction with his qualifications, he was happy to 
have a higher life quality through his job and environment. The responses of Milena, 
Martyna, and Mateusz all imply that a low-skilled job in the UK seems to provide 
more satisfaction for the overall standard and quality of life.  
Achieving a better standard of life, therefore, seems much easier in London and 
involves less effort according to Mateusz’ experience.  
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In Poland I would have to make much more effort in order to reach the same 
status of life like I have here, you know, which is gonna be here.  
(Mateusz) 
Indeed, Migration Watch calculated that a Polish family living in Britain could save 
a fifth of what they take home and still enjoy a better lifestyle than they did in 
Eastern Europe (Migration Watch, 2015). In other words, even modest savings 
would allow Polish workers on the minimum wage in the UK to save what they 
would earn in perhaps an entire year at home. Therefore, the much higher benefits 
for families in the UK compared to those available for families in Poland act as a 
significant pull factor. 
Milosz had a full-time job for 5–6 years in Poland, which indicates that he did not 
have unemployment issues before coming to the UK. However, what seriously 
concerned him was his lifestyle. He explains, ‘I was working, but I just wanted to 
have a better future. Because it was like work, but it was for surviving, you know’. 
Milosz reported his lack of free time as one of his major concerns during his 
decision-making process. Marlena had moved back and fourth between Poland and 
the UK three times to earn money for her studies before she decided to stay 
permanently. Despite having held two jobs in Poland, her income had been 
insufficient to cover her living costs. She precisely describes how her lifestyle was 
affected by the long working hours and lack of free time:  
I was coming [to the UK] to earn a little bit for the university because I was 
studying at the weekends. That was very expensive. But still I had two works 
and it was not enough. And I was coming like three times before. I was 
working in the car wash. I was helping the friends who had the company with 
the houses, who does the finishing of the walls, something small things. And 
things like this. That’s why when I made the decision, when I thought like… I 
don’t want any more life like this, most days work, like seven days per week. 
For over two months, I had no day off. For two months. I was feeling like… 
you know like, something was going wrong in my head. . . . But you know, the 
money as well they [the jobs] did pay for this. But after two months working 
non stop, it’s too much. (Marlena) 
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Like Milosz, Marlena did not base her decision-making process on unemployment; 
rather it was the correlation of the low-income levels with very long working hours 
that did not leave spare time for social life and daily activities. The low-income 
levels practically caused a hindrance to invest more time not only in social activities, 
but also in family duties. When working long hours on a permanent basis, Marlena 
was unable to spend time with her son: 
I was studying at the weekends. On the weekdays, I had two jobs. I was 
working the whole day. From eight o clock until eleven in the night. I saw my 
son only in the mornings when I was taking him to the nursery. Income is less 
there. (Marlena) 
The income levels evidently presented a restriction on the social activities, or 
moreover, caused a barrier for interaction with family members. Based on the 
observation from the interviews, the situation can be depicted with the following 
chain of action:  
 
Insufficient or low income  Excessive work hours  Lack of social life  Migration 
 
As their income levels were insufficient to cover living expenses, participants were 
forced to work in multiple jobs in order to secure their lives. The employment in 
multiple jobs, generally in two, consumed more time, and there was little availability 
remaining for free time for social life. Given this situation, the individuals chose to 
move to regions with improved income levels or to regions where income–living 
costs were better balanced and overtime was not required to cover the living costs. 
This move enabled the migrants to profit from a far better work–life balance. 
Moreover, availability of free time simultaneously meant that the individuals were 
now able to spend more time on their daily needs and interests. Sometimes they 
stated how they used the time to invest in their human capital by, for example, taking 
up courses in various fields or visiting language schools. Maja and Milena 
specifically mentioned that, in the later stages, when they started to feel more 
confident about their language skills, they dedicated the extra time resulting from 
flexible working hours to academic courses. Hence this can be also regarded as a 
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contribution to a better quality of life. However, this use of free time was mentioned 
infrequently and was emphasized less in the interviews, which means that investment 
in their own qualifications had no priority at that point of time. Prior to their arrival 
to London, these kind of ‘privileges’ were practically impossible, as they ‘didn’t 
have time to do nothing’ (Martyna) because ‘there was too much work in Poland’ 
(Marlena) due to multiple occupations or weekend jobs. 
It is noteworthy to underline how much migrants were concerned about their future 
lives. Moving to another EU country to work was often regarded as an investment in 
their own future. Apparently, any opportunity that allowed them to leave Poland 
seemed to be a profitable option. In particular they reported ‘not many opportunities 
in Poland’ (Adrianna).  Prior to their migration, the participants had possessed a 
pessimistic view about their own future; they spoke of ‘experiencing lack of 
prospect’ or feelings of being ‘stuck’ (Maja).   
I used to work hard as well back in Poland. I didn’t come only because I 
want to work less. I just wanted obviously to invest in the future, in terms of 
learn the language, English, that was my first plan. I wanted to see the world 
and travelling. From London, you have an opportunity to go everywhere, you 
have more connection to go everywhere. From my country I could not even 
whole year save the money to go somewhere once a year. So I jeopardized 
just to go abroad and to see how it’s going in the other country because it’s 
always better there. (Milosz) 
Along with the discussions on the future, certainly another realm of interest was the 
degree of satisfaction with their current workplace and life. Overall, on a 
comparative basis in terms of their work in Poland, the majority was very satisfied or 
happy with their work in the UK, as well as with their lives in the UK. This was true 
for all the migrants from the Polish sample, independent of age, gender, or even 
length of stay.  
I have my life here and I’m happy. I can do more here than in Poland. 
(Adrianna) 
For me I would say it’s perfect for now. (Milena) 
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Although the sample size was based on migrants who work in the low-skilled sector, 
the migrants were happier and more satisfied than they had been in their previous 
lives in Poland. The migrants were not asked about details in relation to their wages, 
but they were asked whether they were happy with their current income. The overall 
answer was ‘yes’, with very few outliers. They seemed to enjoy the moderate 
working hours compared to the hours in their previous jobs in Poland, as they could 
now achieve a better work–life balance. Another reason why they were happier in 
their current work than they had been in their work in Poland was the availability of 
promotion prospects at work, an opportunity which they stated was generally lacking 
in Poland. A few of the labour migrants brought up in the interviews that they liked 
the idea of promotion prospects at their work place, e.g. the possibility to become a 
shift manager or to be promoted from a team member to a ‘professional barista’. In 
relation to their jobs, Polish labour migrants felt that they could accomplish more in 
the UK than they could in Poland:  
Here I can start low but get a better position if I want. I can become a team 
leader or manager. (Adrianna) 
Surely, such appealing conditions and advantages in the labour markets with 
promising future prospects in the UK may have contributed to their decision to stay 
in the future rather than to return to Poland.  
In summary, in the interviews, ‘a better life’ was often linked to different variables 
related to various kinds of personal matters, in order of importance, namely social 
activities, promotion at work, and current mood or satisfaction at work. Essentially, 
the specific desires can be classified under the concept of work–life balance. 
Although these factors were important as well, still, the main object of the Polish 
migrants was to ensure a stable life through increased income. The improvement of 
life can be linked to increased availability of time. The availability of time for leisure 
activities or family duties, in turn, is affected by the working hours, which are 
required due to low income. The Polish workers thus migrated in order to break out 
from the vicious circle induced by wage gaps or low wages.   
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4.2.1.2 Implications of the variables ‘higher income’ and ‘wage differential’: Polish 
labour migrants in converging regions 
The introductory question served well as a starting point for the interviewees and 
paved the way for the continuation of the conversation. During the course of the 
interviews, the participants could touch upon any issues they desired to talk about. 
However, overall, the conversation can still be categorized as a guided interview. 
The researcher did intervene from time to time, especially when the researcher felt 
that the interviewee was deviating too far from the main theme. By posing a mixture 
of open-ended as well as closed, semi-structured questions, the researcher ensured 
that the conversation revolved around the pre-set orientation line, which kept the 
interviewees focused on the main theme. By the nature of the empirical design, it 
was necessary to address all the determinants of migration, economic as well as 
social, inclusively. If the interviewee did not make any reference by himself/herself 
to a determinant, then the researcher would interfere by asking directly about the 
specific variable. Any theme revolving around the ‘income’ variable can be 
described as at the heart of the empirical part of this thesis. It is important to mention 
that in the majority of the interviews, the migrants addressed the income variable by 
themselves based on their own initiatives and without any preceding indications 
regarding wage differences. This finding underlines the presupposition that they 
came in order to profit from better income levels, as suggested in the majority of the 
literature (Galgoczi et al., 2009; Baldwin, 2010; Portes, 2012). Sometimes, the 
researcher also asked the participants directly about income by asking ‘Do you earn 
better here than in Poland?’ or ‘Is your income here better than in Poland?’ The 
prevalent response, in almost all cases besides a few exceptions (which will be 
discussed in the subsequent paragraphs), underlined the economic motivations to 
move by providing a positive ‘yes’ answer, thus confirming the neoclassical theory, 
namely that migrants move for the sake of increased wages. 
Income is less in Poland. Wages are much better here, so I came here. 
(Marlena) 
I came because it is better here, I can save more money. (Ala) 
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The principal motivation was clearly articulated and stated in the interviews, without 
any significant references to other factors. The Polish workers confirmed that the 
first and foremost reason to move was the attraction of higher income levels.  
The findings from the qualitative data are well supported by the statistical data. 
Figure 4-1 shows the development of the minimum average wage rates in the UK 
and in Poland. In 2004, when Poland joined the EU, the monthly average minimum 
wage in Poland was 175.75 EUR (Eurostat) compared to 1,054.20 EUR in the UK. 
By 2014, the average minimum wage in Poland doubled and reached 404.40 EUR, 
but the wage in the UK increased only by a minimal percentage to reach 1,251.05 
EUR. Despite the 100% increase regarding the average minimum wage, there still 
existed a significant wage gap between the UK and Poland.  
 
Graph 5-1 Development of the average minimum ages in the UK and Poland from 2004 to 2012 
Source: Eurostat, 2015 
The UK experienced a decline after 2007 with a nadir from 2004 to 2012 reaching its 
lowest point in 2009. Poland, in contrast, experienced only a minimal or almost no 
decline, hence converging towards the UK minimum average level in 2009. The 
previous chapter four on migration levels showed how migration levels into the UK 
declined after 2007-08. There is a correlation between the convergence level of 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Poland 175.25 207.86 232.9 244.32 313.34 307.21 320.87 348.68 336.47
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minimum ages and migration levels. The subsequent paragraphs provide further 
exemplification of the same phenomenon by looking at other economic indicators.   
If wage gaps constitute the main differential behind the migration levels, this may be 
why the migration levels from 2004 continue today. The interviewees strongly 
portrayed how the lack of time for social activities was very important. When 
sufficiently similar standards of living are achieved, a significant decrease in 
migration levels can be expected. The neoclassical theory of migration prescribes 
that migration will continue until no wage differentials exist. Migration Watch has 
calculated that an adult with a spouse and two children who earned the minimum 
wage in Britain would receive 543 GBP a week, or 28,200 GBP a year, in salary and 
benefits including child tax credit and housing benefits. Using Purchasing Power 
Parity data to compare earnings across the different countries, the think-tank 
estimates that in Poland, a family on the minimum wage would receive about 145 
GBP per month. Those on an average salary would receive just 235 GBP a week in 
Poland, less than half the minimum wage and benefits in Britain (Migration Watch, 
2015) 
According to the International Labour Organisation (2010) (ILO), pay in the UK was 
much higher than in Poland. The minimum monthly wage (expressed in USD using 
purchasing power parity [PPP] in the UK) was 1,507 USD. In Poland, it was 628 
USD (ILO 2010). A McDonald’s cashier or crew member earned an hourly wage 
rate 5.5 times higher in the UK. Even accounting for differences in price levels, the 
gap was still significant: a British employee of McDonald’s could buy 2.11 Big 
Macs for his/her hourly wage while a Polish employee had to make do with less than 
one (Ashenfelter & Jurajda, 2001). Empirical as well as statistical data support the 
theoretical literature and the tenet of the neoclassical theory, which claims that 
individuals move due to differences in the wages. After the lift of the restriction, as 
the section above has shown, an immense number of Polish labour migrants moved 
to the UK in the first year and still continue to move to the UK today. The 
descriptive statistics are in compliance with the qualitative data, as well as with the 
neoclassical theory. For instance, Julka asserted in her interview that she could have 
obtained a position back home. However, the certainty that income levels in her 
origin country would not exceed the income rates in the third sector in the UK 
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convinced her to migrate. The poor performance of the national economy and the 
resulting dissatisfaction with it was undoubtedly a push factor for the Polish labour 
migrants to move to developed regions with higher earning prospects, under any 
circumstances. In order to earn more in the low-skilled sector in the UK, the labour 
migrants abandoned the idea of finding jobs suitable to their qualification levels. 
This schematic behaviour has led to what is known as over-qualification in the 
labour markets.49 In this case, over-qualification is not due to the limitations in the 
receiving country; rather, the phenomenon has its roots in the origin country. Over-
qualification, in the Polish case, is therefore a problem that is ‘imported’. The 
literature on east-west migration discusses to a large extent how Polish labour 
migrants in the UK market are known to be highly educated or skilled, but are 
largely represented in the low-skilled sector (Johnston et al., 2010; Khattab et al., 
2010; Phung, 2011). Polish labour migrants draw their conclusions to move or not to 
move explicitly on the basis of the comparison of income levels, independent of the 
migrants’ sectors or professional areas. This preference shows how the variable 
‘income’ is the paramount factor and exceeds all other remaining contemplations, 
confirming the implications of the neoclassical theory of migration.  
I had two works and it was not enough. (Marlena) 
Income was low. No, just to pay the bills, that’s it. (Milosz) 
I was working in the Police Department. Not like a Policewoman, but in the 
office. And then I was working in the petrol station. It was so bad when it 
came to money, and not many opportunities. (Amelia) 
I was studying at the weekends. On the weekdays, I had two jobs. I was 
working the whole day. From eight o clock until eleven in the night. I saw my 
son only in the mornings when I was taking him to the nursery. Income is less 
there. I wanted to provide my son a better life. This was the main reason. 
(Martyna). 
                                                        
49 Qualifications are certified skills acquired through formal education (Quintini, 2011a). A worker is 
over-qualified if the highest academic and/or vocational qualification that he attained exceeds the 
maximum qualification requirement of the job that he does (Felstead et al., 2007; Quintini, 2011b). 
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Ehhh… it’s difficult to say. It depends if I work probably what I was studying 
then I could earn more money, good money. But then if I work like here, it’s 
not comparable. (Basia) 
For instance, a weekly minimum wage for an individual in the UK who has a 
dependant spouse and two children, including benefits, would be 543 GBP, or 
annually approximately 28,200 GBP. Thus, a weekly savings of 20% equates to 110 
GBP, which is worth 540 Polish Zloty. In Poland, a person in the same 
circumstances would have a weekly income of 375 Zloty (after tax and including 
benefits). Hence, if an individual could save 20% of their earnings in the UK, they 
would be saving almost one and a half times what they would have earned in total in 
Poland (Migration Watch, 2015). 
In regard to the comparison of wages and income between the origin and the 
destination country, the Human Capital Theory (HCT) implies that individuals make 
a cost-benefit analysis before they decide to migrate. During analysis, this study 
attempted to determine whether the HCT applied to the Polish east-west EU 
migrants. Furthermore, the study sought to determine to what extent the migrants 
were knowledgeable about income levels in the UK prior to their move. Was their 
arrival to the UK based merely on ‘hope’ or ‘assumptions’ that they would earn 
more, or had the migrants been precisely informed about the extent of the benefits 
available if they chose to migrate? The results indicated that the migrants did not 
undertake detailed research on income levels before their departure. Rather, the 
perception that income was much lower in Poland provided a plausible reason to 
leave their home country. The migrants thus relied on their confidence in this 
perception without performing an extensive cost-benefit analysis. Their 
dissatisfaction and the existing difficulties constituted a sufficient factor to migrate. 
Based on the poor performance of Poland’s national economy, detailed risk 
calculations seemed superfluous. Social networks in the destination country 
occasionally may well have served as a source of information and comparison.  
Moreover, noteworthy to mention is the observation that labour migrations in larger 
numbers are generally observed among ‘unskilled labourers’. Contrariwise, skilled 
labour mobility is scarce. These trends represent an issue on a global level. However, 
the pattern of Polish labour migration into the UK reveals an irregular 
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exemplification of the phenomenon. The exploration of the literature has revealed 
that Polish labour migrants are known to be skilled or highly qualified (e.g. 
Durstwater, 2013, Okolski 2014). This observation is in accordance with the 
composition of the participants in the sample size. The participants were selected on 
a random basis, but the majority possessed a university degree or was going to 
university. The demographic profile from the existing literature was thus confirmed 
and again underlines the argument that the migrants came here for the sake of higher 
income. The migrants are thus willing to take up less-skilled jobs in order to earn 
better. Basically, wage differentials and increased income provided a good attraction 
for mobility and are the reason behind high levels of mobility.  
Ensuring a safe future for oneself by accumulating savings was also a frequently 
noted motivation to migrate. In Poland, it was just not possible for the participants to 
accumulate any savings at all. Thus, the perceived insecurity in relation to future 
lives due to less economic means was also a trigger to move.  
Although the unemployment later fell quite rapidly to 10% in 2006, in 2004 the 
levels were as high as 20% (EUROSTAT, 2015). Despite this figure, after Poland 
became a member state of the EU, unemployment as a determinant for migration was 
hardly addressed at all, let alone as a primary reason to move. The date of arrival to 
the UK of the participants who were interviewed varied from 2004 to 2012, which 
may explain why the interviewees were not strongly affected by unemployment in 
their origin country. Since 2004, unemployment has remained slightly below the EU 
average (EUROSTAT, 2015). Conclusively, the reduction in unemployment 
suggests that a major driver of Polish migration has been the higher standard of 
living in the UK. The potential to build savings in the UK was also a highly 
important factor.  
The intention of this section was to depict the main purpose behind Polish labour 
migration to London. The face-to-face interviews of the Polish sample indicate that 
‘higher income’ or ‘wage differentials’ were the primary motive behind the 
participants’ migration to London. Almost the entire sample confirmed the 
proposition from the neoclassical theory of migration, namely that individuals move 
for economic reasons. To capture the implication from the data briefly, firstly, as 
shown in the previous sections, the Poles constitute a migrant group with ‘high 
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mobility levels’. Secondly, their tendency to constitute a highly mobile population is 
explained on the basis of income levels. Contemplating these two factors embedded 
in a broader context, the interrelation between the two observations leads to the 
understanding that mobility is a phenomenon which takes place between converged 
and non-converged regions. Hence, the first and most important condition, as 
illustrated in table 3 – 1 in chapter four, of this thesis is met, confirming the 
hypothesis. 
The distinctiveness of this research study lies in the contemplation of labour 
migration specifically within converging regions. This section addresses the 
following sub-research questions: How do the GDP levels relate to the motivations 
of the Polish labour migrants? How can the macro factors be linked to the economic 
behaviour of the social migrants? How are these factors related to each other? How 
do migrants value the changes in wage levels from the levels in their origin country 
to the levels in new country? And how may migrants react to future changes? Would 
they move back? The exploration of these questions will add further substance to the 
main hypothesis. 
The first question of interest tackles the convergence argument: Firstly, what would 
migrants have done if they had been earning more in their origin country? Would 
they still have migrated? Secondly, if the origin country experiences convergence 
(i.e. if income levels of the origin country converge with the average), would the 
migrant then move back? What would the relationship to income and migration then 
be like? Within the framework of this research study, Poland provides a suitable 
prototype, in particular because of its length of membership in the EU.  
The Polish labour migrants stated that they came to ‘search for a better life’, which 
indicates a desire for improvement regarding a particular life condition. In economic 
terms, a better life can be translated in an increased availability of financial means 
or, in other words, it is equivalent to earning higher wages; high wages, in turn, are 
relative and depend on the strength of the national economy. More theoretically, 
‘better lives’ can be found more in converged regions rather than in converging 
regions. In order to express the degree of convergence, this thesis will consider GDP 
per capita levels, which is the most frequent indicator of a country’s standard of 
living according to the European Parliament.  
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According to the statistics World Bank (2015) Poland had a GDP per capita of 
6,639.89 USD when it joined the EU in 2004. The UK’s GDP per capita was almost 
6 times higher at that time, at 38,309.84 USD, and the EU average was at around 
32,000.00 USD in 2004, which makes Poland’s GDP per capita about 20% that of 
the Euro Zone when Poland joined the EU. The literature attributes the mass 
migration levels after the lift of the restrictions in 2004 to the large economic 
differences. From what the participants stated in the interviews, the results of this 
study comply well with the descriptive data. The GDP per capita continued to rise in 
Poland, higher than the average rates in the EU (as expected). As discussed in the 
previous section, a faster rise than the average means convergence. Hence Poland is 
in the process of converging with the EU average rates, as convergence in this study 
refers to a developing country’s GDP rates increasing at rate faster than that of the 
developed nations. Poland reached a GDP per capita of 12,876.46 USD by 2012, 
meaning that it doubled within 6 years time. The UK’s GDP per capita, however, 
had not changed much, remaining at 41,053.74 USD. The migration rates from 
Poland to the UK declined, as outlined in the previous sections. 
 
Graph 5-2 GDP per capita in Poland, UK, and Euro Zone from 2002 to 2004 
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Development economics argue that GDP as an indicator may be deceptive, and it is 
not often considered as the best indicator, as GDP rates do not expose the 
distribution of wealth in the country. Other indicators may better explain the 
standard of living. GDP levels only provide a summary of the economic performance 
on an aggregate level. GDP levels provide information about the gross domestic 
product, i.e. about what the nation on average earns, and that may be insufficient to 
explain the relative average rise per person. In short, GDP per capita is not a measure 
of personal income. When comparing generalized differences in living standards, the 
preferred version is often using a PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) basis, as PPP 
reflects the differences in what people are actually able to buy with their money. PPP 
takes into account the relative cost of living and the inflation rates of the countries, 
rather than using only exchange rates, which may distort the real differences in 
income. PPP has its own drawbacks, too; it does not reflect the value of economic 
output in international trade, and it also requires more estimation than GDP per 
capita. On the whole, PPP per capita figures are more narrowly spread than nominal 
GDP per capita figures. 
Income and wages are relative, and thus insufficiently explain what this research 
seeks to understand: namely, the perception of the ability to ‘live’, to afford a life, 
considering differences in the varying market values across the EU. When looking at 
the GDP and PPP of Poland, obviously and as expected, one can see that these 
values have risen over the years. At the point when Poland joined the EU, Poland’s 
PPP kicked off at 15,153 USD in 2006. The EU at that time had a PPP of 30,061 
USD. The PPP of Poland grew steadily and reached 24,755 USD in 2014; at that 
point, the EU had reached a PPP of 36,326 USD. The difference of the PPP per 
capita figures was minimized from 20,038 USD in 2004 to 15,018 USD in 2014. 
Conclusively, regarding the PPP, this means that disparities were minimized as 
Poland economically converged. 
At the present time, Poland’s economy is known to be successful and flourishing. 
The impressive economic performance can be attributed to the important reforms 
and structural funds granted by the EU which came with the accession, and which 
have deeply transformed the structure of the economy. Poland, despite some 
continued systemic problems, made substantial economic progress over the last 
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decade, and can now prove its success by being now ranked 23rd worldwide in terms 
of GDP nominal (World Bank, 2015) with the largest component of its economy in 
the service sector. Other sources claim of Poland’s success that ‘by 2013, the country 
had achieved levels of income and quality of life likely never experienced before’ 
(Piatkowski, 2013). Despite the large success, nevertheless, Poland’s GDP levels are 
still far below those of the EU average and the UK, which may well explain the 
ongoing influx of Polish labour migrants.  
When asked whether they would have stayed if they had been earning the same value 
of income in their home country, the prevalent answer during the interviews was a 
very straightforward ‘yes’ (e.g. Ania, Julka, Maja), ‘I would have stayed’ (Basia). In 
reflection on the future, that means if convergence of Poland with the EU average 
continues, this would mean that migration is likely to decrease in the future. Indeed, 
the statistics show that Poland is already, however slowly, converging. Based upon 
this, a long-term prediction would be a decrease in migration levels. The financial 
crisis in 2010 shows how the migration levels respond to GDP levels: in 2008–2009, 
Poland was the only country that did not suffer from the crisis and the only country 
in the EU that demonstrated continued growth in GDP levels. GDP as well as PPP 
fell at the time in the UK (and in the EU general). However, GDP and PPP continued 
to rise in Poland, which means in economic terms, Poland converged with the UK (to 
a faster extent and stronger degree than in general). The primary data of this study 
indicates that labour migrants are receptive to economic changes and move if they 
feel that ‘they will have a better life’. During the peak of the crisis, when the UK and 
the rest of the EU was doing worse, outward migration did not stop entirely but 
decreased significantly, as shown in Graph 3 – 2 in chapter four.  
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Graph 5-3 GDP growth percentage rate in Poland, UK, and Euro Zone from 2002 to 2014 
Source: World Bank, 2015 
The interviews support the claim that migration is elastic according to economic 
indicators, such as GDP per capita levels or GDP growth rates. The results from the 
qualitative data are thus in accordance with and reflect well the descriptive statistics 
and provide an explanation for them. The search for a better life, in numerical terms, 
can be translated into the increase in PPP, or standard of living.  
Concerning the length of stay, the following pattern was detected among the Polish 
migrants: Strikingly, the interviewees either intended in the beginning to come for 
only a temporary period of time in order to earn some money, or the interviewees 
chose to stay in the UK after a holiday trip. In the latter case, the idea of staying and 
working was also absolutely unplanned. However, in most of the cases, both of the 
primary intentions turned out to be inapplicable. This was true for nearly all of the 
interviewees. Nearly all the Polish migrants responded that they initially came ‘for 
holidays’ only:  
So, the plan was like, to go abroad, save money, and to come back.  
(Amelia) 
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I was coming to earn a little bit for the university because I was studying at 
the weekends. (Monica) 
I came here for holidays. And I sort of stayed. That was 8 years ago. 
(Mateusz) 
My plan was to come and earn money just for holidays, probably then I 
would choose a place where you get easily, like my friend she went to 
Australia, at that time I didn’t think of visa and stuff like that. (Adrianna) 
In a similar fashion, a further peculiar discovery was that all the Polish workers from 
the sample had the possibility to stay in the homes of their friends in the beginning. 
As they came for ‘holidays’, renting a place seemed unnecessary while staying with 
a friend enabled them to save money and time. Strikingly, even those few who came 
with the intention to work and not for holidays used their friends’ homes until they 
made their final decision to stay. Hence, their cost of living was reduced drastically, 
as housing is notoriously expensive in London. The three most concerning factors 
related to housing in London – cost, risk, and stress – were thus virtually removed 
thanks to the participants’ social networks, creating a situation that contributed 
positively to the decision-making progress. Their carefree mindset and awareness of 
risk-reduction was very obvious:   
I had friends and first I came for holiday here and then I decided to stay 
longer because I had a job and… I didn’t have nothing to do in Poland 
because I finished my school. So I just decided to stay longer here and I can 
always go. (Adrianna) 
Yes, I came for holidays to my friend. Because she invited me just to see how 
it is. Then I was like, okay I will stay one month longer maybe. Then I stayed 
like two years now. (Ala.) 
I had a friend here in England we spoke and it was like, okay why not? If not 
you can go back to Poland! (Maja) 
The absence of borders plays a role as well: The abolishment of the border controls 
with the accession of Poland to the EU provided an attractive opportunity to earn 
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more money within a short span of time and without any administrative troubles. 
Unquestionably, the free movement of workers that came into force in 1992 with the 
introduction of the SEM offered for some EU countries more beneficial prospects 
than for other EU member states. As shown in the previous chapters, after the EU 
accession of Poland, the country’s migration rate rose excessively, while labour 
mobility levels were rather indifferent for other EU countries (e.g. France and 
Germany). Staying in the UK appeared to the participants to be a good and 
uncomplicated opportunity to generate some extra cash money. Commonly, Polish 
workers primarily came for a temporary period only, with the purpose of earning 
money and subsequently returning back to their home countries. The accumulation 
and provision in the destination country of the several advantageous factors 
discussed in these sections caused a radical change in the participants’ minds, 
leading the participants to alter their plans from a limited stay to an unlimited stay. 
The progress chain of the participants becoming Polish labour migrants can be 
characterized as follows: The decision-making process can be classified as less risky 
and uncomplicated. It was non-costly (i.e. entailed no unforeseen costs), as they had 
come ‘for holidays’ and the possibility to return was always available and 
emotionally, personally, and financially almost free. The decision can be described 
as quite riskless or nearly risk-free, as the migrants had the opportunity to find a new 
job easily should they return home. The entire sample size was employed in the low-
skilled sector where they could find jobs easily. Some even had multiple jobs. The 
decision can also be classified as uncomplicated, as it was a (mostly) unplanned, 
spontaneous trip and did not involve deeper reflection. Geographical proximity was 
not a crucial factor, but somewhat important. The accumulation of these multiple 
givens during the decision-making process and during the migration process led to 
one deduction: it was indeed desirable to stay and go from being a ‘holiday visitor’ 
to being a ‘labour migrant’.  
Based on the answers from the interviews, one could argue that the Polish workers in 
general were convinced that they would have stayed in Poland had they been earning 
more money. Assessing the sequences of answers critically, in relation to the 
development of the argument, indicates that the participants’ replies are not only 
plausible, but also logically consistent and make full sense. They are free from any 
inconsistency and within the fit of a logical line: The essential causal relationship of 
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‘more income–migration’ and  ‘not more income–no migration’ is confirmed. If the 
answer were ‘no’, namely migrating despite the fact that they earn more or at least 
the same amount of income in their home country, their behaviour would not comply 
with the rules of the neoclassical theory.  
The following strategy was applied in the interviews in order to learn more about 
participants’ feelings, tendencies and intentions regarding their future plans related 
to income. The migrants were confronted with a possible scenario, namely that 
Poland might be fully converged in the future, meaning income levels may get closer 
to the average income level of the EU. The answers were solely assumptions and 
based on expectations. The answers to the first question were not unanimous. Having 
gone through the experience of migrating, the Polish workers were now able to make 
better predictions about their sensitivity to return migration. The opinions were 
manifold. Two broad categorizations emerged which describe the participants’ 
thoughts on return migration. Those who had come alone (or with a partner) and who 
had established a family or life over the years did not consider returning back. In 
contrast, younger migrants who had come only recently were more prone to consider 
migrating to somewhere else or even back to their home country. Conclusively, one 
can assume that return migration therefore depends on the length of the stay in the 
destination country and personal background. The longer a migrant has spent in the 
receiving country, the lower the probability that the migrant will return.   
In this section, the neoclassical theory of migration and the applicability of its 
determinants have been discussed in light of the Polish labour migrant participants’ 
responses. The main focus was on the income variable. According to the data 
analysis of the interviews, Polish labour migrants primarily move in ‘search for a 
better life’. Hereby, the composition of multiple factors, mainly economic-related, 
and their interaction during the migration process have lead to the decision to 
migrate. The migrants reported looking ahead and a desire to ensure financial 
security for their future, which seemed impossible in their home country. The core 
motivation, and the linchpin at the centre of all interacting factors, was to earn higher 
income. Therefore, the interview data fully complies with the fundamental paradigm 
of the neoclassical theory, namely that income is the main motivator, even if the 
migration process began with spontaneously planned holidays. The driver behind 
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large migration streams is based on economic determinants. This finding confirms 
the hypothesis that economic stimulants to migrate are quite strong.    
4.3 Patterns of employment of Polish labour migrants: Labour market 
determinants and characteristics 
This section scrutinizes the interaction of further factors related to economic 
determinants, focusing this time on the nature of the labour market. This section will 
review the results from the interviews on how labour markets contribute to migration 
between converged and non-converged regions. The discussion again takes place in 
the context of the patterns of Polish labour migrants in the UK. In what sectors are 
Polish migrants employed and why? The section also analyses why skilled labour 
would move in order to accept low-skilled jobs. 
The first chapter introduced the extended version of the neoclassical theory of 
migration, the Harris-Todaro (H-T) model, which contemplates the variable 
‘unemployment’ next to ‘income’ and ‘wage differentials’. The H-T model was 
originally developed in order to explain rural-to-urban migration amidst 
unemployment (Harris and Todaro, 1969), but some of its elements may be helpful 
in the analysis of this section. For example, according to the H-T model, the costs of 
the probability of being unemployed when migrating are still important, because 
these costs may influence the decision-making process. Within the context of this 
research, it is of interest to know to what extent Polish labour migrants calculated 
risks and how the migrants overcame those risks. Migrants frequently calculate and 
evaluate the risks associated with migration before they move (Sjaastad, 1968). One 
of the potential risks is unemployment or a lengthy period to find a job, which results 
in additional costs.  
Risk assessment, as outlined in the first chapter, is an important component of 
migration (theory) and may help to contribute to a better understanding of the 
employment pattern of Polish labour migrants.  
4.3.1 Employment patterns of Polish labour migrants 
The migrants were asked what kind of difficulties they encountered when entering 
the labour market, or whether they had any difficulties in finding a job. In the 
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participation group, none of the migrants referred to any kind of troubles or 
difficulties. On the contrary, the overall reply was that it had been very easy for them 
to find a job and access the job market in the UK.  
Agnia came to work in her brother’s shop in 2012. At the time, she spoke very little 
English. Before taking the decision to come to the UK to work, she was already 
confident that she would have a job in the UK; basically, there was almost no 
probability that she would end up unemployed. When asked in the interview whether 
she had any difficulties in finding a job after her arrival to the UK, she laughed and 
replied, ‘Ahh no because it is my brother’s shop, so.’ However, Ania was the only 
participant in the group who already knew where she would work. Therefore, in her 
case, any cost that could have accrued from a period of unemployment, as the H-T 
model argues (Todaro, 1976), was eliminated beforehand.  
Overall, the majority of the other participants came without a job lined up, but 
nonetheless easily found a job. Milosz confirmed that he ‘started to work 
immediately’ and ‘it wasn’t difficult to find a job.’ Amelia and Martyna confirmed 
the same, stating the following: 
It was actually very easy for me to find this job here (. . . ) I was quite lucky. 
I’ve met this through stranger people. (Amelia) 
I didn’t have a problem. I was just walking from door to door ( . . . ) and I 
was asking for a job. (Martyna) 
Nearly 85% out of the total sample affirmed that they had been highly confident 
about their ability to find a job. Besides, the reason to migrate originated not from 
unemployment, as all of the migrants interviewed had already employed before they 
arrived to the EU, sometimes even in two jobs at the same time. Unemployment as a 
push factor to move was hence excluded. So why were the labour migrants so 
confident that they would find a job immediately? In the migration story of Poles to 
the UK after enlargement, the attractiveness was not only one-sided: the labour 
markets may indeed have provided a pull factor as well, and are accordingly 
discussed in the following sub-section.  
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4.3.2 Characteristics of the labour markets as determinants 
The dual labour market theory, as one of the major migration theories, can be 
reflected on the Polish migrants. Based on the results from the primary data, the easy 
accessibility to the UK labour market might be a sign for the high demand for the 
type of Polish migrants in the country. Getting jobs under relatively easy conditions 
also contributed to the migrants’ decision to stay. Most of the time, interviewees 
were not necessarily aware of their high probability in finding a job. 
Yeah, firstly I didn’t think that I would work, really, I just wanted to save 
some money, and visit London. But after I have changed my mind. (Hania) 
When asked, ‘Do you think it is difficult to find a job in London?’, the response from 
one participant working in the catering service was, ‘Once you get around, you sort 
of know, I don’t think that it’s too difficult. There is a difference in what you are 
looking for. This kind of job is not so difficult to get’ (Dawid). 
The reason why Polish labour migrants have little uncertainty about finding a job 
became obvious when asking more about their employment background. The Polish 
labour migrants were certain from the beginning about their sector of employment in 
the UK. They invariably chose the third sector, as they were sure that finding a job in 
the low-skilled sector was almost guaranteed, as these jobs were easily accessible 
and did not require high qualifications. The labour market in the UK is experiencing 
scarcity in unskilled labour (e.g. Anderson et al., 2006), e.g. because the native 
population refuses to fill the low-skilled jobs, as accordingly to the dual labour 
market theory. Thanks to the easy access to the jobs in the low skilled sector, 
especially in restaurants, cafés, and similar establishments, concerns about long 
periods of unemployment in the destination were eliminated (the H-T extended 
model).   
This finding fits well with the dual-labour market theory outlined in the theories 
chapter (Chapter 2): the character of the economy in advanced countries creates a 
demand for low-skilled jobs, which domestic workers refuse to take up due to, for 
example, status.  
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There is a primary sector providing well-paid jobs and a secondary sector offering 
unskilled jobs, e.g. manufacturing. Lower pay makes the secondary sector 
unattractive to native workers. Migrants are more motivated to work in these low-
status jobs because they do not consider themselves as part of the destination society. 
The fact that they do not consider themselves as part of the destination country was 
underlined in the interviews by many migrants’ expression that they feel excluded 
from certain jobs, mainly white-collar jobs, due to language deficits. 
Although the majority of Polish migrants can be categorized as ‘skilled’ and possess 
university backgrounds, they revealed in the interviews how they were already 
employed in the low-skilled sector in their origin country before their arrival to the 
UK. Milena, for example, finished her degree in Communication Science, but she 
stated that she could not find appropriate employment in her field in Poland. Rather 
than being unemployed, she chose to work in simple jobs in the UK. 
Q: Would you say that it is difficult to find a job in Poland? 
A: Yeah. Yes it’s difficult. I tried it. I found a place to work in a café as a 
waitress. I was paid but for me it was not enough. Because I pay a rent, I 
have to pay ticket, I paid for food and ( . . . )I have nothing in my pocket! 
(Milena) 
Milena was not the only individual in the sample size who ended up working below 
their qualification skills. The other migrants in the sample group shared the same 
situation. In fact, all of the interviewees in the Polish sample had university 
backgrounds. Barbara, who earned a university degree back in her home country, but 
who works in the catering service, explains as following why she did not make 
further effort to look for a job that matches with her qualifications:   
Q: You mentioned that you have a university degree. Usually, with a 
university degree, you could work in an office job. Is it difficult in London for 
you? Or have you ever tried?  
A: I have never tried, I’ve never tried, you know when I came here I worked 
in catering, and it just stayed like that. Before I did not have the time to look 
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for anything else because I was working long hours in here, so, always like 
ten hours and I didn’t have time or feel like to look for another job. (Basia) 
Furthermore, all of the participants were asked what kind of jobs they had held 
before they came to the UK. Either the participants had come to the UK straight 
away after their studies, or they had accepted other low-skilled jobs even though they 
had studied. In contrast, this specific pattern is not observable in the case of the other 
two case study countries, Germany and Portugal. Ultimately, the Polish labour 
migrants exhibited a high propensity to work in the low-skilled sector. Their major 
concern was to earn money and to start to work as soon as possible. Once they had 
earned a certain amount and their personal minimum desires had been met, they 
ceased thinking about looking for more suitable professions that would be in 
accordance with their educational background. Underemployment thus is imported. 
Drinkwater (2013) underlines in his study how information was often reported back 
to families and friends in the home country, which mean that the potential labour 
migrants were informed about the possibilities to find work in the destination 
country. 
Working in low-skilled jobs was rather predetermined. The Polish labour migrants 
knew beforehand where to look for jobs, namely in the low-skilled sector, despite 
their high educational attainments. However, by accepting low-skilled jobs, they 
were able to reach their aim of earning higher income and enjoying ‘a better life’, as 
they often emphasized, and they were able to circumvent the problem of 
unemployment while seeking higher level jobs, which are generally more difficult to 
get. Their confidence in finding a job in that particular sector explains the reason for 
their carefree mindset towards finding employment. This was, at least, the 
perspective of the migrants, and the perspective of the migrants may rely on or be 
influenced by the perceived labour market in the receiving country. Not only is the 
Polish labour migrant pushed into the third sector, the composition of the labour 
market proves to be attractive to non-UK workers (e.g. Poles and low-skilled 
migrants) as well, thus constituting a pull-factor. For instance, one key finding 
reported in studies over the past few years is that two thirds of employers in 
agriculture and food processing and 40% in hospitality have suggested that UK 
workers are difficult to recruit because the work is physically demanding and ‘not 
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glamorous’ (Anderson et al., 2006; McCollum and Findlay, 2011; Migration 
Advisory Committee, 2014; Rogaly, 2006). Other studies have come to similar 
conclusions regarding the employment structures of labour migrants in the UK, 
namely that the native population refuses to take up some specific types of works for 
class reasons, as postulated in the dual-labour market theory.  
4.3.3 Implications of language for the Polish migrants 
 
A further variable, which was frequently mentioned, was ‘language’. The following 
section will portray the function and relevance of the factor language.   
4.3.3.1 Language as a determinant in the labour market 
Both of the facts noted above, namely that entering the low-skilled sector was easy 
and that the migrants’ previous jobs had also been in the low-skilled sector, 
contributed significantly to the phenomenon of over-qualification of Polish migrant 
workers. In addition to these observations, there is another interesting reason why the 
participants explicitly chose the third sector in particular: poor language skills. When 
they were asked why they had not sought an office job, one of the reasons for most 
participants was language deficit.  
Q: And is it for you difficult to get an office job here?  
A: I didn’t try.  
Q: Why did you not try?  
A: I don’t know. I thought that maybe my English is not so good to do it. 
When I’m speaking with someone for example from Poland or something we 
can understand each other. But when I speak with English or British people 
it’s really difficult. It’s quite difficult. (Amelia)  
The participants were keenly aware of their language skills. Some of them could 
imagine working in an office job, but felt their weak English skills would limit their 
capability. As Carolina put it, ‘I have problem with my language’. Concerning the 
language skills, the majority of the participants had good conversational English 
skills and could express themselves easily. Undoubtedly they must have advanced 
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their language skills immensely since their point of arrival. From the interviews, 
though, it was clear that the participants still felt insecure about their language skills. 
Frequently, they expressed their lack of confidence whenever they were talking 
about other job opportunities, i.e. jobs in the skilled sector. The interviewees rated 
their language skills as insufficient, thus classifying themselves as incapable of 
holding jobs in the qualified sector that would align with their educational 
background. This finding does not comply with the results from other studies (e.g. 
Drinkwater, 2013) that classify the language skills of Polish labour migrants as 
‘intermediate’ or ‘good’. As a result of their insecurities regarding English, the 
participants did not even try to seek employment outside the third sector. Though the 
language deficit did not constitute the main reason for this job search focus, it was a 
factor of influence.  
Kataryna, who came to the UK in 2012, was well aware that even in the low-skilled 
sector she would be able take up only a few specific jobs due to language deficits, 
namely those jobs that would not involve direct communication with customers.  
Q: And was it easy to find?  
A: Ehmm, yes, I think so because it took me two weeks. Because I walked 
around, first I was looking at shops with clothes and shoes, restaurants, but 
my English was not good, not good enough to speak to customers. And I 
passed in Hampstead McDonalds, and I said okay McDonalds, I’ll ask about 
the job. I went there, I spoke to the manager and he said okay we need one 
person. And I was like woaaaaw I’m happy! Okay! I left my CV and few days 
later the manager sent me an email about another meeting with me. And he 
said okay, you have the job. (Milena) 
Consequently, employment opportunities are limited for newly arrived Polish 
workers. Performing any services related to engagement with customers was 
considered virtually impossible. However, being aware of their deficit concerning 
their language skills, the participants were engaged in improving their English: ‘Now 
for me it’s important, English, English, English… now I’m working in McDonald’ 
(Milena).  
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4.3.3.2 Language as a determinant in choosing the destination country/labour 
market 
Another special characteristic of language is its functionality as a determinant when 
migrants are choosing their destination country. The interviews revealed how 
language skills can be highly influential in the decision-making process.   
The participants stated that English was a compulsory class in their educational 
system, whereas German was optional. Almost none (1 out of 25) of the participants 
had any German language skills. When asked why they did not choose another 
country to move to, the participants reported language as one of the major reasons. 
Nearly all of them said that because they spoke at least ‘some’ English, they had 
chosen England.  
Although they were not very fluent initially, at least they knew that they would learn 
it and they were confident that they would overcome the language problem.  
Q: And why did you come to London and not to Germany or to other 
European countries?  
A: Yeah, but because of the language. I know English.  
(Marysia)  
Q: You could also go to France, but you came to England.  
A: Yes, but also if you want to go to Germany you have to speak German. 
Definitely. I feel more comfortable. English is still a problem, but you can 
learn it. It’s easier.  
(Cezar)  
Q: You could have gone to Germany. But you did not go there.  
A: I didn’t go because before I’ve studied English language. That’s why most 
of the people came.  
(Aneta) 
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The participants had felt, at the very least, that they would be able to overcome the 
language problem and learn English, whereas German seemed to be ‘very difficult’ 
(Milosz) or ‘they do not like the German language’ (Maja). Basically, when migrants 
have a choice to migrate, they migrate to places where language problems will be 
easier to overcome. That is maybe why more people moved to England after the 
enlargement than to Germany, even though Germany may have been geographically 
closer. The personal background or profile of the migrants seemed to be of a lesser 
concern. It did not matter what kind of qualifications the migrant had achieved. What 
mattered was their ability to speak the local language.  
Language factors seem to play a pivotal role in the migration processes, especially 
when it comes to the determination of the destination country, even more so than 
geographic characteristics. Germany is geographically much closer to Poland. The 
fact that more people decided to migrate to the UK undermines any argument 
stipulating that migration is defined by geographic proximity. It is unknown how 
many people would have migrated to Germany instead of the UK if Germany had 
opened its borders as well right from the beginning for Polish citizens. Nevertheless, 
the factor of language does seem to be a contributor to the UK’s exceptional 
popularity as a destination.   
4.4 The significance of network theory for Polish labour migrants 
Generally migration concepts try to identify the determinants behind the motivations 
of migrants. As opposed to other theories, network theory considers migration as a 
dynamic act that results out of social networks in between spaces. Hence the theory 
explains what ‘perpetuates’ migration in time and space (Massey et al., 1993). By 
focusing primarily on social relationships, the deterministic view or the perspective 
of atomized rational actors is abandoned, thus network theory functions within a 
different kind of systematic framework. In brief, network theory is conceivable as a 
‘self-perpetuation’ of migration streams. This argument, as well as the role of 
networks, is examined in this section in the content of the decision-making process 
of Polish labour migrants. Within the framework of this research study, network 
theory is used to allow a better comprehension of the migration patterns of the Polish 
labour migrants. Networks seem to be very important as well. 
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4.4.1 Facilitator of migration: The positive effect of social networks 
In the interviews, social networks and their role in the receiving country were of 
particular interest. As described in the previous section, according to network theory, 
social networks are not categorized as direct determinants behind the motivation of 
the migrant; rather networks serve as facilitators of migration. However, the 
interviewees stated that they probably would not have come if they had not known 
anyone at all. Almost all of them knew someone before they came, or they were in 
contact during the migration process. In the majority of the cases, with a few 
exceptions, if the Polish labour migrants did not have family or friends, they stated 
they most probably would not have come to the UK. Having friends and family 
members in the UK contributed significantly to their decision-making process to 
come to London. Of all the Polish migrants interviewed, a clear majority had a social 
tie in the UK, and also the majority stated that they came in part because they could 
rely on their friends’ help. In fact, most of them claimed it was conditional for them 
to know someone in order to depart on a journey to another EU member state. When 
asked whether they would still have come if they had not had any social ties, nearly 
all of the respondents said no.  
Reflecting on the theories of migration, network was treated not as a determinant to 
move. In the interviews, they never provided ‘networks’ as a determinant to move in 
their decision-making process when they were asked about their motivation. Rather, 
wages and higher income was the general main reason to migrate. Hence, networks 
may be a facilitator to move, however the ultimate factor which influences their 
decision-making process may be the wage determinant. Also, sometimes, it was just 
about knowing ‘someone’, and not necessarily always a close friend or relative, 
which is a tie that can be found generally quite easily. Portes (1989) defines social 
capital as  
the capacity of individuals to command scarce resources by virtue of their 
membership in networks or broader social structures. Such resources may 
include economic tangibles like price discounts and interest-free loans, or 
intangibles like information about business conditions, employment tips, and 
generalized ‘goodwill’ in market transactions. (Portes, 1989) 
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The role of social capital can be considered as highly important, but social capital 
cannot be justified as a determinant. In particular, accessible advice on employment 
opportunities and intangibles like sources of information were highly important for 
the migrants. Housing played a vital role as well. Most of the migrants’ migrations 
were utterly spontaneous and unplanned. Their initial intention was to stay in 
London for a limited period. In fact, for most of them the only plan was to 
accumulate additional income and return thereafter. Therefore knowing someone in 
the destination country in advance and having the ability to stay at their place at the 
early stages of their journey created a convenient opportunity to eliminate the 
additional expenses or living costs.  
To provide an example from the interviews, Barbara used her social capital and 
resources from her existing personal network of people to overcome housing and 
employment issues. When asked whether it was easy to find a job, she replied as 
follows:  
Yeah, it wasn’t very difficult. As I say, you know we are close to the Polish 
community so when we came we rent the room from a Polish girl you know 
its always like that someone knows someone who knows someone, so it 
wasn’t very difficult. (Barbara) 
Next to housing, the act of finding employment was also heavily connected to the 
use of the social network. Nearly all the interviewees confirmed that they found their 
jobs through the help of friends or people they knew. Their friends’ help served as 
guidance. The transfer of information hence functioned as a reassurance for the 
labour migrants. 
Milosz, corroborated the existing difficulties of not having a social network:  
Yeah it was…was hard. If you don’t have anyone here there is no guide. Tell you 
what to do, where to go. It’s quite hard. . . . The other Polish people, most of them 
had friends or family here, which made everything a lot easier for them. Yes, they 
just go there, stay with them, so they didn’t worry about accommodation, with the 
food, don’t have to be looking for job… but I had no one. I just came, stand there on 
Victoria Station and just was wondering what to do next. (Milosz) 
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With social capital, the costs and risks associated with the act of migrating are 
reduced, i.e. housing, employment, and social interaction. Social capital thus has a 
direct effect on the migration process. The probability of migrating is increased, and 
the selection of the destination country is facilitated. 
Furthermore, although in the first few months of their arrival the migrants used their 
networks as a starting point, afterwards the migrants started to become independent. 
Sonia explained that, though her friend was a great help in the beginning, Sonia later 
‘started to be independent’; after she ‘start[ed] to work’ and ‘go to English school as 
well’, Sonia left her friend’s place. Martyna described a similar experience.  
In most of the cases, having a family functioned as a determinant for choosing the 
new destination country. The participants’ destination country was practically almost 
determined on the basis of geographic location of their social network. Hence their 
networks served as a determinant of where to move. Maja, for instance, did consider 
the option to go to Germany. However, as she explains, ‘but then my friends called 
me in London. Because it was just a spontaneous decision. I just finished my school 
I did my exams and then I came here straight away.’ Similarly, Milena toyed with 
the idea of migrating to Germany, but ultimately elected the UK as well: ‘I didn’t 
know no one there, at this moment. So I didn’t go. But if I will know someone, yeah 
I will go, because they pay good!’  
4.4.2 Same identity network eases life through network community and group 
psychology  
The networks not only facilitated the actual movement of Polish labour migrants to a 
specific country but also generated a community feeling that contributed to the 
comfort and fast adaptation of the migrants. This community feeling eliminates the 
feeling of alienation in a new home country. The knowledge of the existence of 
diaspora eases feelings of anxiety or loneliness and therefore increases the tendency 
to migrate. In some of the cases, the community was an important factor that 
contributed to the participants’ decision to stay permanently in the UK. Most of them 
naturally felt connected to their fellow countrymen. This may have alleviated 
homesickness or even substituted the community feeling they had in their home 
countries. As Basia assessed, ‘You always try to stay close to your community, and 
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especially when you have kids, you want them to learn their own language and to 
learn everything in Polish.’  
Sonia, who came alone and stayed thanks to an invitation from a close friend to live 
at her place in the beginning, explained happily how comfortable she feels in 
London: ‘It’s very interesting because like you know, many cultures and religious 
live in one place, and they don’t argue. Everything is together. There is harmony. A 
lot of Polish people live in Dalston, Hendon, Islington.’ The concentration of groups 
from the same nationalities or ethnicities in the same area is common in many 
migration countries. Before the act of migration, it is very likely or even presumed 
that the individual migrant possesses a substantial amount of information or 
knowledge about the geographical location as well as about other further information 
about his peers in the recipient country. The information is obtained via the circle of 
personal social networks in the origin country or, as is common nowadays, through 
the means of media. Thus, generally, before moving migrants become acquainted 
with the existing concentrations of their peers in the receiving countries. With the 
high accessibility and the dispersion of excessive information thanks to online 
media, potential migrants are well informed about both the opportunities and the 
risks of migration, and they take these into consideration before moving.  
The abundant availability of information, however, may not represent the only 
channel to stimulate migration. Generally, the composition of a migrants’ social 
circle tends to feature acquaintances or friends who have also experienced migration 
or are in some ways related to migration. Labour migration (unlike forced migration 
or other forms of migration) can be defined as a ‘positive’ form of migration as, 
fundamentally, people are going to other countries to work in order to ‘improve’ or 
‘add value’ to their lives, whether in terms of financial or personal gains. Within a 
social circle, the perception of migration as a positive act may create a highly 
influential factor amongst social groups. The results can be interpreted as a type of 
‘herd mentality’ behaviour. For instance, the interviewees subconsciously mentioned 
that, before they had migrated themselves, ‘most of the people go to another country 
to work’ or that another ‘friend went to Australia’ (Adrianna) or that ‘friends had 
come to England’ (Sonia). No direct questions were asked to determine whether the 
participants had been influenced by external factors such as the influence of the 
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existence of peer migrants. However, through the indirect and unconscious linkages 
to other peer migrants, it was understandable that peer pressure to migrate was 
existent to some extent. 
If the aforementioned condition to migrate – i.e. ‘having a social network’ – was not 
applicable, then the option of ‘coming with someone’ provided a further channel that 
facilitated migration.  
When the migrants were asked whether they still would have come if they had not 
known anyone, or if they would have come alone, their answers were again very 
straightforward: 
Ehh no… don’t think so. Probably I would be carrying on studying and do 
the master. (Ewelina) 
The presence of a community in the destination country, specifically a community of 
people who had underwent the same experience, had provided a secure foundation 
for the potential migrants.  
4.5 The negligence of the social determinants of Polish labour migrants 
The main objective thus far in this chapter has been to focus on the economic 
determinants and on the role of networks that led to migration and to explore the 
different factors and interrelations of various contexts within the act of migration. 
The fundamental aim was to find out or to scrutinize through the semi-structured 
interviews whether and how economic determinants lead to more mobility among 
Polish migrants. In order to confirm the expectations of the hypotheses of this 
research, the interviewees had to confirm that…  
- ‘economic’ factors were the paramount reason to migrate; 
- the migrants would not have come if they had earned the same level of income in 
their origin countries; 
- the migrants would take up any job independent of skill levels as long as they earned 
more compared to the income levels in their origin countries. 
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So far, the determinants have been concentrated around economic activity related 
variables. The next section addresses the social related variables and their 
importance.  
4.5.1 The role of social determinants for Polish labour migrants working in the low-
skilled sector in London 
The fact that the migrant workers never referred to any social variables in relation to 
their migration can lead to the first assumption that those variables were simply 
irrelevant. The migrants were then asked directly whether social factors, such as the 
attraction of the city, social activities, or social status or even prestige, played a role 
during the decision-making process. The responses were clear and unanimous: the 
majority shared the opinion that ‘it was not important at all’ (e.g. Martyna, Ania). A 
few common explanations were that ‘it has become normal’ to go abroad. Basically, 
according to the opinion of the Polish labour migrants, moving to another EU 
country to work did not contribute to their social status or prestige at all. Or at least, 
the migrants did not consider these determinants as valuable or as important. Basia 
explains as follows: 
Q: Do you think you will profit from prestige or social status when you work 
here in London and then go back? Or does it not make a big difference in 
your Polish environment?  
A: Not really now anymore. Maybe before, like when we came here. Like 
eight years ago, ten years ago. Yeah then it was something like oh my god… 
are you in London, I wish to go there. Now it’s like, so many Polish people 
are here. They probably have someone from their family, in England, 
Scotland or in Germany. So it is like normal now when you’re living in the 
UK. (Basia) 
Regarding the development of personal skills, Polish labour migrants considered 
English language skills as important. Although most of the participants did not excel 
in terms of English language skills, they were able to express themselves on a fluent 
basis and could lead conversations without big difficulties. They were perfectly 
aware that sound English skills were essential to become part of the society they 
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were living in, and they perceived those skills as an important factor in relation to 
their work: 
Without English you cannot do a lot, when I want to work in another job, I 
need to speak better English. Like, it is okay to talk in English with Polish 
people, but not with the English. They speak different English. (Carolina) 
The Polish migrants showed a strong interest in improving their language skills50, 
but doing so was never cited as a reason why they came. Rather, they perceived it as 
a duty in order to become part of the society. The Germans, in contrast, often came 
in order to excel in their English language skills and to become more competitive in 
the professional world. This was never the case for the Polish labour migrants. In 
short, though both groups regarded improvement of English skills as an increase of 
human capital, the groups had different underlying motivations or reasons.  
Furthermore, some of the participants considered their stay in London as a 
‘privilege’, which can be linked to the ideas of prestige or social status. In fact, 
London was perceived as a ‘door opener’ to the rest of the world (Milosz). Or, for 
some, the UK (in this case London) presented the better alternative to every other 
possibility they had at that moment in their lives.  
So I met people from everywhere, literally from everywhere, because it was 
nice, so I was like, if I can study here, its always better to study in London, 
the paper from the Uni that you study here is always better than the one from 
Poland. (Marte) 
I wanted to see the world and travelling. From London, you have an 
opportunity to go everywhere; you have more connection to go everywhere. 
From my country I could not even whole year save the money to somewhere 
once a year. (Ewelina)  
Nevertheless, the advantages of London were generally not stated as a reason to 
come. Only two participants began the interviews by emphasizing the advantages of 
                                                        
50 In fact, most of them they enrolled into language courses, or wanted to continue their language 
studies. Since they have the flexibility at work, most (e.g. Kataryna and Katrin) were able to attend 
courses in the evenings. 
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cosmopolitan cities such as London and did not state income as a main reason. 
However, both of the interviewees (Ewelina and Mateusz) also stated that they were 
regarding their stay in London as ‘journey’ or as an ‘adventure’.  
The factor of networking, which presents another social variable as it is an 
investment in human capital too, was not addressed by the Polish participants at all. 
Lifestyle reasons were mentioned in the interviews, but they were not a priority as 
they were was for the Germans. In conclusion, social reasons seemed of less 
importance for the Polish labour migrants. Although the participants spoke of leisure 
activities, their first motivation was to meet their basic demands via financial gains.  
4.6 Barriers and labour mobility levels in the EU 
This last section focuses on barriers to moving. The first chapter outlined how, 
regarding European labour mobility, in recent decades the debates have revolved 
around the argument that mobility levels are low due to barriers. The most prominent 
barrier, as put forward by the literature, is the language barrier. A plethora of recent 
studies on mobility levels in Europe have argued that the fundamental cause behind 
low mobility levels is language deficiency, which allegedly hinders potential labour 
migrants from moving. It may be useful to ask how this particular ‘problem’ can be 
overcome, or whether it is a surmountable problem at all.  
4.6.1 Approaches of Polish labour migrants towards the conception of ‘language’ as 
a barrier 
In order to investigate the validity of language being an inhibitor to move, the 
researcher asked the participants to explain their decision to move and that decision’s 
linkage to languages in detail. The variable ‘language’ was thereby tested to 
determine whether it acted as an inhibitor or not. The results were remarkable: 
contrary to the main argument from existing literature, all the workers migrated 
despite huge language deficits. Firstly, language was not considered as a barrier, or 
at least it was not considered as an insurmountable problem. As Ania stated with a 
laugh, ‘It is a problem but I have my teacher . . . and I try to learn.’  
The participants did acknowledge language deficiency among Polish workers as a 
hindrance or problem, but not when related to migrating to the UK. Rather, as 
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discussed in the previous sections, it was considered a hindrance for entering the 
white-collar job market. Possessing only low English skills, the participants basically 
resigned themselves to accepting any kind of job: 
I was looking for work everywhere! I was going from one place to another 
place and you know, learned the words, looking for a job, going everywhere 
asking the same sentence, then I found kitchen porter for ten hours. (Milosz) 
In fact, the migrants did not consider their language challenges as a problem at all in 
terms of choosing to migrate, as long as they had the right motivations. That means, 
their interest in moving was stronger than the contemplation of language deficits. 
Again, it may be related to the fact that most of them work in the third sector, where 
low English skills may be regarded as sufficient. Also, they were quite confident that 
they would gradually improve their language skills. As Mateusz noted, ‘I don’t speak 
like them, but I want to be close to. It takes me time.’  
Ada described her difficulties and her determination to overcome her anxiety in 
terms of language as follows: 
I was so scared to open my mouth. It was a big issue in my mind before I 
came. I refused to speak in the beginning for over a couple of months. But 
then, I thought that, if that Chinese girl can speak English as well, then I can 
learn it, too! And after one year or two, it was not a problem anymore. (Ada) 
Regarding the Polish labour migrants, although the majority had language-related 
issues, such as lack of confidence, they still chose to migrate to another EU country. 
As a conclusion, for the Polish sample, which constitutes a ‘highly mobile’ group of 
migrants, language was not really considered as a barrier even though anxieties 
existed. The participants were quite aware of their language deficits, as outlined in 
the previous sections, and they had invested in their language skills as soon as they 
had arrived. This furthermore shows their willingness to overcome the language 
problem. In essence, it can be argued that the migrants’ motivation to earn money 
overcame the deficit in language skills. Based on the interviews, those who had the 
underlying motivations to move (originating from economic motivations) considered 
language problems as no hindrance or at most a surmountable problem.  
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This section of the study has challenged the common argument in the literature on 
mobility levels, namely that mobility levels are low due to language barriers. The 
results are interesting in that, although the Polish sample size was affected very 
highly by high rates of language deficiency, Poland is one of the EU countries with 
the highest rate of migration of workers. In contrast, German workers generally have 
advanced language skill levels, but they are more reluctant to move. Those with low 
language skills are in fact ‘more mobile’ if you compare the two groups from this 
study.  
4.7 Summary and conclusion 
The chapter has explored the compliance of the neoclassical theory of migration with 
the responses of the Polish labour migrant participants who came to London in order 
to work. The aim of this chapter was to investigate and to reveal the interrelations of 
various factors and circumstances that motivated the Polish labour migrants to move. 
The difference to existing studies lies in the use of methodologies. Whereas a large 
body of studies (Brueckner et al. 2009, Sprenger, 2013; Kahanec and Zimmermann, 
2008) mainly employed statistical devices and relied on large data sets, this study 
used semi-structured, face-to-face interviews on a personal basis, which provided a 
more detailed analysis and deeper understanding behind the motivations and the 
harmonization of the variables that induced migration, thus providing a distinctive 
approach. One big advantage of interviews is the possibility to interfere whenever 
required or to scrutinize irregularities or new, unanticipated findings. Overall, the 
findings confirm the results from the preceding studies (e.g. Sprenger, 2013) and the 
hypothesis of this research, namely that labour migration can be explained on the 
basis of the neoclassical theory of migration, with ‘higher income’ being the main 
motivational source. At least, the findings confirm the hypothesis for the sample 
group in this chapter. In addition, however, the interviews led to some new 
discoveries: For example, ‘the search for a better life’ was an aspiration 
fundamentally desired by the Polish workers. The income levels hereby may define 
what ‘a better life is’, but based on the analysis from the interviews, the process 
seems to be more complex, including further aspects such as long working hours, 
promotion prospects at work, and work–life balance. Essentially, economic 
advantages are not the only stimulus, or they are too simplistic to explain the 
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phenomenon of high migration rates of Polish workers. Instead, the motivational 
background revolves around a multidimensional layer. Conclusively, although 
income was the primary reason, ‘income’ referred not exactly and solely to ‘higher 
income levels’. Rather, ‘income’ incorporated the consequences of the income levels 
which had motivated the workers to move. Furthermore, the Polish labour migrants 
had determined beforehand that they would seek and accept employment in the low-
skilled sector. This observation hints that the over-qualification problem of skilled 
workers is rooted in the sending country and cannot necessarily be attributed to a 
problem in the developed economies. Lastly, social networks seemed to be more 
significant than anticipated. According to the literature, network theory explains how 
migration perpetuates. However, most of the participants stated that it was almost 

















Chapter 5 German labour migrants in London 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter evaluates the most important determinants regarding labour migration 
from Germany. Figure 3 -1 in Chapter 4) provided a detailed illustration about the 
preconditions to confirm the postulation that migration is a phenomenon that occurs 
in significant sizes only between regions with economic disparities. The first case 
study exposed how the Polish sample came to London in order to profit from 
improved income. The present chapter analyses the opposite scenario by looking at 
labour migration between regions with similar standards of economic levels. The aim 
of this chapter is to uncover what causes low levels of mobility within these regions 
by looking at the motivations of labour migrants. This chapter seeks to find out what 
drives people to move between converged regions, and it examines what types of 
motivators are missing in comparison to the Polish sample.  
In order to address the research question, this study conducted 21 semi-structured 
interviews with skilled as well as unskilled labour migrants from Germany from 
different employment sectors who had come to London to work. The results from the 
semi-structured interviews are presented in the subsequent paragraphs, and are 
structured according to the density of the variables as well as their relevance. 
5.2 Why German citizens migrate to the UK: Tracing the motivations of 
Germans working in London 
As per the research framework, the interview opened with the question, ‘Why did 
you come to the UK?’ The very first intuitive answers of the Germans were much 
more concrete than those of their Polish counterparts. Nearly the entire sample 
proposed the following striking and very straightforward answer: 
To work. (Christine) 
In order to work here. (Ruben) 
Their instinctive intention behind their arrival to London was stated in a very 
succinct and precise way. Considering the fact that the target group of this study was 
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comprised entirely of labour migrants / professionals, one might regard the 
formulation ‘Why did you come to the UK to work?’ as more appropriate, instead of 
‘Why did you come to England?’ However, migrants do not always necessarily 
come with the idea of being a ‘labourer’51  in the first place. Recent studies on 
international migration have exposed how under certain circumstances, migrants 
enter the country as ‘transition migrants’ (e.g. refugees) and unintentionally turn into 
‘labour migrants’, thereby contributing to a significant change in the composition of 
the national labour force (Içduygu, 2011). Theoretically, this chain of thought can be 
applied to the first case study group, i.e. the Poles, too. The interviews with the 
Polish workers in this study have revealed how their principal motivation to move 
was based on the notion to ‘have a life’, which in turn was achieved via the means of 
‘working’. Henceforth, labour migrants may not always directly be equalized with 
the ‘mobile workers’. On the surface, both terms may appear merely as a ‘mobile 
labour force’, but further scrutiny of their motivations reveal their disguise and show 
how their incentives to move were rooted in more complex reasons. This rationale is 
not overly controversial, as within the logic of the neoclassical theory of migration, 
through the act of moving, an increased income will most probably entail 
improvements regarding the general well being and most probably positively affect 
the social life of the individual. Therefore, the open-ended type of formulation (i.e. 
Why did you come to the UK instead of Why did you come to work?) in the 
introductory question is considered as more pragmatic. 
The aim of the interviews for the German professionals was similar to that of the 
interviews for the Polish group of participants: to capture the most intuitive and most 
vital drives behind their motivation to move. Among the Poles the most frequent 
answer was ‘to have a life’, which could be attained through the channel ‘higher 
income’. ‘To have a life’ was basically the ultimate desire of the Polish migrants, 
and working was the necessary vehicle to achieve it. The very primary intuitive reply 
from the Germans, in contrast, was ‘I came to work’, as opposed to ‘I came to have a 
life’. This initial finding with the subtle variation indicates that there is an essential 
distinction between the two motivations. The two expressions give the impression of 
reflecting the same idea, but yet provide a large spectrum for variances in terms of 
                                                        
51 Professionals, in this case. 
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interpretation. As one of the aims of this research is to capture the most fundamental 
motivation to move, this subtle distinction seems highly important. The delicate but 
simultaneously highly significant difference between both articulations can be 
interpreted as following: whereas the Poles had to come to London to work in order 
to benefit from an improved standard of living (via increased income), the Germans 
did not necessarily come in order to benefit from an improvement in their lives. In 
fact, the Poles desperately needed to improve their social lives, whereas the Germans 
rather simply wanted to have a ‘change’ in their lifestyle. The former need can be 
described as an essential requirement for a decent life, whereas the latter want is a 
choice. The feeling of urgency is absent from the German migrants’ motivation. For 
the German labour migrants, changing their workplace was an optional choice, one 
which did contribute to a change in their lifestyle, but did not essentially bring 
substantial improvements in terms of standard of living. It is at this point where the 
nexus of common motivators deviate and where the dissimilarity of the motivation of 
each group originates. For the Poles, moving to work was a means to achieve a 
greater standard of living where higher income was an absolute necessity; for the 
Germans, moving to work did not bring higher income and thus was rather a choice 
of lifestyle. A positive change can be regarded, to some extent, as an improvement 
too. Nonetheless, the two forms of improvements of the two groups are far from each 
other.  
The bottom line is that the underlying differentiation between the motivations of the 
two groups exhibits following rationale: groups from different regions of the EU 
migrate to work for different reasons, either seeking for an improved standard of life 
through income, or seeking a positive change in their life via changing workplace 
where income is irrelevant. The contrast is between an improved life and a positive 
lifestyle change. Both motivations result in different mobility levels.  
5.2.1 Active and passive labour migrants 
Among the German participants, two types of migration groups emerged: active and 
passive labour migrants. The first type of workers, the passive movers, consisted of 
individuals who had arrived to the UK as a result of merely taking advantage of 
offers or opportunities that they had happened to come across incidentally. The 
migrants from this specific group were not actively seeking a job in another EU 
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country. Rather, their movement to the UK was the result of the following process 
chain: realizing, considering, and subsequently accepting an opportunity that had 
arisen incidentally.  
The main reason for me was the job. I had been working for the same 
company already in Germany. After 6 months I was offered the job in 
London. I consequently decided to come here in order to work, to gather 
some work experience abroad and in order to improve my CV ( . . .) I knew a 
few people already from the company before I came. To be honest, I would 
personally never  have sent a CV, if I had not been offered the job. (Timur) 
Before coming to the UK I was employed in Germany also at the (Deutsche) 
Bank in the department for commerce of certificates. I also sent applications 
for jobs in Germany. While I was still there, it happened that four people 
resigned from their current jobs and left job openings. This means they were 
looking for people. Among others, also Juniors. So I handed my application 
directly over to colleagues who were already working for the bank, and this 
is how I got the position. (Jörg) 
Quite often, the German migrants’ change of workplace and residence to the UK 
resulted out of a conventional job application process, where applications were being 
sent to any suitable open positions in England and in Germany. The UK was not the 
only option. Or, sometimes, the participants had simply been ‘offered’ a job 
opportunity; the opportunity thus did not arise from self-initiative. They 
subsequently moved to the location of their new job. Besides, the ‘passive seekers’, 
as they are labelled in this research, often were open to any type of positions in line 
with their qualifications in almost any destination country. In theory, there were open 
to work in Germany, too. Therefore, one can argue that the passive job seekers never 
felt a strong desire to move to the UK. A very common behavioural approach of the 
passive movers was that they were not desperately seeking to move for a job; they 
simply ‘made use of’ existing opportunities without any self-commitment or self-
initiative. The participants did not become active by themselves; rather, they were 
‘mobilized’ by an opportunity that they had not elicited. This observation was not 
applicable to all of the participants, but it was true for half of the number of 
participants. In addition, once they were offered a position, the participants still went 
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through the stages of the decision-making process and thus exhibit motivators to 
move. However, it should be kept in mind that the decision-making process was 
initiated only once the participants had realized potential opportunities.  
Furthermore, for some of the participants, specifically for those in the lower age-
range, the general perception was that they felt relatively indifferent about 
continuing their lives in Germany. Their attitude was somewhat neutral about where 
they would work. They did not have a strong desire or urge to leave the country, but 
were propelled to migrate because they were ‘seeking for something new’, for a 
different city, as they were ‘bored’ with their current city (Alissa), or because they 
wanted to gain ‘international experience’ or ‘work experience abroad’ (Alissa). 
Some had already been abroad before London (e.g. Andreas and Franziska), and 
once they came back they realized that they were unhappy. Franja lamented, ‘Then 
my visa was expired. When I came back to Germany I realized that I do not fit in 
there anymore.’  
The remaining counter-group, which comprises around two thirds of the 
interviewees, can be described as a group with more enthused attributes towards the 
idea of working in another EU country. Hence they are classified as ‘active seekers’. 
The underlying difference is their motivational approach towards moving abroad. 
The group of active seekers was driven by an explicit and specific urge or drive to 
work in another EU country. They exhibited common motivators, which can be 
summarized as ‘the search for a different lifestyle’ or ‘career aspirations’. This type 
of labour migrant can be characterized as a ‘firmly determined to move’ type of 
labour migrant. During the interviews, they commonly referred to key phrases such 
as ‘attraction of the city’, ‘work experience abroad’, or ‘skills improvement’ as 
reasons behind their motivations to go abroad to work. These reasons are depicted 
and analysed in detail in the subsequent section.  
5.3 Determinants to move of German employers in the UK  
The principal answer to the introductory question (i.e. ‘Why did you come to the 
UK?’) among the sample of German workers in London often comprised the short 
and precise formulation ‘in order to work’, as described above. In most cases, the 
participant then continued by telling the story behind their decision to move to 
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London. A noteworthy observation is that the answers of the German participants 
were quite often succinct, pragmatic, and brief in comparison to those of the Polish 
participants, and the researcher therefore quite often asked the participant whether he 
or she could elaborate more. Once the interviews were completed, the researcher 
produced a chart with the help of Nvivo and identified the most important variables 
that led to the decision to move among the German participants. The determinants 
were predominantly socially related variables. The most frequent answer for why 
they came to London was because they felt ‘attracted’ to the city. The following 
sections will portray the most important variables behind the migration of the 
German sample size.  
5.3.1 Attraction of the city 
Because London is simply very interesting. The people here are interesting. 
And because I think the city is simply great. (Christine)  
Well, on one hand, the prospects for a permanent job, on the other hand also 
the city, which I quite like. (Simon) 
I wanted to live in a cosmopolitan city. (Arnold) 
Within the literature of migration, the attraction of migrants to big cities is not a new 
theme. For example, Henderson (1986, 1988) discussed a strong positive correlation 
between the city and the skill composition of the workforce, with skilled labour 
being drawn out of smaller cities. The reason primarily results from the demand side, 
as higher skills are required as production rises with the increase of the city size. 
Secondly, from the supply side, educated people are attracted to large cities because 
of amenities and services, as noted under the so-called ‘bright lights’ hypothesis. 
London hereby provides an excellent destination for migration as it meets the criteria 
perfectly well for being an attractive city. Because of its large size, it offers a wide 
range of employment opportunities. London is one of the largest cities worldwide 
and thus is home to a multitude of international companies. On top of that, London is 
also one of the most important financial hubs. For someone working in the financial 
sector, London undoubtedly can be described as a mecca in the heart of Europe.  
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I have been here before thanks to an internship and I fell in love with this 
city. So I wanted to go back to London very much. Because I also think that 
London offers quite a lot as a financial centre. There are so many 
possibilities here. Also it is the core of Europe and the city has a lot to offer. 
(Benjamin) 
Without a doubt, on a global scale London is one of the most attractive cosmopolitan 
cities worldwide for a multitude of reasons. Precisely out of this reason, this research 
suggests that London is a suitable archetype to investigate migrant workers from 
other EU countries. A further explanation why the city of London was picked, and 
not another UK city, is based on the fact that considering that Germans hardly move 
in general, it is more useful to look at those regions in the UK where their population 
is statistically the highest.   
Other than employment opportunities, London provides a wide range of social 
activities, which also contributes to its attractiveness. As for what interested the 
German participants, one of the central findings was that the availability of the social 
activities was a highly significant determinant to move and played a crucial role 
during their decision-making process. In the interviews, the participants often made 
statements referring to attributes such as ‘more to do’, ‘the city has a lot to offer’, or 
‘never boring’, to mention only a few examples. As the data gathered is not 
quantifiable, it is difficult to assess which factors dominate. Still, the perception that 
emerged during the interviews was that, compared to the variable ‘employment 
opportunities’, the longing for social activities seemed to play a bigger role when 
moving. The major finding of this research is that the reason why someone from 
Germany moves to London to work is because he or she wants to have a ‘change in 
their lives’ without necessarily earning more income or even seeing change in any 
other economic activity. Although working was stated as the principal answer, the 
underlying rationale was that the participants wanted to ‘change’ their lives, and 
were essentially seeking for something ‘new’. They had a desire, an aspiration, too, 
just as the Polish participants did. Both groups were seeking for an achievement, 
where ‘working’ was merely a means to achieve the purpose. The Polish workers 
wanted to benefit from a better standard of living (having more free time), whereas 
the Germans simply wanted to have a ‘change’ in their lifestyle. The main difference 
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between the groups is that whereas the Poles required more income to achieve their 
goals, the Germans wanted to achieve their aspiration through moving to a different 
work location. This move also often enabled higher income, but the income lacked 
the meaningful function it had in the context of the Polish participants. The 
following section demonstrates how income was even absolutely irrelevant when it 
came to migration among the Germans.  
The motivations attraction of the city or desire for new life experience / adventures 
are supported by the literature on the determinants of German immigrants. The study 
by SVR (2015) looked at the motivations of Germans immigrants of a particular size 
across all professions and skill levels. The study measured the frequency of answers 
when asking respondents about their motivation, and the most frequent answer was 
‘to make new experience’ and to extend their cultural horizon. Certainly, 
cosmopolitan cities such as London offer opportunities to satisfy such needs. 
Regarding the study of the SVR, the participants could provide multiple answers, 
and the frequency of the answers determined their importance. In contrast, in the 
present study, the participants’ very first answer counted as the most important one. 
Surely, emigration is not a monocausal process with only one determinant behind it, 
but in this study it was important to identify and examine the ‘major’ reason. 
5.3.2 Skill development and career opportunities  
As mentioned earlier, London being an ‘attraction’ as a destination city was among 
the most frequent preliminary answers, but it was not the only determinant. The 
other determinants consisted mostly of variables which can be related to 
‘improvement’ or development of the personal profile, e.g. through the acquisition of 
various skills. These variables included language skills, career opportunities, 
networking or other soft skills, and can be considered as an investment in the 
personal human capital. The findings resemble and confirm the findings of the SVR, 
where the second most frequent answer was ‘for professional reasons’, followed by 
partner or family obligations. Income was only the fourth most frequent answer.  
I have been working in Mannheim in the SAP Arena, since right after my A 
levels. I was responsible for the VIP areas. In Mannheim in the realm of 
event management, I had achieved the highest, which was possible to 
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achieve. That is why I knew that I could not achieve anything more in terms 
of career in Mannheim. The only possibilities left were to apply for bigger 
event management positions such as in Berlin or in Hamburg. However, my 
English skills were too bad for that. Then I thought that, alright, if I go to 
England now, improve my English skills, after a few years when I am back to 
Germany I will come back with great qualifications. (Alissa)  
At first sight wage played not a big role at all. Because the primary concern 
was ‘the experience with soft skills. . . . Work–life balance is important. But 
work is important too since career was for me on the foreground in order to 
come here. That’s why on one hand I want to achieve my career goals, on the 
other hand I would like to enjoy London as much as possible. Networking 
was very important for me too, definitely. (Timur).  
International work experience.  (Rosi) 
In addition to the determinants obtained in the responses to the opening question, the 
continuation of the interview uncovered a broad range of further variables that had a 
direct effect on the decision-making process to migrate to London. The determinants 
display one common characteristic: each of them ought to contribute to their 
‘personal profile’ in a positive way. That means that the participants’ motivations 
were based on the idea of enriching their own human capital. All of the German 
labour migrants basically shared this one universal trait of character when it came to 
their motivations to move. This peculiar trait of the German labour migrants can be 
explained against the backdrop of globalization, wherein the professional world is 
becoming more and more competitive. Nowadays, professionals often excel on the 
basis of their work experience and their professional skills. The density of their 
accumulated skills hereby establishes an essential criterion to succeed in their career. 
Based on the data from the interviews, the types of skills that were revealed included 
language skills, but also skills at work, communication skills, international work 
experience, and even range of network. That being said, one might argue that most 
of the skills in theory could be acquired in the home country, too. An individual does 
not necessarily need to travel abroad to develop personal skills. Hence, the 
acquisition of skills cannot count as the only motivator to move abroad to work. The 
desired skills must have been considered as available in combination with other 
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types of variables during the participants’ decision-making process. It is also notable 
that although these variables were referred to very frequently, they were never put 
forward as the ‘primary’ reasons. Hence, among migrant groups who make up a ‘less 
mobile’ type of labour force, such as the German group, examining the variables in 
an intertwined framework is important due to the variables’ richness in complexity. 
One reason alone is mostly not the only (obvious) factor. As it happened, the case 
was the same for the Polish group.  
5.3.3 Further variable pairs and groups, e.g. work–life balance / more free time 
Another determinant that was a push factor to migrate was the lack of time available 
in Germany. Similar to the Polish sample, some of the interviewees complained 
about the insufficiency of leisure time during their previous jobs and thus decided to 
come to London to work. Andreas explicitly recalled thinking, ‘Okay, I have been 
working too much in Germany’ and then realizing ‘I wanted to have more free time’.  
In both of the interview groups, lack of free time, as a result of working overtime, 
can be observed as one of the major reasons to migrate. Yet there was an underlying 
difference. Whereas the Polish group was suffering from lack of free time as a 
constraint due to their necessary long hours or employment in multiple jobs due to 
insufficient income, the German group was lacking free time as they were choosing 
to do overtime purely for career reasons. Both groups thus exhibited fundamentally 
different reasons behind the non-availability of time for social activities. Essentially, 
one group was dependent on higher income in order to have more free time, whereas 
the other group was not.  
In theory, Andreas could have circumvented the problem of working too many hours 
by finding a different job in his own home country, too, instead of migrating to the 
UK. Moving abroad thus undeniably did not provide the only solution to the problem 
of ‘lack of time’. Additional factors must have had an influence on the decision-
making process to move, too. In the interview, Andreas noted further factors such as 
‘working in an English speaking environment’ and the non-requirement of a visa. 
Andreas had been abroad before in order to work, which speaks for his ‘mobile 
personality’ and openness to moving. Again, like the desire ‘to develop new skills’, 
lack of free time or work–life imbalance does not constitute the only stand-alone 
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reason to migrate. Rather, this determinant is another of the multiple joint 
determinants that the German group revealed as a cause to move. 
5.4   The function of the factor ‘language’  
Language as a skill qualification, as well as a means of communication, is a non-
ignorable criterion among the determinants to move. Currently, there are 23 
officially recognized languages in the EU. This section attempts to find answers to 
the following questions: For the German migrants, to what extent was language an 
important factor when moving abroad to work, i.e. to London? In addition, in what 
way did the individuals perceive language as an impediment to moving? In 
particular, the first sub-research question aimed to scrutinize how the German labour 
migrants dealt with ‘language deficits’ and to what extent those deficits were 
perceived as barriers to moving, as it is often argued that language is one of the main 
reasons behind the low mobility levels (e.g. Zimmermann, 2008; EU Commission, 
2012). 
The initial observations indicate that most of the Germans came because they wanted 
to work in an English-speaking environment. Language, instead of being a barrier, 
may be regarded as a pull-factor. The German professionals repeatedly reported how 
they were offered a job directly from recruiters or internal contacts thanks to their 
German language skills. The next section questions the role of language when 
moving.  
First and foremost, based on their own evaluations, none of the participants 
possessed impeccable English skills (although most of them had held high-skilled 
jobs). Before moving to the UK, the interviewees were perfectly well aware about 
their unsatisfactory English language skills. Some of the migrants even stated that 
they had feared that their limited fluency would make it difficult to get a job in an 
English-speaking country. Nevertheless, their perception about lacking language 
skills did not to seem to constitute a barrier to migrate (otherwise they would not be 
in London now). Despite their awareness and worries about their communication 
skills, they still chose to migrate. None of the labours indicated that their language 
deficits ever composed a serious concern regarding their decision to move or not to 
move. Nor did they ever consider it as a potential reason not to migrate. 
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In the office, we are all German speakers. Still I do notice that it is not too 
easy. We frequently make phone calls with English companies. So it was 
quite difficult for me in the beginning on the phone. Generally on a daily 
basis it is ok. (Christine) 
I did not really have a problem with the language. I would not say that my 
English is particularly good. I have a very strong German accent. But well I 
can make it through and can communicate. (Ruben). 
I do not really have any problems concerning language. Once in a while 
there is this word which I do not know, but this is quite normal. . . . Language 
turned out not to be too big of a problem. When I was new, surely it was a bit 
more difficult. But now it is ok. . . . I had doubts in the beginning concerning 
the language. But when I arrived here, especially here in London, I had 
noticed that not many people speak perfect English. That was encouraging 
for me to speak more. (Timur) 
Moreover, the German labour migrants stated how their communication skills 
improved immensely after a short while, and so was now considered as a 
surmountable hindrance. In sum, language certainly does not constitute a barrier for 
those migrants who are determined and truly willing to move. Conclusively, it can be 
argued that if an individual has a strong willingness to come, the individual will 
choose to migrate despite lower levels of communication skills. 
When asked why their primary choice was to migrate to the UK instead of to another 
EU country, the participants responded that their knowledge of the English language 
was the main reason.   
Because I do not speak any other European language (Ruben)  
I don’t speak French. Because of the language. (Louise) 
Similar to the Polish group, the German group viewed language basically as a 
determinant for choosing the country. Upon the question ‘Why England?’, the 
respondents did not make any further referrals other than ‘language’, thus excluding 
other factors. Language therefore qualifies as the ‘only’ factor as a determinant for 
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the destination country. This finding could justifiably inspire the following enquiries: 
If the participants from the sample group spoke French, would they have moved to 
France instead? And on a wider scale, if Germans spoke French, would that generate 
higher levels of migrants moving to France from Germany, and thus increased 
mobility levels within the EU? Based on the interviews, language itself alone was 
never a direct determinant to move, as knowing the language itself alone was never 
stated as a ‘reason’ or motivation to move. There is always another variable present 
that provides the rest of the incentive necessary to make the individual move. 
Interestingly, the migrant participants in this study possessed different degrees of 
English levels, from very low skills of English (Polish sample size) to relatively 
proficient English command (German group), and all of the migrants decided to 
come independent of their language skills. In addition, labour migrants who possess 
lower English skills – such as the Polish labour migrants – exhibit larger sizes of 
migration streams. And those who migrate in small numbers, they never considered 
it as a problem. In brief, based on the findings from the data, language seems not a 
problem if the right motivations exist, even if the language skills are low.    
5.5 Examining economic determinants of migration between converged regions 
The following sections will present the findings about economic determinants in the 
German sample size.  
5.5.1 The non-compliance of the German migrants (i.e. of converged regions) with 
the neoclassical theory  
As set out in the previous sections, one hypothesis of this thesis stipulates that the 
determinant of individuals to move from less converged regions derives mainly from 
economic motivation. This postulation tested positively on the Polish workers. It was 
proven on the basis of the semi-structured interviews that Polish workers move in the 
first place in order to earn higher income. This section addresses the role of 
economic determinants and their interaction within the decision-making process of 
German labour migrants. The objective of this section is to scrutinize whether the 
reverse causal relationship of the hypothesis – namely the non-application of 
economic variables as motivators among labour migrants between converged areas 
within Europe – is applicable. Because, as shown, economic factors are the cause 
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behind the movement of people between converging regions, then as a causal 
relationship, between regionally converged economies, the incentives to move are 
expected to be based on non-economic determinants, as income levels are similar in 
those regions. As there is less variation of income levels between converged regions, 
income as a motivator is supposed to play a less significant role when migrating. 
Exactly this relationship will be analysed in this chapter. 
To begin with, a crucial observation is the fact that no economic variables were 
mentioned in response to the introductory question ‘Why did you come to the UK?’. 
The primary evaluations of the interviews within the German sample revealed how, 
regarding their arrival to London, economic determinants as motivators were 
completely lacking. In fact, they were never mentioned in the course of the whole 
interview at any time. None of the participants ever referred to any economic, i.e. 
income-related, motivators when explaining why they came to the UK to work. 
Instead, as outlined above, the main motivations originated from social reasons. The 
negligence of the economic determinants of the labour migrants leads to the 
presumption that these determinants were simply insignificant when the Germans 
were deciding to move to work abroad. In order to substantiate the assumption that 
any economic motivation is disregarded, the researcher asked the participants 
explicitly and directly about the importance of income in relation to their decision-
making process. The answers were generally as follows: ‘No, I did not come for the 
sake of higher income. I believe that in Germany I would be earning more’ (Timur). 
The straightforward statement that they did not come in order to earn more income 
explicitly confirms the non-applicability of the neoclassical theory of migration 
among German labour migrants, or in a broader sense, among labour migrants 
between converged regions.  
The researcher asked the entire sample about income as a variable, and each of the 
participants could assured the researcher either that income was not a relevant factor 
at all, or that it played only a tertiary or maybe secondary role. Evidently there was 
unanimous consent that economic motivations were not among their reasons to work 
abroad. On the basis of the findings from the primary data of this study, this further 
underlines the hypothesis that between converged regions, economic migration is 
less existent.  
 179 
The German migrants additionally explained that their current wages were even 
lower in their destination country, i.e. the UK. Over half of the participants stated 
that they were, or would be, earning higher levels of income in Germany. 
Surprisingly however, they had happily given up the idea of benefitting from higher 
levels of income and turned to other alternatives where socially related interests were 
prevailing. German professionals prefer to focus on other preferences in life, such as 
the availability of more free time, international (work) experience, the development 
of personal skills, and an improved work–life balance. This finding suggests that 
German migrants value non-materialistic capital. As Arnold representatively noted 
with satisfaction, ‘I earn less now. But I have more free time instead.’ 
The German participants generally rated their own income levels in the UK as ‘not 
high’. In fact, their perception was that their wages were under their expectations. In 
a more detailed conversation, they explained how they were unsatisfied with what 
they were earning and stated that income levels in their country of migration could 
be a lot better. This reverse condition – where earnings were lower in the migration 
country – was applicable to more than half of the German participants.  
Q: Are you happy with your wage? Do you think that you are paid 
accordingly to your qualification? 
A: At the moment, no. I have earned more in Germany. There was more 
available. But here I have more quality of life.  
Q: And this is important for you? 
A: Right. 
Q: So you did not come to earn more money? 
A: Nope.  
Q: What about the social status and prestige? 
A: If I go back to Germany, it will be surely easier for me to find a job.  
(Arnold) 
 180 
I work in a small company. I have to admit that my salary is not too high. It 
is about just enough. It could be more, definitely.  
(Franja) 
Despite the lower income in their new jobs in the UK, the participants refrained from 
complaints. Presumably, this contradictive attitude was related to the fact that in 
theory, more availability of income would not necessarily have made any significant 
change to their lifestyle. They were already at the upper level of income levels and 
above the average, so they were already enjoying a certain minimum of living 
standard.  
Q: Wages were not significant? 
A: Let’s say it like this, I know that I can find something good in this 
professional area. That is why the entry salary is not really important for me.  
(Jörg) 
Q: Was salary important for you? 
A: In the first moment not at all. I first wanted to have a job, as London is 
important. But the wages for me are ok since I work in a bank.  
(Christine) 
Accordingly to the demographic profiles, sharing the same educational background, 
both of the cohorts (German and Polish) can be classified as ‘skilled’ labour. Still, 
strikingly, each of the sample sizes is employed in different sectors and belongs to 
different income categories. Being part of the lower income level, Polish labour 
migrants are inherently compelled to economically motivated migration. German 
labour migrants, in contrast, are in the upper income levels already and do not feel 
the same economic strain. It is noteworthy to mention that the aim of this thesis is 
not to draw a comparison between the two countries. Rather the intention is to ask 
‘why’ levels of labour migration differ regionally. Hence, sharing the same 
educational profile or similar skill level, but being employed in two different sectors, 
provides a very good basis for examining migrants’ variances in motivations to 
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migrate. One of the most valuable findings from the interviews so far is the 
observation that both groups were ultimately seeking a change in lifestyle or in terms 
of personal improvement, whether through the development of skills or by enjoying 
an improved social life, and where money was the essential vehicle to achieve that 
change for one group, namely the Poles, this was much less so the case for the 
Germans. As the Germans already belonged to a group with higher income levels, 
they did not feel the necessity to move further up on the income bar to achieve an 
‘improved lifestyle via materialistic improvement’. In other words, they were not 
obliged to earn necessarily more income in order to have an ‘improved life’, as was 
the case with the Polish labour migrants. Indeed, the improvement of skills can be 
regarded as an economic related activity, too. In the future, this particular acquisition 
may lead to higher income as well. However, the German participants did not give 
the impression that they had migrated because they wanted to ‘invest’ in their future, 
as they hardly talked about it. Rather, seeking social pleasure was the prevailing 
variable. Future investment in the German groups seemed less important than it had 
been in the Polish group.  
According to the results from the interviews, unlike the Poles, the primary concern 
of the Germans is not to earn more money but to satisfy their interest in non-
materialistic gains, such as experiencing new cultures or a different lifestyle. These 
are the variables, which define the mobility levels of migrants between two 
economically converged regions with similar standards of livings.  
5.6 Tracing the employment patterns of German migrants in the UK 
employment market 
Regarding employment of the Germans in the labour market, a striking insight was 
that German workers seem to make up a highly popular labour force in the British 
employment market based on their own narratives. This section explores recruitment 
as well as employment patterns and any peculiarities regarding German workers, 
specifically German professionals in London. 
The dual-labour market theory, as portrayed in Chapter 1, explains how specific 
features of the labour markets can create pull factors for migrants. According to the 
dual-labour market theory, the segmentation of the employment market as a result of 
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wage differences leads to a higher demand of unskilled workers from abroad. The 
observations from the interviews lead to the assumption that regarding the German 
migrant workers, the UK employment market constitutes to some extent a pull 
factor, too. The role of the UK employment market as a pull factor is supported by 
the fact that the entire group of participants from the interviews was employed 
exclusively in jobs that required them to speak German. This section traces and 
unfolds this particular pattern of employment or characteristics of the employment 
market in London and demonstrates why it can be perceived as a pull factor. 
First of all, the entire sample group was working in jobs where German language 
skills were essential. This pattern of employment was not a coincidence. In fact, all 
of the interviewees had been offered their jobs in part as the position required a 
fluent German speaker. Without this very specific requirement, these German 
speakers would have found gaining access to the job market to be considerably more 
challenging. 
Q: Was it easy to find a job? 
A: It was not too difficult. I had sent away a few applications and found a job 
very soon after. In a German-speaking company. We are selling to German 
companies. I found that quite quickly.   
(Fred) 
It is a really good job. I speak German and English. And also sometimes 
Spanish. The colleagues are very nice, too.  
(Christine)  
I work in a company which mediates interns. . . . In the office, everyone is 
German speaking. I believe that is why I got the job so easily.  
(Alissa) 
Thanks to their fluency in German, the German professionals were granted easy 
access to jobs. If these positions were not existent, the migrants would have had to 
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compete for jobs with local job seekers, which would have made finding a job much 
more difficult. This competition, however, was eliminated.  
Moreover, the migrants’ specific distinctiveness – being a fluent German speaker – 
made them more demandable, at least for some specific jobs. London, as a 
cosmopolitan city, is home to various multinational companies, financial institutions, 
and headquarters of numerous international companies where many different 
languages are represented. To scrutinize further, no German professionals were 
employed in jobs in which only English was spoken.  
The access to the jobs was provided through the use of various channels: the German 
professionals mostly attained their jobs either through the use of social capital (i.e. 
information or social networks from their former workplace in Germany) or through 
recruiters. Though sometimes they had gone through an active job application 
process, this was very seldom. 
I contacted a recruiter/recruitment agency. (Rosi) 
I in fact received a telephone call from the headhunter. She must have found 
my CV somewhere. I had also applied for other jobs, but not at the bank. 
(Christine) 
It was relatively easy to find a job. I had two interviews and it was done. 
Through internet. (Ruben) 
For IT people it is easy to get a job. The only thing you have to do is to 
upload your CV on a recruitment page in the internet, to wait for the 
recruiter to call you. (Arnold) 
Some of them were fairly confident from the beginning that they would not 
encounter any troubles in finding a job. Others, on the other hand, were not sure in 
the beginning, but then were surprised at how they got a new job in London so 
quickly. Caroline noted her own surprise at the speed of the process: ‘I resigned from 
my previous job, came here and after three weeks I had a job.’  
It is also noteworthy to mention that Germans in general enjoy a positive reputation 
and thus are highly sought after in the UK labour market. As Arnold observed about 
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job searching, ‘if you are German, this makes everything a lot easier’. Germans’ 
popularity can be explained on the basis of various characteristics, such as having a 
pedantic work attitude or high reliability. These factors may also contribute to why 
they are hired easily, forming a further pull factor. Moreover, it is also notable that 
the lack of skilled labour is a current issue on a global scale; the resulting demand for 
skilled labour may have further eased the Germans’ process of finding a job in 
London.  
5.7 The non-compliance of the network theory 
In the chapter about Polish labour migrants (Chapter 4), networks played a crucial 
role when migrating. This theory of migration describes networks as social links 
between friends or family members who reside in the destination country. Within the 
process of migration, their presence is used as a ‘source to get support’ in various 
forms, such as in relation to housing, obtaining information, or mediating between 
contacts. Fundamentally, networks serve to alleviate the process of migration. 
Concerning the labour migrants from the Polish sample group, the majority of the 
interviewees had assessed that, in theory, their arrival to the UK would have been 
significantly more difficult without their networks. This section will scrutinize the 
role of networks among German labour workers. To what extent are they important? 
How are they used, if ever? Surprisingly, the interviews have revealed that networks 
are completely insignificant among German labour migrants. Evidence of this 
assessment is presented in this section.  
In order to assess the availability of as well as the German migrants’ relationship to 
their social networks, the participants were asked whether they had known anyone 
before they came to the UK. No interviewees had known anyone or had any social 
ties with anyone in London before they came.  
Q: Did you know anyone before you came? 
A: No, I did not know anyone.  
(Franja) 




All of the replies from the group of participant were almost equal. None of the 
participants reported having a contact person before their arrival, let alone someone 
they knew personally. The answers were slightly unexpected, as London is home to a 
substantial German community and, in terms of geographical proximity, Germany is 
very close to England, even closer than Poland.  
The stark differences in terms of population size of Germans and Poles in London or 
in the UK in general may not provide an equal base for comparison. Still, the 
scrutiny of networks is significant, as this thesis is interested in the ‘use of the 
networks’ for each individual case study. The findings of the use of social networks 
regarding Germans may be summarized and interpreted as follows: First and 
foremost, German workers, representing a sample of migrants from a converged 
region, do not rely on networks when moving, unlike their Polish counterparts. As 
explained by network theory, networks perpetuate and alleviate migration via the 
dissemination of information. This means for the German group of workers that they 
did not need to rely on, obtain, or use any of the social capital (such as housing, 
information, or personal contacts) in the receiving country. The absence of a social 
network did not make any difference to the moving process of the Germans. As a 
result, German labour migrants moved independently of social networks. The Polish 
group, on the contrary, was somewhat heavily dependent on their network, e.g. via 
relying on friends and contacts’ help, especially in their initial period after arrival.  
A more detailed evaluation of the data provides more insight behind the indifferent 
attitude of the Germans towards social networks. For example, the following 
quotations demonstrate the Germans who came to London to work were confident 
that they would meet and expand their social network relatively quickly. 
I live in a shared flat. It was therefore easy to connect to the people. And also 
I started to work very soon.  
(Rosi) 
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Q: Was this convincing for you to move, knowing these few people? How 
significant were they? 
A: Well yes it is quite nice to know someone from the beginning, but you 
mainly work together with German colleagues, that’s why.  
(Jörg) 
As opposed to their Polish counterparts, the Germans were confident that they would 
meet new people very soon through their jobs and establish a social network. They 
believed that in particular their workplace would serve as the major environment 
through which they would make new friends and connections. Their confidence 
minimized their inclination to rely on help from other networks. Possibly, their 
confidence may be explained on the basis of their sufficiency in terms of material 
capital, which made them feel secure, as they were not depending on higher income 
as much as the Polish migrants were. Knowing or not knowing anyone beforehand 
thus seemed irrelevant, as the German migrants materialistically felt more 
independent. On the basis of the findings, one can therefore stipulate that the 
Germans had an entirely different attitude towards ‘social ties’ and ‘networks’ as 
opposed to the Polish and were less dependent on them.   
In summary, Germans are non-related to network theory. This helps to confirm the 
‘non-migrating’ character of Germans, or, from a broader perspective, of people 
between converged areas. Theoretically, one may argue that Germans are generally 
non-migrating groups of people, as they do not share the characteristics of the 
migrants outlined in migration theories. This study, however, postulates that German 
migrate too, but in lower numbers as their determinants are different from those of 
the general migration theories.  
5.8 Future plans: Moving or not 
In addition to the foregoing themes, this research was further interested in the 
medium-term and long-term plans of the labour migrants. The sample was therefore 
asked as well about their intentions to move or stay in the future. The research was 
interested in knowing under what circumstances the migrants would move again. 
Would they move if they earned higher wages, just as the neoclassical theory of 
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migration stipulates? This section presents the results from the interviews on this 
subject.  
Some of the participants did not know about their future plans yet, so the answer was 
simply ‘I do not know yet’ (e.g. Arnold and Alissa). For the other participants, 
generally their decision to move or stay was dependent on multiple factors. In 
respect to their future plans about to move or not to move, following responses were 
given:   
Q: Would you consider moving again?  
A: Yes I am relatively open to that. Eventually to do a PhD. It depends on a 
lot of things, whether I will go somewhere else to work later or not. It 
depends on the private relationships, it depends on the job. 
Q: Let’s assume that you get a job offer where you will earn more. 
A: It depends how much more. But it also depends on the time, and for how 
long I had been where. Because you do build your friends circle. I find it very 
tiring to change your city again and to start from zero. 
(Ruben) 
At the moment I would not move on. I was already earning more in Germany. 
I could also start to earn more. But leisure time is more important for me. 
 (Arnold) 
I would not make it only dependent on the money. If the option suits me, if the 
career suits my profile, then I would eventually consider it.  
(Timur)  
Q: If you received a job offer where you earn more in Germany, would you 
then go back? 
A: Yes, if the life standard in Germany is higher. That means I should earn at 
least the same or more there. But this also depends on the position, whether 
it will be again as interesting as this one.  
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(Jörg) 
Depends why you go or where you go. If it was a super cool company, for 
instance, then I would consider it, but this also depends on the commission 
that I will get and what kind of company. 
 (Simon) 
Evidently, this time there is no one straightforward and comprehensive answer. The 
answers to the question in relation to their intentions to move or not to move were 
very multifaceted. Some of the points which were discernable are the following: 
participants’ decision on moving or not was not especially dependent on financial 
factors, as no participant ever mentioned that they would exclusively move for the 
sake of a higher income. (Remember that within the Polish group, this was 
sometimes the case.) Rather, when asked whether wages played a role in moving, the 
Germans explained that their decision was based on the interaction of multiple 
factors, namely on the coupling of numerous social variables. The single component 
‘earning more’ did not qualify as a determinant to move. For some, the nature of the 
job was important. Would the new job be ‘interesting’, or would the individual be 
able to develop new skills through accepting a new job in a new place?  
It is noteworthy to mention that return migration rates are relatively high among 
Germans. The study conducted by the SVR (2015) found that as many migrants as 
immigrants move back again after a couple of years. Migrants’ main motivation to 
move back is different from their main motivation to migrate away: German 
migrants return home for family and friends. Secondly, the SVR (2015) study 
reported that their German participants frequently referenced employment 
opportunities. Whether employment opportunities constitute a plausible answer is 
doubtable though, as in theory, Germans could switch to other job opportunities 
anywhere (unless the country or world is affected by high unemployment levels or 
crisis).  
Taking into account all of the above, regarding the motivations of German labour 
migrants, there is no uniform rule for why they move. This finding is opposed to the 
migration patterns of the Poles, whose major motivation behind their migration was 
straightforward and singular. The reasons why Germans came to London are 
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multifaceted. Perhaps the most important differentiation is that money played no 
significant role for the Germans when moving. Their motivational reasons were 
grounded on social variables only. The same applies for their future intentions. In the 
long run, the standard of life seemed to become more important when deciding 
whether to move or not to move.  
5.9 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the motivations of German labour migrants residing in 
London. The objective was to identify the dominating determinants of migration as 
well as their relevance. One of the major discoveries was that, unlike the case with 
the Polish sample, there was no single dominant determinant why the German 
sample had migrated. Regarding the German labour migrants, their motivations were 
grounded on a variety of reasons.  
A further crucial finding in this research was that Germans move exclusively for 
social reasons. The identified determinants all consisted of social variables. In 
contrast, in the Polish group, motivations were driven mainly by economic 
aspirations. 
The first section of the chapter scrutinized the difference of the prevalent response to 
the opening question ‘Why did you come to the UK?’. ‘To have a life’ was the main 
response among the Polish group, but ‘I came to work’ was the German group’s 
primary answer. The interpretational analyses gave way to the understanding that 
Poles come in order to improve their lives through the benefits of higher income. 
Thanks to increased earnings, they will be able to work fewer hours and thereby 
enjoy an improvement in their social life. Basically, their social life is attained via 
the means of income. In comparison, the Germans were not reliant on higher income 
to attain an improved standard of life. Instead, they wanted a change in lifestyle, 
which they sought to find through a change in their jobs (by migrating).  
The second section explored German labour migrants’ reasons for moving in more 
detail. The results from the interviews led to the assumption that the Germans’ 
movement was not dependent on money at all. Rather, their motivations were related 
to social variables predominantly and were mostly grounded on the combination of a 
variety of determinants. Material gain was rather insignificant. Therefore, one of the 
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findings from the field research was that the ability to earn more money in another 
country does not lead to higher mobility among Germans. In a broader sense, 
between the converged regions in the EU, income is irrelevant when moving. The 
only determinant that generates a high stream of migration within the EU is income, 
which can satisfy economic motivations.  
Moreover, the role of networks was examined among German labour migrants. The 
results showed how network theory of migration is not applicable to the Germans. 
The findings conformed to the common logic: as Germans are classified as a non-
moving cohort, the non-application of the migration theory is reasonable. To confirm 
this assessment, the application of network theory was examined at the micro-level. 
In other words, the use of social networks was scrutinized among a sample group of 
Germans who are considered as ‘movers’ among a large non-moving cohort. Even 
these movers did not conform to network theory. This supports that German labour 
migrants cannot be classified as the ‘typical’ labour migrants who are generally 
explained through the models of migration.  
The findings regarding the factor of language were that, in general, a higher degree 
of fluency in the specific foreign language leads to more confidence and courage 
during the decision-making process to move or not to move. Despite their poor 
language skills, the Polish participants exemplified that language does not matter at 
all, at least as long as the ‘main’ stimuli to move originates from economic 
motivations. The results from the German group are similar to those from the Polish 
group: although the Germans had language deficits, they were still keen to come. 
Conclusively, one can say that for those who are really interested in migration, 
language might not always constitute a barrier to move.  
In regard to their plans either to move or to stay, intentions were less settled. 
However, the general opinion was that standard of life was important for the long 
term. The Germans, i.e. the movers between converged regions, also seemed more 
open to ‘move on’ or, in other words, they seemed more mobile and also more open 
to returning back to their families and friends. Rather than long-term migration, 
circulation of workers might be more appropriate as a characteristic of the sample in 
this chapter.  
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In summary, those who moved to the UK to work were not after material gain. The 
factor of income had no influence on their lifestyle and in particular, it did not limit 
the amount of available time for leisure activities, which was the case for the Polish 
migrants. Those who had moved from Germany seemed to have already reached the 
minimum level of income necessary to guarantee a decent life. The Germans were 









Chapter 6 Portugal and the crisis: Labour migration during times of divergence  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter traces the motivational background of Portuguese labour migrants 
working in London. The sample consisted of heterogeneous participants and can be 
separated based on two sets of contrasting dimensions: firstly, those in the low-
skilled sector versus those in the high-skilled sector, and secondly those who came to 
London before the European Debt Crisis (after 2009) versus those who came after.  
The main focus of this chapter is on the financial crisis as well as the Euro debt crisis 
and its impact on the decision-making process to migrate. The following sections 
will in particular scrutinize mobility in the EU during periods of crisis and recession, 
and will discuss labour migration under the contemplation of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). The objective of this chapter is to identify the determinants 
of the decision-making process of the labour migrants affected by the crisis. As 
labour mobility, according to Mundell (1961), has a regulative function during 
asymmetric shocks in optimal currency areas, this chapter scrutinizes under what 
circumstances labour migrants move. The assessment is based on the sample of 
Portuguese labour migrants, namely on what their main determinants are and how 
the determinants relate to periods of crisis. The major aim is to expose the crisis in 
the EMU and its interaction with the movement of workers (labour mobility) and to 
show how divergence results in increased mobility levels, and not convergence.  
6.2 Tracing the motivational background of Portuguese labour migrants: ‘Why 
did you come to the UK?’ 
Chapter 4 about the country profiles illustrated how Portugal has experienced 
recurring crises and thus has exhibited a less stable economy in the EU over the past 
few decades. This chapter traces the motivations to migrate among Portuguese 
migrants by examining the stories of Portuguese labour migrants who decided to 
move to the UK. The results of the interviews indicate that the migrants’ decision to 
move was heavily influenced by the negative impact of the crisis and the related 
sense of insecurity and instability, which left them almost with no other choice but to 
migrate. As were the first two case studies, this case study opened the interviews 
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with the question ‘Why did you come to the UK?’. The prevalent determinant was 
very obvious, namely ‘the crisis’ or, as a consequence of the crisis, the loss of a job. 
This universal answer was applicable to the whole of the sample, independent of 
whether the migrants were skilled or unskilled or had come before or after the crisis.   
Q: Why did you come to the UK? 
A: I lost my job. I had some family here. We had the chance to come. Then I 
said okay let’s go and try for one year. (Patricia)  
Patricia came to London in 2003. At the time of the interview, she was working in 
the catering service and was very content with her current job as well as her personal 
life. Before she came to London, she had been a factory worker (tertiary sector) in 
Lisbon, and she had no strong educational background. Similar to the Polish group 
migrants, her initial intention was to come for a temporary time only, save money 
and then return. However, she ended up staying longer, as did most of her peers. Her 
migration story cannot be related directly to the Eurozone crisis, as she arrived to 
London prior to 2008, but the reason behind her arrival can be grouped with the 
same determinant(s) – loss of job or, so to speak, unemployment. Patricia explained 
that before she moved to London, she had been employed in a few jobs in the low-
skilled sector, but even those were difficult to keep up with, and she finally lost her 
job. Her major concern, that she would not be able to pay her bills one day, became 
real, and she consequently decided to leave the country.  
Like Patricia, Andre decided to migrate to London after losing his job. Upon arriving 
in London in 2006, Andre found a position as a barista in the catering service; at the 
time of the interview (all interviews took place in 2014), he was still working as a 
barista. He, too, came to England before the main crisis, namely the Euro crisis, hit 
Portugal in 2010 Nonetheless, Andre reported that his country had already been 
seeing foreshadowing of the issues to come: ‘on that time we had a lot of recession, 
there was an economic crisis. And our business was not employing staffs . . . and we 
decided to come to England because here are more options of job.’  Considering the 
economic indicators in regard to this, Gibson, Palivas and Tavlas (2014) describe in 
their paper how Portugal experienced a downward fall already after 2001 and how 
this affected the citizen already long before the crisis intensified after the 2009. As 
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outlined in chapter four, unemployment rates started to rise after the beginning of 
2000s. According to the statistical data on unemployment growth and GDP per 
capita, Although things got seriously worse for Portugal especially after 2010, where 
divergence increased more than ever (see chapter four), based on the experience of 
the interviewees, the worsening situation of the economy was already in the 
beginning of the 2002 and Portugal’s ranking had been falling since 2005 52 , 
recovering again by2014.  
Similarly to Patricia’s migration, though Andres’ arrival cannot be linked directly to 
the Euro crisis in 2010-11 yet, nevertheless, the persisting instability in the economy 
for the last decades had the same effect on the decision-making process to migrate or 
not to migrate. The critical economic situation in his home country prior to the Euro 
crisis was a sufficient reason for Andre to leave his country and the symptoms of the 
actual crisis in 2010 were perceived already long before.  
‘Losing my job’, the same reason put forward by Patricia, was the main reason why 
Amadeus came. Based on the observations from the participants, the following 
process chain led to the outward migration in Portugal before the Euro zone crisis: 
constant economic instability and imbalances, followed by unemployment or the 
threat of unemployment. In turn, the Portuguese work force felt insecure and 
anxious, as they faced a potential lack of income. The determining variable behind 
their decision to migrate was therefore loss of job and lack of income, which led to 
anxiety, worry about the future, and feelings of insecurity.  
Divergence / Instability  Insecurity  Migration 
The other half of the interviewees consisted of participants who came during the 
period after the crisis. The researcher was interested in finding out what these 
participants’ motivations to migrate were, and to what extent their motivations were 
related to the crisis. These migrants’ feelings, or the variables, were not necessarily 
different in comparison to those who had come before the Euro crisis.  
Q: Why did you come to the UK, what was the main reason? 




A: Basically, like I said, I finished my studies, and in Portugal it was already 
the beginning of the crisis in 2008 and in 2009. So when I finished in 2011 I 
knew that it would be hard to find a job. So I thought that I have to prepare 
myself to get out of Portugal. The reason why I came to UK is, at that time I 
was speaking English, a little bit, I had no clue about German or French. So, 
this was the only option for me, to come to the UK. (Jose) 
Andre came as a fresh graduate to work in the UK. Back in Portugal, even though he 
had had finished his university degree, he had worked as a security guard. He 
explained that he had been satisfied with the income, but he had also been aware that 
his job was not suitable as a long-term job. Most importantly, the idea of losing his 
job and facing unemployment had constituted a main and disturbing factor. During 
the conversation, Jose communicated that he had found himself in a hopeless 
situation. Comparing to the Polish sample group, the Portuguese group did not refer 
to income levels. The main motivation revolved around the crisis and unemployment 
as a cause to move. As Cruz representatively responded when asked why he had 
migrated, ‘Crisis, just the crisis.’ 
In a speech on behalf of the EU Commission given in 2014, Andor Laszio, the 
European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion stated that 
the ‘current level of economic and social divergence within the euro area is without 
precedent in the entire history of the EMU.’ Accordingly, there was gap between 
unemployment rates in the northern and southern parts of the Euro Areas already in 
the 1990s; however, the rates were moving in the same direction, thus converging. 
He further acknowledges in this speech how a massive, unprecedented divergence 
came into effect and that the ‘divergence is clear from the unemployment rate for 
young people and the percentage of young people neither in employment, nor in 
education or training.’ (EU Commission, 2014) 
He further highlights that divergence is very dangerous in the EU. In a recent report 
from 2014, the EU Commission states happily that labour mobility has slightly risen 
recently in the EU-12 countries. Considering divergence since the economic crises 
in the EU, labour mobility may not be the result of the deeper integration of the 
labour markets but, theoretically, instead the result of the divergence in the Euro 
Area.  
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The report Labour Market and Wage developments released by the EU confirms that 
‘From migration data based on administrative records it is possible to discern clear 
patterns of intra-EU mobility, with net flows from crisis-hit countries to better 
performing Member States’ (EU Commission, 2015) The marked rise in EU citizens 
working in another EU country reflects increased mobility from crisis to non-crisis 
countries. Moreover, the report states the following regarding the expected 
significant effect of the unemployment rate on migration: ‘If the unemployment rate 
of the destination country increases by 1% relative to the origin country, the bilateral 
migration flow to this country is estimated to decrease by about 0.14% in the 
specifications with country effects.’ The same report also gives a statement on the 
effectiveness of labour mobility as an adjustment mechanism during asymmetric 
shocks:   
Finally, mutual euro area membership does not appear to affect migration by 
itself, but the estimated interaction terms indicate that it does influence 
migration flows . . . Mutual euro area membership intensifies migration 
toward countries with a relatively low unemployment rate, as suggested by 
the negative and significant estimated coefficient of the interaction term 
between the EMU. . . . this effect appears to have strengthened further in the 
crisis. This suggests that migration flows have contributed to the adjustment 
to asymmetric shocks more in the euro area countries than between other 
countries. (p. 123) 
Looking at the statistics, the UK, which is a member states outside of the Eurozone, 
is the largest recipient of Portuguese migrants (except for the year 2004, when the 
EU underwent the enlargement process, Factbook Portugal, 2014). The comparison 
of GDP per capita levels in chapter four show how the GDP per capita levels of 
Portugal diverged with those of the UK as well. This research study considers 
divergence not only as a issue related to the EMU only, but specifies the divergence 
levels and migration levels between the UK and Portugal.  
Cruz and Roberta came as a married couple and with one child from Lisbon to 
London 2-3 years before the interview took place in 2014. They were both skilled 
workers. They categorized themselves as the ‘middle class’. The trigger behind their 
decision to move was very obvious, again the crisis. Cruz and Roberta provided very 
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detailed answers. To the first question, for example, Cruz, the husband, did not 
hesitate to explain in detail the manner in which the crisis affected them. The 
couple’s level of detail in their explanation proved that their decision was less 
spontaneous and more carefully thought-out than the decision of the low-skilled 
migrants. Their decision to move can be directly linked to economic crisis. They 
mentioned that they were frightened of losing their jobs even before the crisis: ‘Even 
before, it was already like that. With the crisis, it became even worse. The middle 
class was really hit by those’ (Cruz). After the crisis in 2009, their concerns 
intensified, and they finally took action ‘to move’. 
In summary, regarding the introductory question ‘What was the main reason why 
you came?’, both of the groups evidently and exclusively migrated thanks to the 
consequences of the crises, i.e. the loss of their jobs or the threat of losing their jobs, 
which would unavoidably lead to a ‘lack of income’, aggravating their lives. 
Whereas the unskilled sample mostly had already experienced a job loss, the skilled 
labour migrants mostly just felt insecure, and migration served as a form of 
‘prevention’. This section has briefly exposed the main reason why Portuguese 
people migrated. The next section provides a more detailed analysis of the 
determinants and migration of Portuguese people within Europe.  
6.3 Behind the impact of the economic crisis: A more detailed examination of 
the motivations and determinants of Portuguese labour migrants within the 
framework of economic crisis  
The first section exposed the most prominent intuitive answer to the opening 
question ‘Why did you move to London?’. The whole group of participants in the 
sample group provided the same, unanimous answer: the crisis.  This section 
provides a broader analysis on the relationship between the economic crisis and the 
participants’ migration by scrutinizing more profoundly the individual variables 
mentioned during the course of the interviews. The results show how the decision-
making process of the Portuguese labour migrants was highly influenced by an 
intense feeling of ‘economic insecurity’ and  ‘lack of trust’ in the government (as 
opposed to the variable ‘to have a life’ in the Polish case study). The deep mistrust 
and pessimistic perception of their future lives was coined by the impact of the crisis, 
which led to high levels of shortages in the labour market. This section analyses the 
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effects of the instable economy on the Portuguese employers in more detail and 
within the context of the Eurozone crisis and the unsustainable national economy of 
Portugal during the last years. 
6.3.1 Variables influencing the decision-making process of Portuguese migrants: Job 
loss and the sense of instability / insecurity  
During the Eurozone crisis in 2010, Portugal was one of the countries that suffered 
the most from the crisis in the EU. The financial crisis entailed a stark decrease in 
productivity levels, which led to shortages in high numbers regarding work and 
employment on the European level, particularly in Portugal and in Spain. To 
illustrate the magnitude of the crisis, in 2010 the number of unemployed in Portugal 
increased by 40.5%. That represents an increase of approximately 175,000 
unemployed, elevating the unemployment rate by 10.9% since the third quarter of 
2008, when the American banks and insurance companies began to implode. 53 
However, Portugal was hit by high unemployment rates before the era of crisis even 
began. In the 2 years just before the crisis struck, this tendency sharpened 
exponentially.54 
Concerning the national labour markets, the employers did not remain unaffected. 
The interviews incorporated workers from both sectors – unskilled as well as white-
collar workers. The participants in the interviews did not restrain from providing 
very wide and intensively elaborated answers to the question of the motivation 
behind their migration. As evident from the interviews, the on-going economic crisis 
undeniably affected the personal lives of the Portuguese citizen. Most importantly, 
the persistent threat of being unemployed – entailing lack of income – put a big 
question mark in their minds about their future lives. The feeling of continuous 
insecurity, their sceptical attitude towards the political situation and the government, 
as well as their overtly pessimistic mindset about their future were all ongoing issues 
discussed and were mentioned in all of the interviews. The portrayal of Andre’s 
situation literally left him no other possibility than contemplating outward migration: 
                                                        
53  http://observatorio-das-desigualdades.cies.iscte.pt/index.jsp?page=projects&id=115. Accessed 23 
March 
54  http://observatorio-das-desigualdades.cies.iscte.pt/index.jsp?page=projects&id=115. Accessed 23 
March 2015. 
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Q: At the point of time when you left Portugal, was it difficult for you to find 
a job?  
A: It was, it was. Yes, it still is difficult. . . . Because I was working for a 
French company. And the salary was late all the time. I had to pay rent. I had 
my own house over there. I had to pay mortgage. So it was a struggle. That’s 
why, that was the reason. (Andre) 
Unquestionably, the long-term economic instability, followed by the Eurozone crisis, 
had a huge influence on the lives of the Portuguese people, and often on various 
dimensions. The unsustainable, but above all, unpredictable future prospects 
concerning the national labour markets made Amadeus’ life enormously difficult as 
he was constantly confronted with the possibility of having no money at all. At the 
point when he decided to come, he was still working. However, he experienced 
steady fear and was anxious about losing his job. The difficulty in foreseeing 
whether he would be able to pay his rent turned into a psychological concern. 
Finally, the persistent concerns were reason enough for him to convince himself to 
migrate somewhere else. In comparison, the main underlying trigger to migrate was 
not ‘low payment’ as it was the case within the Polish sample group; rather the 
insecurity of getting paid constituted the main driver behind his decision to migrate. 
The questionable reliability of his monthly income rendered it nearly impossible to 
lead a normal life in his home country. 
Jose, who can be classified according to his educational background as a skilled 
worker, was exposed to the same dilemma as Andre. He fiercely accentuated how 
the underlying concern was about much more than a ‘low’ income; rather, the main 
problem was his ability to ‘keep a job’ at all: 
The only reason why I’m here is that at least I can keep a job and swap. I can 
find another job quite easily. Otherwise, I mean, all my family, all my friends, 
all my everything, all my life is still in Portugal. (Jose) 
Ana, who came to work as a waitress, confirmed the same observation as well: 
Q: Compared to the average wages in the EU, the income level in Portugal is 
relatively low. That means you came explicitly to earn a higher wage? 
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A: Yes, wages and it is easier to find a job. (Ana) 
Each time, the participants confirmed that though ‘generally low income levels’ was 
a concern, the ability to keep a job was the prevailing determinant. The Polish 
migrants, in contrast, never complained about difficulties in accessing jobs. On the 
contrary, they were sometimes employed in multiple jobs. The variable of ‘low 
wages’ was never put forward as the main argument by the Portuguese and can 
therefore be excluded from being a main stimulator to migrate. ‘Low wages’ were 
mentioned in the interviews sporadically, but most of the time as a result of cuts in 
wages during the crisis. In fact, some of the participants indicated that they did not 
perceive any big differences comparing the wages in Portugal (when they were 
employed) to the wages in the UK, and thus weakened the argument that ‘Portuguese 
move due to low income levels’. Cruz, for example, explicitly mentioned that his 
income in Portugal permitted a comfortable lifestyle: 
So we didn’t have really like... we were not big spenders in anything. But 
when someone would invite us to have dinner out, we would go. On one hand 
we weren’t in a situation to see, to check our balances whether we had 
enough money to do anything we wanted to do, on the other hand we were 
not spending crazy on it like that, so. (Cruz) 
As evident from Cruz’ story, he and his family were not seriously suffering from 
deficits of income in Portugal. In fact, no participants in the entire sample group ever 
mentioned that money was insufficient, as was the case with the Polish group. 
Rather, their concern originated from the feeling of insecurity and the fear of losing 
the job, which would then lead to a total lack of income. 
Reflecting on the GDP per capita levels, in chapter four, it was explained how 
Portugal made a progressive growth regarding the standard of living, although it 
never caught up with the EU average. Portugal was strong enough to qualify to join 
together with ten other EU countries in launching the EMU, which proves it 
achievement of an efficient economy. Overall, Portugal has been a member of the 
EU for a longer period than has Poland, and thus Portugal has undergone economic 
convergence and adaptation of standards of living to the EU average to a greater 
extent than has Poland. This may explain why, even though GDP per capita diverged 
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slightly, the standard of living was still perceived as more tolerable in Portugal than 
in Poland, where differences in standards of living were the main results behind the 
participants’ movements.  
Cruz’s further explanation of his family’s situation in Portugal only makes the above 
assessment more convincing:  
If we were in that situation where we were able to save, we would have been 
stable . . . [and] the other thing is that, what we knew was that if one of us 
lost their job in Portugal, things would be really difficult immediately. It 
would just take me losing my job. . . . We weren’t in a situation where we had 
to manage whether we had enough money… But in the end, if we were in the 
situation where we could save, then we would have settled. (Cruz).  
The participants almost all noted that they would have stayed in their homes if a 
steady and ‘secure’ income had been available, independent of ever mentioning or 
complaining about wages being low. Hence, the feeling of instability was the main 
contributor to their decision to move. It remains questionable whether they would 
still have migrated if their perception about their future lives had been more positive. 
It is interesting that the Portuguese stated that they would not have come if their 
employment was secured, and that they seemed to be happier with the standard of 
living in their original country than the Poles had been with their original standard of 
living. The inflow of funds allocated by the EU under the cohesion policy seems to 
have led to convergence in Portugal, at least until the country was hit by the crisis.   
Nevertheless, both determinants (low wages and job loss) lead to the same 
implications – namely to economically stimulated migration, independent of whether 
within or between countries outside of the EMU.  
Throughout all of the interviews, under each aspect of their decision-making process 
to migrate, the Portuguese participants regularly brought up how ‘keeping a job’ 
formed a steady problem in Portugal. Their aim was to escape this vicious cycle. The 
researcher did make a specific effort to dig deeper about the role of income levels 
with the intention of determining whether low income levels were possibly a plague, 
as they had been in the Polish case.  
 202 
Jose also explained that he had been considering returning home in the coming 
summer, but he still had concerns: ‘few months ago, everybody in Portugal was 
talking that now we are getting in a good pathway, we are going there, there is no 
more crisis, but it is still crisis.’ Jose was very much influenced in his decision 
making by the shape of the economy in his home country.  
Moreover, the researcher was interested under what circumstances the migrants 
would return, and to what extent the instable economy influenced their thoughts 
about their future. When asked if he would return in case he knew that he would earn 
higher wages, Jose answered, ‘Yeah. With some guarantees, yes, I would go back.’ 
Jose emphasised the necessary of ‘guarantees’, however, which further demonstrated 
how the situation is not only about wage, but also about the ‘security’ of a steady and 
sustainable income. Cruz provided a similar answer to the same question:  
The thing with salaries is that, if we feel that they are sustainable. So if I 
went back to Portugal, I would have to feel that the salary is sustainable. I 
would need to be able to think at least of 2-3 companies to get the same 
salary, if something went wrong with my company. Even like the golden 
special job is not good enough. (Cruz) 
Strikingly, the words ‘guarantees’ and ‘sustainability’ were mentioned often during 
the interviews. The strong insecurity towards the government was blatant. The 
unsustainable nature of the wages was grounded on the long-term employment 
problems that have been present throughout the last decade. In fact, Portugal has 
been plagued with long-term unemployment trends, which manifests one of the 
major problems of the country. The persistence of low periods of shortages in the 
labour market over multiple years has led to a pessimistic and insecure attitude 
towards the government, leading to migration to other EU countries.  
6.3.2 The lack of trust and confidence / pessimistic outlook as result of 
unemployment 
The bad economic situation has deeply instilled negative feelings in the Portuguese 
people. Vanda and Cruz explained their mistrust as follows: 
Patricia: I think we would go back to Portugal, ehmm… if we had … 
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Cruz: Let’s say if the political situation changes in Portugal. Let’s say it goes 
into another direction. . . . There was an opposition party that said okay this 
is the way. But that’s not happening. We will change government, but the 
things will stay the same.  
Researcher: So you don’t get a feeling of security from your government? 
Cruz: Not at all. (Patricia and Cruz) 
A notable observation from the interviews is that the Portuguese participants 
provided very lengthy and detailed descriptions in their answers about their lives. 
Their vivid engagement in the conversation proves the seriousness of their concern. 
Particularly, their lack of confidence in their own future was blatant, and the way 
they were plagued by long-term insecurity was evident. Their provision of a very 
detailed illustration on how the economy of the country was affecting their way of 
thinking proves how closely they followed the developments in the government even 
after leaving the country. Cruz representatively criticised the government by 
remarking of recent events that ‘this is just a quick fix’ and ‘that is not really a 
change at all.’ Cruz grimly concluded that ‘The reasons why the crisis had happened 
– it could happen to anytime again and again.’ This conclusion expressed his fears 
about continued instability. 
The insecurity and lack of trust was manifest in all the participants. In response to 
the question on work–life balance, Duarte provided the following answer: 
Q: What about your work–life balance? Do you think your life quality here is 
better? The working environment? 
A: It is easier here. You are not struggling. You don’t feel threatened in your 
professional life. There is a lot of people looking for a job. Once you get a 
job you can feel that pressure but at least I am safe. That’s also why I have 
kept two different jobs. It gives me more comfort when something goes wrong 
I always have the second plan. (Duarte, 2014) 
Duarte’s reply was interesting in so far as everything seemed to revolve around the 
feeling of insecurity and about having a job. When asked about his work–life 
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balance, he instantly connected his thoughts with the feeling of security when having 
job. Moreover, Duarte was employed in two jobs, which is atypical for the London 
standards. He explained in the interview that the fact that holding at least two jobs at 
once gives him some kind of comfort. This shows how precautious he is and how the 
fear of being unemployed still has a severe influence on him. In response to further 
probing about his willingness to return to Portugal, Duarte responded as follows: 
Q: Are you thinking of going back sometime later? 
A: Not at all.  
Q: What is keeping you here? 
A: Ehmm, in professional terms I have a lot of more opportunities, that I 
haven’t explored yet. England is not perfect. But at least I feel that the system 
works. You can rely on the system. You can rely on the transport, you can 
rely on the healthcare. So there is a lot of things. The market is flexible. You 
don’t have those things. But you have those opportunities on a daily basis 
life. I don’t expect to get rich or whatever. But just want to get a normal life. 
It wasn’t possible before. I’m from Lisbon and Lisbon is not that bad. But I 
see how people are struggling to pay mortgages and losing their houses. 
Coming back to their parent’s houses with their children. And even those 
from the higher classes. You would not expect it what really happens so. 
(Duarte) 
Overall, the responses expand the understanding of how intensely the Portuguese 
labour migrants long particularly for ‘safety’. However, as the Portuguese 
government does not meet their expectations, the participants considered the 
possibility of returning to Portugal mainly in light of their feelings of insecurity, 
which they all underlined multiple times throughout the interviews. Given these 
results, one might question whether the absence of ‘security’ or ‘trust’ in the 
government might lead to higher mobility levels. Migration under this aspect has not 
been scrutinized yet in the literature. According to the statements from the 
Portuguese participants, they chose to move to another country as they considered 
their government to be incapable of responding to the economic imbalances. Thus, 
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the mistrust in the government and in the prospects on future policy making has a big 
influence on the decision-making process to move. 
6.4 Summary and conclusion  
As part of the research design, the aim of the third case study was to explore the 
motivational reasons of labour migrants from an EU member state with a medium 
membership term length in the EU. Portugal was selected on the basis of being an 
EU member since 1986 and an EU country that has undergone some degree of 
significant convergence, as shown in the previous chapters. In addition, being one of 
the critical economies during the crisis, Portugal further provides an optimal example 
for the interrogation of labour migrants within the Eurozone. 
Firstly, the sources of motivation to migrate have their origins first in the feelings of 
‘insecurity’ and ‘lack in trust’ directed towards the Portuguese government. The 
‘crisis’, which evoked a strong sense of ‘mistrust’ and recurring worry, formed the 
main cause to move among the Portuguese labour migrants. Whereas the Polish 
maintained that they wanted to move because they wanted to have a life, ‘to feel 
safe’ (in monetary terms) respectively was the main reason among the Portuguese. 
On a comparative basis, Portuguese felt a fear of total lack of income, as opposed to 
the pressure of steadily low levels of income reported among the Polish participants. 
In fact, low levels of income were never presented as the main or explicit reason why 
the Portuguese moved. This is perhaps unsurprising, as Portugal joined the EU four 
decades ago and has experienced convergence and adaptation to the EU average. The 
majority of the participants stated that if they had trusted their governments and been 
able to enjoy a sustainable income, they would have stayed; there was no mention of 
a desire for higher income levels. Social reasons were not important for most of the 
Portuguese and were rarely referred to. In contrast to the Poles, the Portuguese 
seemed relatively happy with their lives in Portugal outside of the unemployment 
issue. Certainly, as this research did not ask Portuguese migrants if they would have 
migrated had the external variable, unemployment not been present, it might be 
impossible to claim that social variables play no role at all. However, under the 
current circumstances, the high levels of unemployment and the divergence in 
unemployment levels seem to have had a major effect on the decision-making 
progress of the Portuguese labour migrants. One might ask further, what would 
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happen if the government starts to implement promising changes, and to eliminate 
the feeling of insecurity, which is the main stimulator to move among the 
Portuguese? The overall impression was that the migrants would not have moved 
had they held ‘safe jobs’ or ‘sustainable income’, and that they were happy in 
Portugal beyond the fear of unemployment. The neoclassical theory of migration is 
hence not entirely applicable to the Portuguese sample.  
To conclude, considering the idea of free movement of workers within the EU and 
the neoliberal aims of the EU to increase mobility levels, both relevant case studies 
(i.e. Portugal and Poland) have confirmed that there is mobility provided there exists 
any form of economic stimulus, whether grounded on income differences or (the 
potential threat of) total lack of income. Yet, it is still important to ask the following 
questions: What are the fundamental ideas behind free movement of workers in the 
EU and labour mobility / intra-EU migration? Do the findings and facts – i.e. that 
people majorly move for economic reasons – correspond with the political aims and 
concepts/ideas of the EU institutions about achieving high labour mobility within 
European borders? Is it a good thing to have high mobility levels induced from wage 
differences (as no other options for high levels are available)? Is this the idea of the 
EU about ‘labour mobility’? Moreover, are the given facts and theoretical visions 
compatible at all? The findings on migration and the concept of mobility of workers 




Chapter 7 Discussion and conclusion  
7.1 Introduction 
This research has addressed and explored intra-EU mobility/the free circulation of 
workers in the EU under the contemplation of the economic convergence agenda of 
the EU and the integration process in the EU. The three case studies, which were 
selected based on the length of their membership in the EU and degree of economic 
convergence, have helped to unfold and embed the migration patterns, the 
convergence levels, and the motivations of the labour migrants into one whole 
framework. The ultimate objective of this research was to build linkages between the 
three components and to reveal their interplay through descriptive statistics jointly 
with qualitative empirical data. The findings and their interpretations suggest that the 
examination of mobility levels within the EU borders under the scrutiny of social 
cohesion policy and convergence levels and their linkage to the neoclassical theory 
of migration suggest that mobility levels are not low. Instead mobility levels are in 
accordance with the expectations of the convergence theory and the migration 
theories. The neoclassical theory of migration suggests that individuals move as they 
respond to wage differentials. However, the social cohesion and regional policy seek 
deeper integration through economic convergence among the member states. This 
clash of two ‘opposing’ concepts represents a challenge to the main argument of the 
EU Commission, which states that mobility levels are low in the EU. If migration is 
regarded according to the propositions of the neoclassical theory, then mobility 
levels are not low between the converged regions or in the EU in general, but rather 
harmonized and in accordance. At the same time, this thesis has found that the 
economic aspect as part of the decision-making process is sometimes neglected, 
particularly much more so regarding mobility streams between economically similar 
regions. (In this case, labour mobility is not linked to economic theories, but 
explained on the basis of social activities.)  
To what extent do the findings from this research thesis affect the manifest ideology 
of the EU on free movement within the EU? The findings are affecting the policy 
agenda of the EU in so far as they contradict the idea that mobility levels are low in 
the EU and hence need to be increased. As discussed in the previous chapters, with 
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the introduction of the Single Market in the 1980s and liberalization of the labour 
markets, the discourse regarding movement of workers in the EU has gradually 
changed towards to aspiring toward ‘high’ mobility. After the introduction of the 
Single Market, the movement of workers ceased to be seen merely as a fundamental 
right. Labour mobility became an economic tool where high levels were regarded as 
essential for a smoothly functioning and powerful Single Economic Market. The 
Single Market was introduced in order to achieve a deeper integration across 
political and economic institutions through a closer economic union. Both economic 
convergence, i.e. the reduction of economic disparities among regions and the 
standardization of living standards, as well as high mobility levels constituted main 
components of this vision. Whether high mobility levels are regarded as useful due 
to their economic benefits, or whether mobility of the workers is supposed to be high 
for its own sake is unknown – in any case, the ultimate viewpoint of the EU 
Commission is that the levels need to be high. The question of whether high mobility 
levels are achievable in converging regions lies at the heart of this research.  
This thesis, in order to test the compatibility of these two contradictory goals, has 
consulted the scientific theory of movement of individuals, i.e. the migration 
theories, tested these theories’ application on EU labour migrants, and extracted the 
determinants of labour migrants. Fundamentally, this research examined migration 
or mobility levels in the EU under the framework of convergence and social 
cohesion. Unfolding the scientific concept of movement has contributed to a better 
understanding of the process of movement within the EU. This research has 
examined the theories of migration within the integration process, i.e. as a 
framework peculiar to the formation of the EU and with emphasis on the regional 
differences within the EU. The study of the motivation of EU labour migrants has 
given way to the knowledge that, in order to understand the irregular mobility 
streams in an integrated economy such as the EU, it is necessary to understand the 
influence of macro economic factors on the decision-making process of the 
individuals (i.e. potential labour migrants) on a micro level. The results have shown 
that movement by itself cannot be understood if the impacts of the macro structures 
on the decision-making process of the micro agents are not considered as one whole 
interlinked unit.  
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The evaluations of the data have shown how, according to the migrants’ personal 
feelings, the reasons behind the migrants’ decision to move are largely linked, 
influenced, directed, and determined by macroeconomic structures. The impact of 
the macro structures decreases with more convergence and cohesion, as prescribed 
by the regional policy of the EU. The lesser the influence of the external macro 
factors on the decision-making process, the more the motivations transform from 
economic to social determinants, and the fewer individuals who move. The social 
cohesion policy is one of the top priorities on the EU political agenda, and has been 
given increasingly more attention in recent years. The EU is currently pursuing two 
parallel goals with opposing theoretical concepts. The incompatibility of these goals, 
in practical terms, is resulting in allegedly low mobility levels, which are in fact not 
low, but moderate. The implementation of programmes to increase mobility levels in 
converged regions is henceforth questionable. Aiming at both convergence in the EU 
and increased mobility levels is, at least theoretically speaking, a contradictory 
effort. According to the consolidation/synthesis of the migration theories with the 
convergence theory, moderate or low mobility levels are symptoms of a ‘healthy’ 
economy. Migration is the result of the existence of economic disparities; 
convergence is the attempt to minimize economic disparities.  
This chapter relates the major findings from the data collected in the three case 
studies to the literature. The findings from the Polish sample are compatible with the 
literature on migration theories, as the migrants mainly moved for financial reasons. 
Regarding the second case study about the German group of migrants, the results 
show that so-called barriers are not the explanatory factor behind the low mobility 
levels between economically similar regions, as suggested by the literature. Instead, 
economic determinants were substituted with social determinants, which were 
revealed as the real motivators behind the lower migration levels of movers between 
converged regions. This observation leads to the conclusion that economic variables, 
as the main stimulator of migration, are missing, so high levels of migration cannot 
be expected in converged regions. The case study on Portugal and the economic 
crises demonstrates how the large numbers of workers who migrated from Portugal 
to the UK were mobilized as a result of the crisis. The findings from this case study 
further confirm that high levels of migration are experienced in a cyclic form and are 
a result of financial or economic motivations and divergence. The complete findings 
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from the three case studies lead to the ultimate observation that the low mobility 
levels are the outcome of harmonized and integrated economies. High labour 
mobility levels, on the other hand, are a result of economic divergence and 
disharmony in integrated regions. Conclusively, the current intra-EU mobility levels 
between the states in Central Europe (a converged region) are not low, as argued, but 
in fact moderate and acceptable in regard to the principles of the migration theories.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: The next section discusses the 
empirical findings by embedding the primary data into the literature and discussing 
its alignment, non-compliances, and variances. Next, based on the results, the most 
important findings are discussed in order to respond to the research question and the 
hypotheses of this thesis. Subsequently, the implications of the results in regard to 
the literature, as well as EU policy are discussed, including the expandability and the 
generalizability of the thesis. The thesis closes with a conclusive remark on the 
results and their significance for the EU.  
7.2 Discussion of the findings in the context of the literature 
7.2.1 Applicability of the neoclassical theory of migration 
In order to answer the research question ‘Why do EU migrants move?’, the 
migration theories were ‘tested’ on the participants. In total, 25 Polish workers from 
the tertiary sector were interviewed in order to learn about their motivations to 
migrate. Based on the results from the collected data, the findings confirm that the 
Polish labour migrants came in the first place (and exclusively) to benefit from 
increased income levels. This finding confirms the hypothesis that the main driver of 
migration between regions with economic disparities is based on economic 
determinants. The results also exclude any types of non-economic (social) 
motivators as determinants to migrate. When asked about their main motivation to 
move to the UK, the prevalent answer was to find ‘a better life’. Behind this 
statement, the variable ‘higher income’ was the main (economic) determinant, 
affirmed by the total number of participants. The financial reason was never 
combined with any other non-financial considerations. This particular statement of 
the Polish participants reflects and complies perfectly well with the propositions of 
the neoclassical theory of migration, where workers move from low-wage, labour-
rich countries to high-wage, labour-scarce countries or regions as a result of wage 
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differentials (Hicks, 1932; Lewis, 1954; Ranis & Fei, 1961). According to the 
neoclassical theory, higher income levels in the destination countries constitute pull 
factors, whereby the decision to migrate is affected by the aspiration for ‘income 
maximisation’ and by bypassing the wealth differentials. Among the Polish 
migrants’ answers, the variable ‘income differences’ was the predominant reported 
reason for migration. The results support the view of the macro level theory of 
migration, namely that many cross-border migrants start as target earners. The 
neoclassical theory constitutes one of a multitude of migration theories, but it 
describes best the motivations behind the migration streams from Eastern Europe to 
Central Europe, or in other terms, from non-converged to converged regions.  
During the course of the interviews, the Polish migrant workers further expanded 
their explanation on how the purpose behind their movement, i.e. to have a life, was 
determined by the levels of income and wages. By seeking to having a better life, 
they meant the following: firstly, they sought a better life in terms of having more 
free time, which in turn had been denied to them due to the need to hold multiple 
jobs due to insufficient income. In other words, to have a life meant simply to cover 
the basic costs for the minimum life standards and, additionally, to have some 
savings in order to be able to enjoy social life in general. Drinkwater (2013), in his 
study on Polish migrants in England and Wales, used a similar fashion of qualitative 
analysis mixed with quantitative data, and extracted similar answers.  
However, the ‘to have a life’ variable among the Polish is not comparable with the 
‘to have a life’ statement of the German group. Among the Germans, the variable ‘to 
have a life’ was not the end product of working too many hours in order to earn more 
money. In the Germans’ case, the desire ‘to have a life’ stemmed from a poor work–
life balance, which is a different issue. The Polish labour migrants stated that a single 
job was rarely sufficient to cover the costs of living. Sometimes even holding 
multiple jobs could barely cover the costs. This means that although they had two 
jobs, the wage differentials between the UK and Poland regarding the average 
minimum income levels were still too large, sparking the act or process of migration 
(neoclassical theory). In regard to this, the comparison of the wage levels have 
shown that in 2004, when Poland joined the EU, minimum wages in the UK were up 
to five times higher than the minimum wages in Poland. In any case, lack of income 
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or the perceived wage differentials was the main cause. In analysing the motivations 
of the different migrant groups, the evidence from the primary data provided an 
excellent resource to compare the data with statistical figures; the primary data 
highlighted the importance of the financial aspect when migrating. It is worthwhile 
to keep in mind that the provision of more money enables the enjoyment of life, 
which was lacking in the earlier lives of the Polish labour migrants. Financial gains 
build channels and are used to improve the standards of living on multiple levels. 
Higher income is a primary fundament for migration, as higher income increases the 
quality of migrants’ lifestyle.  
In the Polish case study, non-financial considerations were hardly mentioned. The 
general absence of any non-financial considerations is largely (but not always) 
confirmed among past studies applying the neoclassical theory to east-west migrants. 
In Heinz and Warmedinger’s (2006) study on Eastern-EU enlargement and Polish 
labour migrants, the findings led to the same conclusion – namely that the ‘key’ 
determinants among Polish labour migrants were ‘economic determinants’. Galgoczi 
et al. (2009) shared similar findings as well. Also in the context of the post-
enlargement EU, Galgoczi et al. scrutinized the main macro drivers, which were 
responsible for labour migration – namely wage and income differentials. Their 
study confirmed Heinz and Warmedinger’s (2006) findings, namely that the wage 
gap between the accession countries and the EU-15 was very wide prior to 
enlargement (especially when calculated at market exchange rates) and thus 
functioning as an important migration driver. With the eastern enlargement in 2004, 
diversity within the EU in terms of GDP per capita and wage levels grew 
enormously (Galgoczi et al., 2009, p. 15), thus fuelling the migration levels. In 
relation to this growing diversity, Maansoor and Quillin (2006) and Krieger and 
Maitre (2006) sought to determine the margin in their respective empirical studies. 
The two studies separately found that a wage differential of more than 30% had been 
set as a margin to override the costs and that the linearity relationship in the wages–
migration tandem in fact does not hold. Both studies confirmed that income 
differentials (measured as GDP per capita) between EU8 countries and the EU15 
average at the time of EU accession were greater than 30%. An exact calculation of 
the differences was not part of the present study. Both the degree of wage 
differentials as well as the level of the country income matters. The statistical 
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findings of the two aforementioned studies, both of which analysed the same 
variables as the present study, are complementary to the results gathered via the 
employment of qualitative data in this study. Generally, studies on east-west 
migration focus on quantitative methods; hence this research provides a good 
complement by using qualitative data. The effect of wage gaps through primary data 
and the effect of income level gaps through the triangulation with descriptive data 
have been examined and compared. The researcher not only tested the economic 
determinants tested but also explored whether other types of determinants were 
relevant.  
A further point of interest was the examination of the ‘sensitivity’ of labour migrants 
to changes regarding wage differentials. Finding out the sensitivity of labour 
migrants towards income levels provides a source for future predictions regarding 
the behaviours of migrants and migration levels. The results from the data indicated 
that labour migrants from regions whose economies are still exposed to convergence 
are highly responsive to variances in GDP levels. When asked if they would have 
come if the earnings in the destination country had been equal to those in their home 
country, nearly all of the Polish migrants answered ‘no’. Simultaneously, when 
asked if they would return to their origin country if they earned more in Poland, the 
dominant answer was yes. Both responses confirmed that wage differentials are the 
unique motivators among migrants from ‘developing’ to ‘developed’ countries 
(Todaro, 1979). The results are compatible with the predictions of the results from a 
number of quantitative studies on east-west migration that generally claim that 
migration from the eastern countries will decrease with the diminishing of the wage 
gaps and income differences. In a similar fashion, Drinkwater (2013) asked his 
participants via interview about their intentions upon arrival and found that less than 
20% of the sample size indicated that they intended to stay permanently.  
‘Spontaneous’ (e.g. Barbara, 2015; Marcziek, 2015; Suzanna, 2015) and temporary 
arrivals are linked to economic gains, at least among those migrants coming from 
disadvantaged economies. Strikingly, the decision-making process of the migrants 
from Eastern Europe was highly spontaneous and risk-friendly, and moving was 
regarded as temporary, at least initially. This type of mobility undoubtedly yields 
higher levels of mobility in comparison to mobility in which the decision-making 
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process is based on thorough risk calculations and planned journeys. The statistics on 
the migration levels and their comparison with the timeline of the crisis further 
underline and confirm the findings from the qualitative data in relation to 
convergence and return migration. It has been discussed how the Euro crisis affected 
the UK GDP levels negatively, hence (slightly) converging with the GDP levels of 
Poland and how, since then, the number of Polish migrants to the UK has declined. 
In brief, convergence of GDP levels led to a decrease in migration levels. In 
addition, regarding the stayers and return migration, studies on Polish labour 
migrants provide data that suggests, while degree-educated migrants tend to stay 
abroad, those with secondary and vocational levels of education increasingly return 
to Poland (Anacka & Fihel, 2012; Drinkwater, 2013). Theoretically, this means a 
gain for the UK in terms of qualified human capital, but only if the migrants are used 
well and their skills are not wasted in the tertiary sector and in low-skilled jobs.  
Furthermore, it is worthwhile to mention that in 2004 when Poland joined the EU, 
the unemployment rate in the UK stood at 4.8%, while in Poland it was 19.5% 
(Eurostat 2014). The youth unemployment rate specifically was at 40% in Poland 
(Eurostat, 2014). Despite these large differences in unemployment rates, the Polish 
labour migrants never mentioned unemployment or any difficulties in finding a job 
back home. In fact, in the sample group in this research, most of the participants 
were employed in more than one job back home.  
The evidence in this study harmonizes with the fact that compared with other 
nationalities, Poles in the UK have high levels of employment and low levels of 
inactivity (IPPR, 2007). Other personal motives such as education enhancement, 
women’s liberation/emancipation, and adventure or curiosity were not the main 
driving force of Polish migrant strategies. In particular, the paradigm of ‘fluid 
migration’ (Engbersen, 2012), which focuses on young and adventurous ‘vagabond’ 
acting with no clear strategy and a philosophy of ‘intentional unpredictability’ (Eade 
et al., 2007), certainly did not reflect the behaviours of a large majority of Poles 
moving to the UK according to this study. Decisively, the juxtaposition and coupling 
of a number of exemplification of observations and their examinations lead to the 
ultimate conclusion that the labour migrants would not have come if the wage gaps 
did not exist.   
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7.2.2 Applicability of the dual-labour market theory  
The dual–labour market theory, which argues that the composition of the labour 
market in the recipient country can constitute a pull factor (Piore, 1979), was also 
thought provoking for the examination of the decision-making process of Polish 
labour migrants within the EU integration framework. Three facts were remarkable: 
Firstly, the Polish labour migrants reported relatively easy and uncomplicated access 
to the (low-skilled) jobs. Secondly, their earnings in one job in the tertial sector 
exceeded the earnings in up to three jobs simultaneously in their origin country. The 
comparison of the average minimum wages in the statistical data has confirmed the 
high differences in the wages. Thirdly, the flexibility in entering and exiting the 
labour markets in the UK (e.g. ‘I came to earn some money and wanted to leave 
again’, Ada) provided a good starting ground for migration and, thus, might have 
attracted them to stay longer. The combination of these favourable factors served 
perfectly well to meet the migrants’ current ‘primary’ needs – namely to benefit 
from increased life standards by earning more compared to the wages in their home 
country in an easy and uncomplicated fashion, which undoubtedly might have eased 
their decision-making process to migrate. Drinkwater (2013) stated in his study how 
the (favourable) conditions in the recipient country may be reported to families back 
home. The employment patterns hence resemble the views of the dual-labour market 
theory, but the labour market opportunities cannot be classified as a determinant as 
the migrants never stated that they came because they had easy access to the low-
skilled employment sector with relatively higher income.  
Interestingly, the migrants deliberately chose to accept employment in the third 
sector despite their higher educational attainment, so their sector of employment 
seemed to be pre-determined. One study of the recruitment of A8 citizens was 
carried out on the eve of accession; in the study, all employers in the UK surveyed 
reported recruitment difficulties (Anderson et al., 2006). This was especially the case 
for low-skilled and some more skilled positions in agriculture, hospitality and 
construction. In Chapter 5, it was shown how the majority of Polish labour migrants 
were employed in hospitality and construction, confirming the compliance of the 
findings from the qualitative data with the descriptive data. This particular situation 
reflects the dual-labour market theory, which contends that migrants accept the low-
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skilled jobs that native workers refuse to accept due to social status and prestige 
issues (Piore, 1979). A large majority of employers had tried to recruit domestic 
workers and raised pay and non-wage benefits, but still shortages existed (e.g. 
Anderson et al., 2006). One key finding, to be repeated in several other studies in the 
ensuing years, was that two thirds of employers in agriculture and food processing 
and 40% in hospitality complained that UK workers were difficult to recruit because 
the work was physically demanding and ‘not glamorous’ (Anderson et al., 2006; 
McCollum and Findlay, 2011; Migration Advisory Committee, 2014; Rogaly, 2006). 
The figures are equal to the theorizing of Piore (1979). 
When asked during the interviews whether they had tried to apply for white-collar 
positions, the unanimous answer was no. The reason for not trying was insecurity in 
communication, i.e. language barriers (e.g. Marianna), particularly in the beginning 
when the migrants were new to the UK. Drinkwater (2013), however, found that 
most of the Polish labour migrants who came to the UK assessed their own 
languages skills as ‘very good.’ Although the dual-labour market theory is not the 
main theory which explains the large migration streams (as when migrants were 
asked ‘why did you come?’, none of them answered, ‘Because it is easy to find a job 
in the UK’), it does help to explain the employment patterns and how the 
composition of the labour markets plays an important role regarding the types of 
labour migrants they attract. Overall, the case study on the Polish migrants via the 
triangulation of quantitative with qualitative data proves that high numbers of 
migration levels are induced by economic determinants and that social motivations 
are lacking, thus meeting the demands of the hypothesis, namely that migration 
levels are high because labour migrants move in order to profit from financial gains 
in converging regions.  
Concerning the exploration of the motivation of the German workers who came to 
London to work, the results in this research suggest that their decision-making 
process was predominantly based on social values. The neoclassical theory, which 
proposes wage differentials between regions are the main cause to move, is thus 
entirely negligible, as expected, as the level of standards of living and/or income 
levels between the UK and Germany are similar rather than divergent. Instead, the 
human capital theory, the micro version of the neoclassical theory, provides a 
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suitable base for identifying the motivations of the Germans. This model implies at 
the micro level that the migrant’s goal is to maximize utility by choosing the location 
that offers the highest net income, in which would-be migrants respond to 
differences in wages across labour markets in different geographic locations without 
consideration of the differences in the standards of living (Sjaastaad, 1968). Before 
moving, the individual undergoes a cost-calculation and decides on the employment 
opportunity, which will provide the highest income and thus maximize its utility. 
This approach was observable among some of the workers in the sample group who 
came from Germany to the UK to work, but the approach did not apply to the entire 
group. Whereas ‘in order to earn higher income’ was only very rarely stated, 
participants often stated that they came to improve their skills. In this case, their 
motivation to move was based on the acquisition of certain skills, such as 
professional skills, communication skills, etc., which they would eventually use once 
they returned or moved on their employment careers and which hence would 
enhance their human capital profile. Although this is not an explicit economic 
activity, in the long-run, it will pay off economically as they increase their personal 
profiles. As Sjaastad (1968) argues, a prospective migrant calculates the value of the 
opportunity available in the market at each alternative destination relative to the 
value of the opportunity available in the market at the point of origin, subtracts away 
the costs of moving (assumed to be proportional to migration distance), and chooses 
the destination which maximizes the present value of lifetime earnings. The majority 
of the Germans immediately responded that they came as they were ‘attracted’ to the 
city, without linking their motivation behind their decision-making process to 
migrate to any economic activity. Certainly, this observation does not entirely 
exclude the fact that they still may want to improve their skills. However, as per the 
nature of the methodology of this research, the ‘first’ mentioned reason equals the 
most important and thus as the major cause.  
As they did not refer to any income related motivations by themselves, the 
interviewees were asked directly about the role of income. Their responses confirm 
the assessments above. Income was less important for them and thus negligible. On 
the contrary, quite a few confirmed that they took up jobs despite knowing they 
would earn less. For those migrants, social life was very important. For instance, 
they stated how they were ‘bored’ in Germany or unhappy with their social lives, or 
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they were simply curious and adventure-hungry and felt confident that they would 
find a job in London. This behaviour less emphasized seeking for opportunities, but 
allowed social activities to dominate the decision-making process.  
On an aggregate level, the group of German migrants, whose motivations were less 
economic, constituted the group of people with 'low' levels of mobility, compared to 
the Portuguese or Polish migration streams. The motivations of both the Portuguese 
and Polish groups were more, if not almost purely, economic. Therefore, it is crucial 
to ask at this point: How does the EU want to achieve increased mobility levels, if 
the mobility motivations are not based on the type of determinants which are usually 
responsible for 'high' streams of mobility levels (see Poles and their motivations)? 
Regarding the migration theories, there is no prominent migration framework or 
migration model, which is used to describe the phenomenon of social movers who 
turn into labour migrants within the EU. There exist some sporadic and independent 
studies that address the social factors when migrating, but there is no known strand 
of literature on social factors as is the case for economic factors, e.g. the neoclassical 
theory. Only recently has the literature in general started to focus more on this issue, 
for instance, O Reilly & (2009) coined the term ‘lifestyle migration’. Though this 
field is still very new, however, it may gain more importance in the near future. 
One may further maintain that economic determinants as motivators are linked to the 
unskilled labour movement, and social determinants are linked to skilled labour. This 
point needs to be distinguished as it may affect the validity of the research question 
of this thesis. In order to test this argument, this research interviewed skilled as well 
as unskilled labour migrants in the German group. The objective was to find out 
whether unskilled or low-skilled workers from Germany migrate for economic 
reasons. Had the outcome been positive, the main argument of the thesis, that 
migration in the EU occurs according to convergence degrees between countries, 
would have been falsified. However, the low-skilled German participants who came 
to work in low-skilled jobs in the UK came exactly for the same reason as the other 
German participants – to get pleasure and to enjoy life, or to improve their social 
skills. Higher income was unimportant.  
Regarding the Portuguese migrants, whose country has been a member of the EU for 
longer than Poland, the point of interest was to find out how they related to income 
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differences during their decision-making process to migrate, as Portugal has 
converged with the EU average regarding the standards of living to some 
considerable extent. Based on the qualitative data, the main reason to migrate was 
unemployment, with 100% accuracy within the sample group. Income or wage 
differentials were insignificant. The Portuguese labour migrants referred repeatedly 
to a ‘lack of security’, fear of the future, and pessimism about their future lives in 
Portugal, and all these factors were related to fear of being unemployed. They also 
asserted that they would not have come if they had felt safe regarding employment 
prospects in their home country. They seemed happy regarding the standard of living 
in Portugal, which has converged over the last years with the UK. The UK did not 
seem attractive for them at all, other than employment opportunities. Again, this 
behaviour provides evidence how ‘high’ mobility is linked to dissatisfaction with 
diverging economies. Divergence leads to migration. There exists no major 
migration theory which explains the decision-making process based on the variable 
‘unemployment’, even though unemployment can cause large streams of outward 
migration. Whether this type of cyclical migration, which occurs during irregularities 
and divergence, represents the idea of ‘labour mobility’ that the EU had in mind is 
highly questionable. Ultimately, the case study on the Portuguese south-north 
migration exemplifies how larger movement of workers occurs during times of 
divergence (crisis), as opposed to convergence.  
7.2.3 Applicability of the Network Theory 
Although networks did not qualify as determinants in the interviews, regarding the 
Polish labour migrants, networks still seemed significant in the decision-making 
process to migrate. Whereas determinants explain ‘why’ individuals move, network 
theory explains how networks provide channels to move. Within the framework of 
this study, networks turned out to be denominators of ‘where’ to migrate in the case 
of migrants from Eastern Europe, but played absolutely no role regarding movers 
between Germany and UK. All the participants in the Polish group stated that they 
had known someone before they came. Although they also said that they would not 
have come if they had not known anyone, the validity of this answer is questionable, 
as wage differentials were the predominant cause to migrate and not networks. A 
similar use of networks was observed among the Portuguese sample. Regarding the 
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Germans, interestingly, networks did not play a role at all. When asked whether they 
knew someone before they had migrated, the prevalent answer was no. When asked 
whether knowing or not knowing someone mattered in their decision-making 
process, again, all of the participants in the German group confirmed that networks 
did not play a role at all, but they were confident that they would meet people soon. 
The different attitudes towards networks among the participation groups suggests 
that migrants with less financial back up are more reliant on help from their social 
capital when migrating. In conclusion, networks contribute to the understanding of 
the migration schemes and patterns, but they are too weak or simplistic to be 
considered as ‘determinants’.  
7.2.4 The role of language when moving 
Language seems not to be a barrier to move, according to this study, for those who 
have the ‘right’ motivations to move. Of all 69 participants asked in this research, 
zero conceived of language as a barrier strong enough to dissuade them from 
moving. Certainly, otherwise, they would not have been in London. When asked 
whether language was a problem, the answer was yes; they felt that language was a 
problem – however, not a insurmountable one. Although most of the interviewees, 
around 85%, across the groups were insecure about their language skills, they all still 
decided to migrate. These findings conflict with the arguments in much of the 
literature. For instance, Okolski (2014) found out that over two thirds of those 
arriving between 2001 and 2011 (‘new arrivals’) said they could speak English well 
or very well, with only 3% being unable to speak the language. Of all new arrivals, 
just 5% said their main language was English (Okolski, 2014, p. 15). However, most 
of the studies, including Okolski’s, which have examined the significance of 
language whilst migrating, have concluded that language constitutes a barrier. This 
conflicting finding may be due to past studies’ methodologies: most were based on 
‘assumptions’, meaning that the researchers asked ‘potential’ migrants who had not 
moved and not gone fully through the decision-making process. This study, in 
contrast, asked those who had migrated and found out that among those who 
seriously considered moving, language was a not a barrier, despite the 
acknowledgment of the lack of the skills.  
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The participants even noted that despite their lower language skills at the point of 
their arrival, they had been highly confident that they would learn the language over 
time and considered it as a surmountable problem. Many of the participants were 
ambitious in language improvement and went to language classes. The argument that 
‘language constitutes a barrier to move’ is contradictive in various ways. In one 
study where the proficiency of English was tested in more than 50 countries, Poland 
was given a ‘high knowledge’ mark (together with Austria, Belgium, Germany, and 
Hungary), just behind the ‘very high knowledge’ which was attributed to four 
Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands (Gazeta.pl 2012). 
The same findings were applicable for the German group: based on the results from 
the empirics, language generally does not present a barrier to move at all. The main 
observations among the German group was that they came to the UK as they wanted 
to ‘work in an English-speaking environment.’ Language, instead of being a barrier, 
may even hence be regarded as a pull-factor. The German professionals also 
repeatedly reported how they were offered a job directly from recruiters or internal 
contacts thanks to their German language skills. According to their own estimates, 
none of the participants possessed impeccable English skills (even though most of 
them held high-skilled jobs). Before moving to the UK, the interviewees were 
perfectly well aware of their unsatisfactory English language skills. Some of the 
migrants even stated their doubts about the sufficiency of their skills for a job in an 
English-speaking country. Nevertheless, their perception about lacking language 
skills did not to seem to constitute a barrier to migrate (otherwise they would not be 
in London now). Despite their awareness and worries about their communication 
skills, they still chose to migrate, similar to the Polish group. None of the German 
interviewees cited that their language deficits ever composed a serious concern 
regarding their decision to move or not to move. While the data from this study does 
not allow the researcher to assess whether language is a barrier on average, clearly 
for those who did move (and thus were not disincentivised from moving by any 
potential barrier), there were factors that mitigated the language difficulty.  
7.2.5 Divergence and Migration in the EU 
The research further added a third case study on Portuguese labour migrants who 
came to the UK to work. Portugal was hit by the crisis in 2010-11 and was affected 
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by high unemployment rates already before the crisis started. The case study on the 
Portuguese was used to show how EU citizen have a higher tendency to migrate in 
times of wage differentials or divergence. The findings have shown how the majority 
of respondents used the factor unemployment behind their motivations to move. The 
major determinant was identified by the very first answer, which was in this case 
unemployment. When asked further about their motivations, whereas wage 
differentials seemed less important, social or lifestyle factors were sometimes 
mentioned, but not often. Although Portugal has not fully converged with the EU 
regarding GDP levels, keeping in mind that the capacity for full convergence is 
relative, in terms of standard of living based, Portuguese people gave the impression 
in the interviews that other than the high levels of unemployment, they seemed to be 
quite satisfied with their lives in Portugal. Migrating, in their case, would not 
contribute to a significant change in what concerns the quality of their daily lives. 
Therefore, Portugal provides a good example how people in converged countries are 
less motivated to move, unless their country experiences major economic 
disharmony such as high unemployment levels. The sample group included both 
skilled and low-skilled workers, and the variables have not changed between the two 
types of labour migrants. If Portugal did not experience employment difficulties, 
then the variable ‘unemployment’ as a stimulant to move would be missing, and the 
levels of outward migration would be lower, as the participants from the interviews 
did not mention any other variables behind their motivation. Regarding intra-EU 
migration, outward migration levels from countries who have been a member state of 
the EU for a considerable amount of time will decrease.  
Moreover, in regard to Mundell’s OCA theory, which stipulates that high mobility 
levels are required in integrated economies and in the EMU as they serve as an 
adjustment mechanism during asymmetric shocks, based on the findings from this 
research, labour mobility did increase as a result of asymmetric shocks. Although 
this research did not look at labour migration within the EMU only (as the UK is 
outside of the EMU), the research might still contribute to the understanding of the 
migration patterns labour migrants during the crisis. Henceforth, large flows of 
workers, as in the case of Portugal and south-north migration, are a cause of 
divergence, and not convergence. 
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7.3 Findings and the research question  
The main objective of this research study was to unfold the motivational 
determinants of EU labour migrants and assess their behavioural tendencies in regard 
to convergence and standards of living within the EU. The hypothesis made in the 
beginning of the study was that, between regions with relatively similar standards of 
living, the opportunities to increase utility maximization of an economic nature is 
lower or even absent, which implies that mobility levels between converged regions 
cannot be high, as economic incentives are missing. At the same time, this research 
has focused on the motivations of migrants from different regions and found that the 
determinants vary across regions and, accordingly, so do the standards of living 
between the destination and the origin countries, i.e. the economic convergence 
levels. The motivations between west-west labour migrants were mainly linked to 
social activities rather than to economic investments. Based on the findings from the 
empirical data, the human capital theory, which explains economic movement on the 
micro level, is insufficient to explain the migration of Germans to take jobs in 
London, as economic determinants were missing (at least among the main reasons). 
Not only is it the case that opportunities for human capital development are less 
nuanced for the Germans, as they are already relatively high regarding the levels of 
standard of living; moreover, most of the time, Germans’ aspiration to seek for 
opportunities to build their careers was frequently missing and replaced with purely 
social motivations or types of determinants.  
Ultimately, the findings from the primary data support the hypothesis that in the 
absence of economic stimulants, mobility seems less likely. At the same time, the 
findings provide a very interesting and new insight, namely that social motivations 
seem more important than ever, most of the time being the predominant reason to 
move among those who move between regions with similar standards of living. The 
conventional approach was to explain high migration levels on the basis of economic 
stimulants, as per the neoclassical theory of migration. The chapter on the Germans, 
though, has shown that even though economic stimulants were missing, Germans 
still move. In the Polish group of participants, higher income was the main reason for 
moving. However, the Polish migrants also often mentioned that social activities 
were also important – basically, income was the tool to rise the quality of their life 
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via social activities. Therefore, migration does not seem to come to a halt when wage 
differentials are missing (Todaro, 1976), as stipulated in the neoclassical theory of 
migration. Rather, the figures decrease drastically. The stark increase of the use of 
social media, which provides a channel for information distribution, is out of the 
scope of this research but may well provide another explanation for the ‘slight’ 
increase of intra-EU mobility.  
Based on the findings, social stimulants may constitute a major tool to enhance 
mobility between converging and converged regions in integrated regions such as the 
EU in addition to economic stimulants. Whether social aspects as a catalyst for 
migration could ever reach the same intensity as a catalyst for mobility and 
migration would provide an entirely new platform to study intra-EU migration and 
mobility. In this study, the frequent mention of social elements may provide an 
impetus to better understand intra-EU mobility. In any case, firstly the absence of 
economic stimulants in converged regions, and secondly the unanswered question of 
whether social determinants are stark enough to yield high mobility levels, lead to 
doubts as to whether high mobility levels can ever be achieved in a stable EU, and 
therefore call into question the aim of the EU to have high mobility levels in 
successfully integrated regions.   
7.3.1 Economic impact of (high levels) of labour migration in the UK 
There are manifold reasons why labour mobility is regarded as beneficial for the 
economy. Firstly, from an efficiency point of view, mobility allocates the capital and 
skills to the place in which they can be used most productively: a more integrated 
single market, in which economic growth is boosted by the possibility of more 
seamless cross-border trade and collaboration. Secondly, (high) mobility levels are 
regarded as essential as a means of achieving convergence between EU regions, 
particularly in the case of short-term growth differentials, for instance as seen in the 
case of Portugal, where unused labour in high-unemployment places is allocated to 
areas like the UK, where employment growth is robust.  
Therefore, it important not only to ask how mobility levels are achievable, but also to 
be aware of the consequences of high mobility levels. These are not well researched 
yet, as so far it has been generally assumed that high mobility levels are a good 
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thing. The example of the large Poland–UK migration surely has provided impetus 
to rethink high mobility. Labour mobility is important, but it is still just one tool out 
of many that can curb the economy. That said, one can even ask if labour mobility is 
indeed necessary to create convergence, namely convergence of the labour markets, 
and deeper integration.   
Moreover, one may postulate that, rather than divergence leading to high labour 
mobility, convergence leads to more mobility. Certainly, integration and cohesion 
across the labour markets may in fact enable and facilitate more mobility. This 
standpoint has not been addressed in this research. When the Single European 
Market was introduced a few decades ago, barriers were eliminated in order to 
deepen integration. Nevertheless, intra-EU mobility has not increased since 
(Zimmermann, 2008). This outcome could be interpreted to mean that deepening 
integration has not led to significant changes. Convergence and social cohesion 
across the EU member states eases, but does not necessarily prompt, mobility. At the 
end of the day, the ultimate reasons for migration are based on personal motivations 
defined by determinants involved in the decision-making process. 
The only considerably high levels of migration have been the east-west and south-
north migration streams. Regarding east-west migration, the impacts of the Polish 
migrants have been researched relatively well in the literature. Although this 
research did not attempt to measure the impact of migration levels (rather, it 
scrutinized the motivation of EU citizens), it is worthwhile to link the findings from 
this study to studies on the impact, as doing so may support future questioning of the 
necessity of mobility levels.  
Based on a summary provided by Migration Watch (2014 the impact of immigration 
into the UK on GDP per head – the key metric measuring prosperity – is essentially 
negligible. The summary is based on three major reports that measured the impact by 
the GDP per head. In the first report, which came from the Economic Affairs 
Committee of the House of the Lords in 2008, the conclusion was that ‘immigration 
has very small impacts on GDP per capita, whether these impacts are positive or 
negative. This conclusion is in line with findings of studies of the economic impacts 
of immigration in other countries including the US.’ Similarly, the second report, 
which was by the Migration Advisory Committee, stated that ‘HM Treasury 
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estimated that a reduction in annual net migration of 50,000 could result in a 
negligible one year reduction in GDP per capita growth.’ The third report came from 
the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), the UK’s longest 
established economic research institute (founded in 1938). The NIESR modelled the 
impact on the UK’s economy of the immense net migration from 2004 to 2009 of 
around 625,000 migrants from the eight Eastern European countries which joined the 
EU in 2004. The conclusion of their study is also that ‘the long-run impact on GDP 
per capita is expected to be negligible.’ It is important to scrutinize not only why 
mobility levels are low, but also how beneficial high levels would be.  
In discussions about whether excessive migration levels have a negative impact on 
the national economy, sometimes critics specifically highlight the high youth 
unemployment levels in the UK. Other studies have reported how a link between 
immigration and youth unemployment can be observed (Migration Watch, 2014). 
Still other research projects conclude that there is no evidence that immigration 
influences wages or unemployment at all (Eldring & Schulten, 2012). On the 
contrary, for example, Eldring and Schulten (2012) argued that immigration is likely 
to have reduced the natural rate of unemployment in the UK. Under the judgement of 
the dual-labour market theory, the claim that immigrant labour is partly the cause of 
high youth unemployment and thus a negative factor for the national economy is not 
justified, as according to the theory, the immigrant labour force takes up or fills only 
positions which are rejected by the local population due to ‘social status’ or similar 
concerns (Piore, 1979). Experiences from the UK labour markets as well as the data 
confirm the applicability of the dual-labour market theory. 
Moreover, Dustmann and Frattini (2013) investigated the contributions of 
immigrants to the UK tax and welfare system and found that migrants from the 
European Economic Area have put more money into the system than they took out 
(approximately 33% more) and that recent immigrants are 45% less likely to claim 
benefits or tax credits than the UK’s native population. It is noteworthy to mention 
that only one of the participants in the present research study mentioned ‘benefits’ at 
all. 
However, although labour market effects are notoriously difficult to estimate, there 
is tentative evidence to show that some immigration has had negative effects on 
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the employment of UK-born workers. Specifically, a report by Migration Watch 
(2014) found that there is substantial anecdotal evidence that workers in some 
sectors of the economy have suffered more than others from competition with 
migrant labour. The IT industry is one such sector. Notably, perhaps the most serious 
concerns regarding migration in the EU relate not to the economic scale, but rather to 
the social scale, e.g. the impact of migration on housing or, ironically, on the 
‘cohesion of the society’ (Migration Watch, 2014).  
7.3.2 Migration: Why low mobility levels are not necessarily ‘bad’  
Considering the root causes of high mobility levels so far in the history of intra-EU 
migration, high levels of mobility do not especially seem to represent a ‘good’ thing. 
The examples of east-west and south-north migration have shown how larger sizes of 
migration are induced by economic inequalities between regions, namely wage gaps 
in the east-west example and unemployment in the south-north example. Both 
instances of increased mobility levels are the product of inconsistency and 
disruptions in the national economy cycles. One of the main proponents of a 
successfully integrated economy is the reduced economic disparity between the 
regions coupled with it and, according to the migration theories, disappearance of 
high migration levels. In other words, in successfully integrated regions, under the 
framework of migration theories, lower mobility levels are actually a sign of a well-
integrated and functioning economy.  
The question to ask seems to be how much mobility is actually beneficial as a whole, 
or how much is needed to meet the interests across all of the EU states. Rather than 
aspiring for just ‘high’ levels, more efficient ways of allocating the labour supply 
and demand should be considered. EU citizens should be able to move freely and 
their decision to move should not be limited, but free movement should not 
necessarily be equated with high levels of movement. 
7.3.3 Implications for EU policy 
First and foremost, regarding intra-EU migration, it is highly recommendable to re-
think and revise the understanding of the concept of movement of workers and 
mobility of levels. The integration of the EU is an ongoing project on a very large 
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scale, whose dynamics are influenced and change on a constant base. The 
enormously fast rate of technological change, globalization and the increasing 
influence of social media on the patterns and habits of the EU citizen altogether 
constitute a grandiose challenge to the changing expectations of the people living in 
the UK, as well as to the EU as a global player. If the EU wants to maintain its 
economic global power, then it must seek to attain economic superiority on an 
aggregate level, and undergo adaptations in order to remain powerful, which is in 
turn also dependent on the welfare of the nation states as individual organs. At the 
same time, the well-being and security on social as well as economic terms of the EU 
citizen should not be maximized.  
In regard to mobility levels in the EU, ignoring the scientific theory behind 
movement when introducing policies related to mobility will lead to inefficient 
results, such as the Job Action Plans or Job Mobility Plans, which turned out to be 
failures despite heavy financial investment. Rather, it is advisable to invest in the 
research and redefine ‘what makes a migrant’ or ‘mover’ within the framework of 
the EU based on what determinants individuals react to and how. Once the nature of 
movers between converged regions is better understood, appropriate incentives can 
be created in order to feed the motivations of the potential movers between regions 
with similar standards of livings or similar quality of lives. The motivations of labour 
migrants in Central Europe have not been researched well enough, but this study has 
revealed how they can be fuelled by unique determinants just like their counterparts 
from the lesser developed regions. It might be hence useful to revise migration 
studies by creating a new framework, which includes the movement of workers in 
converged regions.  
To modify the levels of workers’ mobility, one needs the right tools. The strategy of 
eliminating barriers has been rather unsuccessful, as shown in this research. Future 
research must find out what really stimulates migration, and then possibly test 
whether incentives can be created to prompt the right type of motivations. For 
instance, the attraction of (skilled) workers through incentives such as higher 
payment (wage gap as a tool) may lead to success on a very small scale only or not at 
all; as shown by the German case study in this research, higher pay is no longer a 
motivation once a specific threshold of standard of living is reached, financial satiety 
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is reached, and economic motivations are eliminated. Alternatively, occupational 
redeployment may allow the EU to maximize the allocation of workers and thereby 
to maximize economic benefits. Even offering training, for instance, for highly 
skilled migrants currently employed in low-skilled jobs could support profit 
maximization. The Polish case study has shown how insecurities in languages skills 
were a major reason why qualified migrants did not try to enter high-skilled jobs, 
and hence remain underutilized human capital. Targeting those groups, e.g. via 
setting up language courses or qualification adaptation courses, may turn underused 
labour capital into a highly valuable labour force and address demands in skilled 
jobs, thus empowering the labour markets in the EU. 
7.4 Generalizability and expandability: Implications for further research 
The dissertation advanced a number of hypotheses tested and analysed them via 
three case studies, which served to answer the research question asking why mobility 
levels are low in the EU. It applied and tested migration theories on three sample 
groups from economically different regions, and scrutinized the applicability of the 
theories under the consideration of the social cohesion policy and convergence 
theory by linking and comparing qualitative data to descriptive data. This 
constellation of framework has not been applied before and is the first of its kind. 
The research has detected the limitations of certain approaches and a lack of theories 
of migration, and assessed that the ‘low’ mobility levels are not low, but in 
accordance with the migration theories. The examination of the interplay of 
determinants and regional differences, which integrates the migration theories 
together with the convergence theories, can be used as a fundament for future 
research on intra-EU migration.   
The research has identified and revealed a number of causal patterns and factors 
regarding the decision-making process to migrate among the three case study groups. 
Regarding the comparability of the decision-making process on a regional basis 
within the EU, this approach can serve as a starting point. The determinants from this 
research can be tested on the whole of the EU and can be clustered according to 
regional differences. The general structure of the research, i.e. identifying the 
determinants and differentiating them according to regions, is likely to translate to 
other countries in the EU. Certainly, there may be some deviations where unexpected 
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factors may play a role or where determinants vary according to the economic 
structures of the individual countries. Nevertheless, the scheme used in this research 
is highly likely to be transferrable to an EU level. Even if other causal factors or 
determinants not studied or identified in this research influence the decision-making 
process in another country, the framework is broad enough to accommodate such 
modifications.  
7.5 Implications of the findings for theorizing migration streams 
This research study has proven again the difficulty of consolidation of migration 
determinants into one straightforward framework. The study has tested the patterns 
of the various mobility streams within the EU according to their levels where finally 
a pattern according to the types of determinant crystallized. The empirical research 
found that the economically motivated groups yielded higher numbers of labour 
migrants and that, when these types of determinants were missing, migration levels 
were lower. As evidenced by the migration levels, the motivation to migrate is 
higher among those who exhibit economically motivated determinants, but lower 
among those who exhibit more social variables instead. In short, migration levels are 
starkly defined by the types of determinants behind the motivations. The types of 
determinants, in turn, depend on the level of the origin country’s economic strength 
relative to the EU’s average. The hypothesis has been tested on the two sample 
groups, but can be reflected on a larger scale as well. The sample size in this study is 
too small to generalize the findings, but similar findings are expected even from a 
larger sample size, in terms of participants as well as country numbers. Then, 
presumably, some variation might be observable regarding the determinants, e.g. 
economic determinants might be combined with social determinants. However, the 
crucial factor is the weighting of the variables when defining mobility levels. 
Presumably, whenever economic determinants prevail or outweigh social 
determinants, mobility levels will be relatively high. If this relationship was 
observed in multiple countries, then one could speak of the elasticity of the 
determinants towards mobility levels. At the current stage, these are merely 
assumptions based on the results, but future studies may further expand and test 
these suspicions.  
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In studying the determinants behind the motivations to migrate within the EU, the 
study chose three different case studies to separate the migration processes according 
to regional differences. The Polish case study scrutinized migration and its 
determinants between converging and converged regions. The results have shown 
that the neoclassical theory is applicable to a large extent. The decision-making 
process in the German case study, however, could be better explained on the basis of 
the human capital theory. In addition, the Germans’ motivation was based on social 
determinants. There exists some literature (e.g. O Reilly, 2009) which looks at 
migration as a lifestyle factor; according to such literature, lifestyle migrants like the 
German migrants in the present research are ‘relatively affluent’ (O Reilly, 2009) 
and do not move because of economic hardship. One characteristic of lifestyle 
migrants incompatible with the profile of a typical migrant in the EU is that lifestyle 
migrants can be any age, ‘but they tend, on average, to be older and many are retired 
or semi-retired’ (O Reilly, 2009, p. 123). Hence, the German sample, which 
averaged at between 22-32, was not exactly representative of lifestyle migrants by 
definition. Nor can they be categorized as economic migrants. Although they did 
move for work, employment was not a direct reason for their motivation to move, 
which was rarely described as work-related. One can thus say individuals moving 
west-west are social migrants disguised as labour migrants. Within the studies of 
labour mobility in the EU, although the studies of the determinants of west-west or 
EU-12 movers are not related to a specific (social) migration theory, such as the 
neoclassical or economic migration theories, social determinants seem highly 
important for the context of labour migration in the EU. Therefore, this research 
study suggests that future research consult and build more on social theories as well 
when examining intra-EU migration, particularly among west-west (converged) 
movers. As the ultimate aim of the EU is to achieve overarching convergence 
between all member states, the socially motivated movements of workers will 
undoubtedly become more significant for future research.  
If mobility levels are to be influenced or changed, then the EU policymakers must 
understand the stimulants of mobility levels, i.e. the type of determinants behind the 
motivations to migrate. Ignoring the positioning of mobility theories and their 
significance in regard to policy formulations can decrease the effectiveness of 
mobility programmes. The liaison of the determinants with levels of regional 
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disparities and macroeconomic structures may provide an even stronger tool to 
modify mobility levels, or at least to understand under what circumstances they can 
be modified.  
In summary, this research has found that no existing migration theory can explain the 
movement of people between converged regions. Hence, the examination of intra-
EU migration and mobility within the EU calls for a new approach. Together with 
the findings, this study may provide a basic fundament for development of…  
- a migration theory which looks at migration according to convergence levels / 
standard of lives, 
- a new migration theory based on the explanation of social determinants only,  
- or a combination of both of these. 
Any new approach to researching migration in the region should view migration as a 
link between exogenous and endogenous factors and accept that migration dynamics 
play out according to a broader set of elements on various dimensions 
simultaneously, such as on the macro as well as micro level. Such an approach 
would be more hierarchical in its analysis, introducing a series of variables related to 
structural change on a macro level and to the effect of this change concerning the 
decision-making process on the individual level. This is just a suggestion and has not 
been tested yet. The starker presence of social media induced by globalization and 
advanced technology has produced changes regarding the socioeconomic structure 
within the population. Such dramatic structural change has produced a new empirical 
reality to be studied by existing migration theories, which were often developed in 
very different contexts. Migration research tools and theories thus need to be 
completely rethought in the European context, which is specific due to the ‘scale of 
these societies, the historical nature of nation building and migration, and the 
transnational context of the European Union’ (Favell, 2008, p. 264). Indeed, 
European national cases are not directly amenable to the habits of analysis that work 
well in the US. 
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7.6 Concluding remarks  
The aim of this research was to contribute to a better understanding of mobility and 
mobility levels within the EU and as part of the European integration process. The 
research has shown that high migration levels are not necessarily highly desirable, as 
they do not have a significant positive economic impact. Quite on the contrary, high 
migration streams of workers can bring about a large strand of socio-economic 
problems. As outlined in Chapter 3, on the outset of the EU, increased levels of 
labour mobility were never really desired or considered as highly beneficial. 
Liberalizing the markets and reducing barriers should not be equated with increasing 
mobility levels. Possibly, low or moderate labour mobility levels may be regarded as 
the better option. The history reiterates, as outlined in the first chapter of this thesis, 
when the EU was just established as the ECSC, the core member states who made up 
the stronger economies and who were exposed to potentially high figures of 
incoming migrants were just as careful and sensitive to opening the borders as the 
UK is today. The major objective of this research was to critically analyse whether 
the two main objectives on the political agenda of the EU – convergence and 
increased mobility levels – constitute a harmonious or feasible couple. By 
scrutinizing the science behind migration and mobility in the context of convergence, 
and by linking the results from primary data with descriptive statistics, this research 
came to the conclusion that one cannot have high mobility levels of workers in 
converged regions.  
Additionally, the structural forces which define mobility levels and (intra-EU) 
migration show that it is not always in the hands of the policy makers to pre-set the 
levels, as migration and mobility are an outcome of economic interactions, which, 
under particular circumstances, surmount all possible kinds of barriers. Sometimes, it 
is not the individual states or supranational institutions, but the characteristics of 
labour markets, diaspora, or other factors, which dictate the direction and intensity of 
migration and mobility levels. Hence, if mobility levels are to be influenced, it is 
first necessary to understand the dynamics of macroeconomic structures and their 
impact on the decision-making process. A new framework of studying intra-EU 
migration, specifically a framework which joins the concepts of migration, mobility, 
and changes in standards of living or even quality of life into one united theoretical 
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construct, therefore is considered as essential in order understand the movement of 
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West? EU Enlargement and Labour Migration from Central and Eastern 
Europe. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
Blanchard, O., & Katz, I. (1992). Regional Evolutions. Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, 1, 1-75. 
Boyle, P., K. Halfacre, et al. (1998). Chapter 3: Contrasting conceptual approaches 
in migration research. Exploring contemporary migration. Harlow, Longman. 
Boeri, T., & Brücker, H. (2001). Eastern enlargement and EU-labour-markets: 
perceptions, challenges and opportunities’, IZA Discussion Paper, 256. 
Bohning, R. (1984). Studies in International Labour Migration. London & 
Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Bonin, H., et al. (2008). Geographic Mobility in the European Union: Optimising its 
Economic and Social Benefits. IZA Research Report No. 19. 
Borjas, G. (1987). Self-selection and the earnings of immigrants. American 
Economic Review, 77(4),531–53. 
Borjas G.J. (1989). Economic Theory and International Migration. International 
Migration Review 23, 457-85. 
Borjas, G.J. (1990). Friends or Strangers. New York: Basic Books. 
Borjas, G. (1994). The economics of immigration. Journal of Economic Literature, 
32(4), 1667–1717. 
Borjas, G. (1999). Immigration and welfare magnets. Journal of Labor Economics, 
17(4), 607–37.  
Boswell, C. (2003). European Migration Policies in Flux: Changing Patterns of 
Inclusion and Exclusion. Oxford: Blackwell and RIIA. 
Boswell, C. & Geddes, A. (2011) Migration and Mobility in the European Union. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Brada et al., (2009). Convergence to the European Union: Challenges and 
Opportunities.  Ministry of Finance. Republic of Macedonia. 
Bradley et al. (2005). Integration, growth and cohesion in an enlarged European 
Union. New York: Springer.  
 238 
Bradley, J., et al. (2005). Integration, cohesion and growth in an enlarged European 
Union.  ZEI studies in European economics and law, 6. New York: Springer. 
Brauninger, D., & Majowski, C. (2011). Labour Mobility in the Euro Area. Working 
Paper DB Research. 
Brettell, C., & Hollifield, J.F. (2000). Migration Theories: Talking Across 
Disciplines. Routledge. 
Bretell, C.B., & Hollifield, J. F. (2008). Migration Theory: Talking across 
Disciplines. London: Routledge. 
Brochmann, G. (1996). European Integration and Immigration from Third 
Countries.      Scandinavian University Press. 
Broyer, S., et al. (2011). Low Labour Mobility Is More than Ever An Obstacle to 
Euro-Zone Cohesion. Flash Economics. Economic Research, 24. 
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2012). Optimizing the Currency Area. The Great Financial 
Crisis: Lesssons for Financial Stability and Monetary Policy. Frankfurt: 
European Central Bank, p14–22. 
Bryman, A. (2008) Social research methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Buiter, W. H., et al. (1998). Financial markets and European monetary cooperation: 
the lessons of the 1992-93 exchange rate mechanism crisis. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Campbell, D.T. and Stanley, J.C. (1963). Experimental and Quasi-Experimental 
Designs for Research. Rand McNally, Chicago, Illinois. 
Caporale, G.M. (1993). Is Europe an optimum currency area? Symmetric versus 
asymmetric shocks in the EC. National Institute Economic Review. 
Castles, S. (2000), “International Migration at the Beginining of the Twenty-First 
Century: Global Trends and Issues.” International Social Science Journal, 
52: 269–281. doi: 10.1111/1468-2451.00258. 
Castels, S., & Miller, M. (2009). “The Age of Migration: International Population 
Movement in the Modern World.” Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan Press. 
Cavelaars, P., & Hessel, J. (2007). Regional labour mobility in the European Union: 
adjustment mechanism or disturbance? DNB working paper No. 137. 
Cini, M. (2007). European Union Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Chandler, Alfred D., Jr. (1990), Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial 
Capitalism. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press. 
 239 
Crawford, T. (1973). Beliefs About Birth Control: A Consistency Theory Analysis. 
Representative Research in Social Psychology, 4, 53-65. 
Crisóstomo, P. (2013) “Portugal desce dois lugares no ranking da competitividade”, 
04/09/2013, http://www.publico.pt/economia/noticia/portugal-desce-dois-
lugares-no-ranking-da-competitividade-1604866, Retrieved: 14 April 2015. 
CRONEM (Centre for Research on Nationalism, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism) 
(n.d.). Polish Migrant Survey Results, commissioned by the BBC Newsnight. 
Guildford: University of Surrey. 
Coffey, P. (1996). Europe-- toward 2001. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Collinson, S. (1994). Europe and International Migration. London, New York: 
Pinter Publishers. 
Coppel, J., & DeSerres, A. (1999). EMU: facts, challenges, and policies. Paris, 
France: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Cordon, W. M., & Findlay, R. (1975). Urban unemployment, inter-sectorial capital 
mobility and development policy. Economica 42(165), 59-78. 
Council of the European Union, Council 2000/C 371/03, Resolution of the Council 
and of the representatives of the governments of the Member States, meeting 
within the Council of 14December 2000 concerning an Action plan for 
mobility, 2000, available online at http://www.bologna-
berlin2003.de/pdf/Council_actionplan_mobility.pdf  
Council of the European Union, Council 2001/613/EC,  Recommendation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 10 July 2001 on mobility within 
the Community for students, persons undergoing training, volunteers, 
teachers and trainers, 2001, available online at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_215/l_21520010809en00300037.pdf 
Council of the European Union, Council resolution of 19 December 2002 on the 
promotion of enhanced European cooperation in vocational education and 
training (2003/C 13/02), 2002a. Council of the European Union, Council 
2002/C 50/01, Council resolution of 14 February 2002 on the promotion of 
linguistic diversity and language learning in the framework of the 
implementation of the objectives of the European Year of Languages 2001, 




Council of the European Union, Council 2002/C 162/01, Council resolution of 3 
June 2002 on skills and mobility, 2002c, available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2002/c_162/c_16220020706en00010003
.pdf 
Dahlberg, K. A. (1967). The EEC Commission and the Politic of the Free Movement 
of Labour. Journal of Common Market Studies 6(4), 310-333. 
Dearden, S., & McDonald, F. (1992) European Economic Integration. Pearson 
Education Limited. 
De Haas, A. (1999). Livelihoods and Poverty: The role of migration. Journal of 
Development Studies 36, 1-47. 
De Haas, H. (2007). The myth of invasion and the European Union: irregular 
migration from West Africa to Maghreb. International Migration Institute, 
University of Oxford.  
De Haas, H. (2008). The internal dynamics of migration processes. Paper presented 
at İMSCOE Conference on Theories of Migration and Social Change, St 
Anne’s College, University of Oxford, 1-3 July, 2008.  
De Haas, H. (2008). Migration and development. A theoretical perspective. Working 
Paper 9, İnternational Migration İnstitute: University of Oxford. 
De Haas, H. (2009). Mobility and Human Development. United Nations 
Development Programme. Human Development Research paper 2009/01.  
De Haas, H. (2010). Migration and development: a theoretical perspective. 
International Migration Review 44(1), pp. 1-38. 
Dehousse, R., & Majone, G. (1993). The Institutional Dynamics of European 
Integration: From the Single Act to the Maastricht Treaty. The Construction 
of Europe. Essays in Honour of Emile Noel. Netherlands: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers.  
Denton, G. R. (2009). Economic integration in Europe. London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson. 
Dinan, D. (1992). Ever closer union: an introduction to European integration. 
Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers. 
Dobson, J., Latham, A. & Salt, J. 2009. On the move?: labour migration in times of 
recession. London: Policy Network Paper. 
Drinkwater, S., J. Eade & Garapich, M. 2006. Poles apart? EU enlargement and the 
labour market outcomes of immigrants in the UK. Bonn: IZA. 
 241 
Dustman, C. (1996).  “Return migration: The European Experience”. Economic 
Policy. 22:215– 250. 
Dustmann, C., Casanova, M., Fertig, M., Preston, I. & Schmidt, C.M. (2003). The 
impact of EU enlargement on migration flows. Home Office Online Report 
25/03, Immigration and Nationality Directorate of the UK, London: UK 
Home Office Report. 
Dustmann, C., & Glitz, A. (2005). Immigration, jobs and wages: theory, evidence 
and opinion. Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London, May.  
Eade, J., Drinkwater, S. & Garapich, M. 2006. Class and ethnicity- Polish migrants 
in London. Guildford: University of Surrey Press. 
Economic Growth and Change, Country Studies: Portugal, U.S. Library of 
Congress,http://countrystudies.us/portugal/64.htm, Retrieved 12 May 2015. 
Eichengreen, B. J. (1992). Should the Maastricht Treaty be saved? Princeton, N.J.: 
International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton 
University. 
Eichengreen, B. J. (1997). European monetary unification: theory, practice, and 
analysis. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.  
Eijffinger, S. C. W., & de Haan, J. (2000). European monetary and fiscal policy. 
UK: Oxford University Press.  
El-Agraa, A.M. (1970). The Economics of the European Community. Oxford: St. 
Martins Press. 
El-Agraa (1988). International Economic Integration. Basingstoke: Macmillan.  
El-Agraa, A.M. (2007). The European Union. Economics and Policies. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ester, P. & Fourage, D. (2007) Factors determining international and regional 
migration in Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions. 
Ette, S., Lenore A. (2010) Auswanderung aus Deutschland. Daten und Analysen zur 
internationalen Migration deutscher Staatsbürger, Wiesbaden. 
EU Commission (2002), Mobility and Migration Update, 2001/0082, Brussels, 
2002b. European Commission, Communication from the Commission: Free 
movement of workers – achieving the full benefits and potential, COM 694 
final, Brussels, 2002d. 
 242 
EU Commission (2003), Communication from the Commission – Education and 
training 2010: The success of the Lisbon Strategy hinges on urgent reforms, 
COM 685 final, Brussels, 2003g. 
EU Commission (2000) People in Europe. Demographic change: The regional 
dimension. Trends and policy issues, on 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-
prot/ageing/news/people_in_europe_en.pdf, 10th of September 2001. 
EU Commission, (2001). The impact of eastern enlargement on employment and 
labour markets in the EU and the Member States, Brussels. 
EU Commission (2001a) Employment in Europe 2001 - Recent Trends and 
Prospects, Brussels. 
EU Commission (2001b) The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of 
Enlargement, information note, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/pdf/migration_enl.pdf, 
Retrieved: 17 December 2014. 
EU Commission. (2002). Free movement – EU nationals [Online]. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=457&langId=en, Retrieved: 17 
December 2014. 
EU Commission, (2006). Employment in Europe 2006, Luxembourg, Office for  
Official Publications of the European Communities. 
EU Commission. (2007). The 2004 enlargement: the challenge of a 25 member EU 
[Online]. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/2004_and_2007 
_enlargement/e50017_en.htm, Retrieved: 17 December 2014. 
EU Commission. (2011). European Capitals of Culture [Online]. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-programmes-and-actions/doc413_en.htm, 
Retrieved: 25 July 2014. 
EU Commission. (2011)a. Migrant Integration: Aggregate Report. Directorate 
General Home Affairs. Qualitative Eurobarometer. 
EU Commission. (2012). Regional Policy- Inforegio [Online]. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index_en.cfm [Retrieved: 24 June 2014]. 
EU Commission (2014), “Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2014” 
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG 
EMPL). 
 243 
EU Commission (2015), “Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe 
2015”, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
(DG EMPL). 
Europa. 2012. Enlargement: Current Status [Online]. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/check-current-status/index_en.htm 
[Retrieved: 19 November 2013]. 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 
(2006). Long distance mobility in Europe: getting the balance right. 
Dublin.Evderveen, S. (2011). Cultural and Institutional Barriers in Migration 
between OECD Countries. Journal of Population Economics 25(3), 1077-
1105. 
Eurostat (2000). The GDP of the Candidate Countries – annual data for 1999. In 
Statistics in Focus, Economy and Finance, Theme 2 – 27.Luxembourg. 
Eurostat, (2001). Regional labour force in the EU: Recent patterns and future 
perspective.  Statistics in Focus. Luxembourg.  
Eurostat. (2011). Migrants in Europe: A statistical portrait of the first and second 
generation [Online]. Available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-31-10-539/EN/KS-
31-10- 539-EN.PDF [Retrieved: 16 July 2013]. 
Ezzedine, O. (2010). The role of labour mobility in reducing unemployment in the 
European Union. LAREFI, Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV. 
Faini, R. (2003). Migration and convergence in the regions of Europe: a bit of 
theory and some evidence. Hamburg: Hamburgisches Welt-Wirtschafts-
Archiv. 
Faist, T. (1997). The Crucial Meso-Level. International Migration, Immobility and 
Development. T. Hammer, G. Brochmann, K. Tamas and T. Faist. Oxford, 
Berg Publishers.  
Faist, T. (2000). The volume and dynamics of international migration and 
transnational social spaces. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Faist, T. (1997). The 
crucial meso-level. İn İnternational Migraiton, Immobility and Development. 
Hammar, T. et al. 187-217. Oxford: Berg. 
Faist, T. (2000b). The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and 
Transnational Social Spaces. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
 244 
Faist, T. & Ozveren, E. (2004). Transnational social spaces: agents, networks & 
institutions. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Farber, S. (1983). Post-Migration Earnings Profiles: An Application of Human 
Capital and Job Search Models. Southern Economic Journal, 49, 693-705. 
Faris, Stephen (2013). How Poland Became Europe's Most Dynamic Economy. 
Bloomberg BusinessWeek Global Economics. Retrieved 23 Nov 2014, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-27/how-poland-became-
europes-most-dynamic-economy 
Fassmann, H., & Munz, R. (1992). Patterns and Trends in International Migration in 
Europe.  JSTOR  Population and Development Review, 18(3), 457-480.  
Fassmann, H., & Hintermann, C. (1997). Migrationspotential Ostmitteleuropa. 
Struktur und Motivation potentieller Migranten aus Polen, der Slowakei, 
Tschechien und Ungarn. Wien: ISR Forschungsberichte. 
Fassmann, H., & Münz, R. (2002). EU enlargement and future east–west migration. 
İn IOM (ed), New challenges for migration policy in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Geneva, International Organization for Migration. 
Favell, A. (2008). The new face of east-west migration in Europe. Journal of Ethnic 
and Migration Studies 34(5), pp. 701-716. 
Fevre, R. (1998). Labour migration and freedom of movement in the European 
Union: social exclusion and economic development. International Planning 
Studies 3(1), pp.1-18. 
Fevre, R., Rees, G. & Gorard, S. (1999). Some Sociological Alternatives to Human 
Capital Theory and their Implications for Research on Post-compulsory 
education and training. Journal of Education and Work. Vol. 12 (2) p. 117-
140 
Fic et al. (2011).  Labour Mobility within the EU – The Impact of Enlargement and 
Transitional Arrangements. NIESR Discussion Paper, 379. London. 
Fields, G. (1975). Rural-urban migration, urban unemployment and 
underemployment, and job search activity in LDC's. Journal of Development 
Economics 2(2), 165-88. 
Fihel, A., Kaczmarczyk, P., & Okólski, M. (2006). Labour mobility in the enlarged 
European Union: international migration from the EU8 countries. Warsaw: 
Centre of Migration Research. 
 245 
Fischer, P.A., R. Martin and T. Straubhaar (1997). “Should I stay or should I go?”, 
in: T. Homar, G. Brochmann, K. Tomas and T. Faist, eds., International 
Migration, Immobility, and Development: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, 
Berg, pp. 49-90. 
Galgóczi B. and Janine Leschke J. (2012), EU Labour Migration in Troubled Times: 
Skills Mismatch, Return and Policy Responses, Routledge 
Galgoczi, B., Leschke, J. & Watt, A. (2009). EU labour migration since 
enlargement: trends, impacts and policies. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Geddes, A. (2003). The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe. London: 
Sage Publications. 
George, S. (1996). Politics and Policy in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the 
social sciences. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Gibson, H., Palivos, Th., Tavlas, G., (2014), “The Crisis in the Euro Area: an 
Analytical Overview”, Bank of Greece Conference Paper: “The Crisis in the 
Euro Area, May 23-24, 2013”. 
Grauwe de, P. (1992). The economics of monetary integration. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Grech, L. (2010) “Delivering a single market to consumers and citizens”. European 




Gros, D., & Thygesen, N. (1992). European monetary integration. London: 
Longman. 
Haas, E. B. (1961). International Integration: The European and the Universal 
Process.  Inernational Organization 15(4), 366-392.  
Haas, H. d. (2008). Irregular migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the 
European Union: an overview of recent trends. Geneva: International 
Organization for Migration. 
Harris, J. & Todaro, M. (1970). Migration, Unemployment and Development: a 
Two-sector Analysis, American Economic Review, 60(5), 126 –42 
 246 
Harrison, R.J. (1974). Europe in Question: Theories of Regional International 
Integration. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.  
Harrop, J. (1989). The political economy of integration in the European Community. 
Aldershot, Hants, England: E. Elgar. 
Hatton, T. J., & Williamson, J. G. (2002). What fundamentals drive world 
migration? Cambridge, MA.: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Heinz, F., & Warmedinger-Ward, M. (2006). Cross-Border Labour Mobility in an 
Enlarged EU. Occasional Paper Series, 52. European Central Bank.  
Hickman, M., Crowley H. (et al.) (2008) “Immigration and social cohesion in the 
UK: The rhythms and realities of everyday life” Publisher: Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation 
Hix, S. (2006). The Political System of the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
Hoffmann-Nowotny, H.J. (1970). Migration. Enke: University of Michigan. 
Hoffmann-Nowotny, H.J. (1973). Soziologie des Fremdarbeiterproblems: 
eine theoretische und empirische Analyse am Beispiel der Schweiz. Enke.   
Home Office, (2006). Accession Monitoring Report 2004-2006. London: Crown 
Copyright. 
Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. (1994). Gendered Transitions: Mexican Experiences of 
Immigration. University of California Press. 
Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2001). Multi-level governance and European integration. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
Hoffmann-Nowotny, H.-J. (1981). A Sociological Approach Toward a General 
Theory of Migration. Global Trends in Migration. M. Kritz, L. L. Lim and H. 
Zlotnik. New York, Centre for Migration Studies. 
Hollifield, J. F. (2000). The Politics of International Migration: how can we ‘bring 
back in?’, in C.B. Brettell & J.F. Hollified (eds.), Migration Theory Talking 
Across Disciplines, 137-185. New York: Routledge. 
Hoey, B.A. (2005). From Pi to Pie: Moral Narratives of Noneconomic Migration 
and Starting Over in the Postindustrial Midwest. Journal of Contemporary 
Ethnography. 34 (5), 586- 624.  
Hunt, J. C. & Kau, J. B. (1985). Migration and Wage Growth: A Human Capital 
Approach. Southern Economic Journal, 51, 697-710. 
 247 
Hussain, M. (2005). Measuring migrant remittances: from the perspective of the 
European Commission. European Commission: Presented at the Meeting of 
the Technical Subgroup on Movement of Natural Persons in Paris.  
HM Treasury, (2003). Emu and labour market flexibility: Emu study. London. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/europe/03/euro/pdf/8.pdf. Retrieved in 
December 2012. 
IMF (2013), "International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity – 
PORTUGAL", 18 March 2013, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/ir/IRProcessWeb/data 
/prt/eng/curprt.htm#I, Retrieved 2 October 2014. 
IMF (2013a) World Economic Outlook Database – April 2013 Edition. 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx, Retrieved 
12 October 2014. 
ILO (International Labour Organisation) (2010). Global Wage Report 2010/11. 
Wage Policies in Times of Crisis. Geneva: ILO. 
Janiak, A., & Wasmer, E. (2008). Mobility in Europe - Why is it low, the bottlenecks 
and the policy solutions. European Economy. Economic Papers, 340. 
European Commission. Jiménez-Martin, S., et al., (2007). The Volume and 
Geography of Remittances from the EU. European Commission. 
Jennissen, R. 2006. Report on economic theories of international migration and the 
role of immigration policy. Netherlands: Dutch Ministry of 
Justice/Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute. 
Jong, G. D. and J. Fawcett (1981). Motivations for Migration: An Assessment and a 
Value-Expectancy Model, in Migration Decision Making. G. D. Jong and R. 
Gardner. New York, Pergamon Press. 
Johns, M. (2009). A Problem By Their Own Hands: Intra-EU Migration and its 
Implications for Europe. Prepared for the EU Centre of Excellence 3rd 
Annual Research Conference. Laurentian University- Barrie Campus. 
Johnson, G. (1971). The structure of rural-urban migration models. East African 
Economic Review, 3, 21-28. 
Jovanovic, M. (2013), The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition, Edward 
Elgar Publishing Ltd.  
Juncker, JD. (2014) “Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission”. 
Opening Statement in the European Parlianment, Strassburg, 15th July 2014 
 248 
Kahanec, M., & Zimmermann, K.F. (2009). International Migration, Ethnicity and 
Economic Inequality. In W. Salverda, B. Nolan and T. M. Smeeding (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality. Oxford, 455-490.  
Kahanec, M., A. Zaiceva, A., and K.F. Zimmermann (2010). Lessons from migration 
after EU enlargement. In M. Kahanec and K.F. Zimmermann (eds.), EU 
Labor Markets after Post-Enlargement Migration, Berlin, Heidelberg: 
Springer. 
Kahanec, M. (2012). Labour Mobility in an Enlarged European Union. Discussion 
Paper 6485, IZA. Bonn. 
Karppinen, J., Fernández, E. & Krieger, H., (2006). Geographical mobility: 
challenges and opportunities. Paper presented at the conference ‘Workers’ 
mobility: a right, an option, an opportunity?’. Brussels, 20–21 February 
2006. 
Kelstrup, M. (2000). Internationl Relations Theory and the Politics of European 
Union Theory. London: Routledge.  
Kindergan, A. (2013), "Portugal: A Peripheral Country at a Crossroads". The 
Financialist. https://www.thefinancialist.com/portugal-a-peripheral-country-
at-a-crossroads/, Retrieved 12 May 2015.  
Krane, R. E. (1979). International Labour Migration in Europe. Praeger Publishers. 
New York, USA. 
Krieger, H. (2004). Migration trends in an enlarged Europe. European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
Krieger, H., & Maitre, B. (2006): Migration Trends in an Enlarging European Union. 
Turkish Studies 7(1), 45-66. 
Krieger, H., (2006b). Long distance mobility within the EU: considering the Lisbon 
Agenda and transitional arrangements. Discussion paper presented at a 
Foundation seminar with stakeholders of the Governing Board in 
Luxembourg, 8 March 2006. 
Krieger, H., & Fernandez Macías, E. (2006c). European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Too much or too little long-
distance mobility in Europe? EU policies to promote and restrict mobility. 




Kritz, M. et al. (1992). İnternational migration systems: a global approach. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Kruse, D.C. (1980). Monetary Integration in Western Europe: EMU, EMS, and 
Beyond. London: Butterworth & Co. Publishers. 
Kunz, J. (2001). Labour Mobility and EU Enlargement – A review of current trend 
and debates. DWP. Brussels/Belgium. 
Laffand, B. (1992). Integration and co-operation in Europe. London: Routledge. 
Lalonde, R., & Topel, R. (1997). Economic impact of international migration and the 
economic performance of migrants. In M. Rosenzweig & O. Stark (Eds.), 
Handbook of population and family economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier.  
László A. (2014), “Countering divergence within the Economic and Monetary 
Union” EU Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 7 
October 2014, Helsinki 
Layard, R., Blanchard, O., Dornbusch, R. and Krugman, P., (2004). East-West 
migration: the alternatives. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994. 
Lawrence, R. Z., & Schultze Ch. L. (1987). Barriers to European Growth. 
Washington DC. Leonardi, R. (1995). Convergence, Cohesion and 
Integration in the European Union. New York: St. Martins. 
Lee, E. (1966). A Theory of Migration. Demography 3(1): 47-57 
Leonardi, R. (2005). Cohesion Policy in the European Union: the building of 
Europe.   
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
  
Lewis, W. A. (1954). Economic Development with Unlimited Supply of Labour. The 
Manchester School, 22(2), 139-191. 
Lewer, J. et al., (2009). Do Non-Economic Quality of Life Factors Drive 
Immigration? IZA DP No. 4385. 
Lindberg, L., & Scheingold, S. (1970). Europe’s Would-Be-Polity – Patterns of 
Change in the European Community. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Lintner, V., & Mazey, S. (1991). The European Community: economic and political 
aspects. London: McGraw-Hill.  
 250 
Maas, W. (2007). Creating European Citizens. Europe Today. Plymouth.  
MacDonald, F., & Dearden, S. (1992). European economic integration. London: 
Longman. 
Mabogunje, A. L. (1970). Systems Approach to a Theory of Rural-Urban Migration. 
Geographical Analysis. 2, 1-17 
Mansoor, A., & Quillin, B. (2006). Migration and Remittances: Eastern Europe and 
Former Soviet Union. The World Bank, Washington, D.C.  
Martin, D., & Guild E. (1996). Free Movement of Persons in the European Union. 
London: Butterworths. 
Massey, D. S. (1990). Social Structure, Household Strategies, and the Cumulative    
Causation of Migration. Population Index 56(1): 3-26 
Massey, D., J. Arango, et al. (1994). Theories of International Migration: A Review 
and Appraisal. Population and Development Review 19(3). 
Massey, D., et al. (1993). Theories of international migration: a review and appraisal. 
Population and Development Review, 19(3), 431–66. 
Massey, D. S., J. Arango, et al. (1998). Worlds in Motion. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
Massey, D. (1999). Why Does Immigration Occur? A Theoretical Synthesis, in The 
handbook of international migration: The American experience, C. 
Hirschman, P. Kasinitz and J. DeWind. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.  
Mincer, J. (1978). Family migration decisions. Journal of Political Economy, 86(5), 
749–73. 
McCormick, J. (1999). The European Union politics and policies. 4th ed. Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview Press. 
McCormick, J. (1999b). Understanding the European Union: a concise introduction. 
New York: St. Martin's Press. 
McCormick, B., et al. (2002). Managing Migration in the European Welfare State. 
Fondazione DeBenedetti: Milano. 
MKW GmbH (2001) Exploitation and development of the job potential in the 
cultural sector in the age of digitalisation. Obstacles to mobility for workers 
in the digital culture in the European Union, study commissioned by the 
European Commission, DG Employment and Social Affairs, Brussels. 
Meade, J. (1957). The Balance-of-Payments of Problems of a European Free Trade 
Area. Economic Journal 67, 379-96. 
 251 
Mei, A. (2003). Free movements of persons within the European Community: Cross-
border access to public benefits. Oxford [England]: Hart Pub.  
Meardi, G. (2007). The Polish plumber in the West Midlands: theoretical and 
empirical issues’, Paper for the International workshop Migration and People 
Movement in Europe: Threat or Benefit?. Vienna, 28-29 September, 2007. 
Migration Watch UK (2012), Briefing Paper 4.15, ‘Incentives for Polish Migration’, 
April 2012, URL: http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/4.15  
Molle,W. (1980). Regional Disparity and Economic Development in the European 
Community. Hampshire: Saxon House. 
Molle, W. (1990). The Economics of European Integration. Aldershot: Dartmouth. 
Mora, J. and J. E. Taylor (2005). Determinants of Migration, Destination, and Sector 
Choice: Disentangling Individual, Household, and Community Effects, in 
International Migration, Remittances, and the Brain Drain M. Schiff and Ç. 
Özden, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Morokvasic, M. (1984). "Birds of Passage are also Women." International Migration 
Review 18(4): 886-907. 
Morrison, A. R. (1994). "Capital Market Imperfections, Labor Market Disequilbrium 
and Migration: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis." Economic Inquiry 
32(2): 290- 302. 
Monfort, Ph. (2003). Convergence of EU regions – measures and evolution. EU 
Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/work/200801_converge
nce.pdf, Retrieved: 12 May 2013 
Monti, M. (2010), “A New Strategy for the Single Market: at the Service of Europe's 
Economy and Society” Report to the President of the European Commission 
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1. Interview Participants  
 
Polish Interviewees  
 
Name Age Working Sector Higher 
Education 
Ania 22 Shop Assistant Yes 
Basia 32 Catering Staff Yes 
Mateusz 24 Catering Staff No 
Martyna 20 Catering Staff Yes 
Ada 28 Catering Staff No 
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Malena 28 Catering Staff Yes 
Julka 32 Shop Assistant Yes 
Milosz 35 Shop Assistant Yes 
Aneta 22 Coffe Shop Yes 
Amelia 25 Coffe Shop Yes 
Adrianna 22 Coffe Shop No 
Milena 30 Restaurant Yes 
Maja 24 Restaurant Yes 
Emil 25 Restaurant No 
Ala 31 Shop Assistant No 
Hania 25 Restaurant Yes 
Dawid 32 Restaurant Yes 
Marysia 24 Restaurant Yes 
Cezar 33 Shop Assistant Yes 
Sonia 28 Catering Staff Yes 
Ewlina 22 Coffe Shop Yes 
Aleksy 31 Shop Assistant Yes 
 
 
German Interviewees  
 
Name Age Working Sector Higher 
Education 
Anton 23 Sales in Media Yes 
Alissa 25 Internship Recruiter No 
Franja 24 Travel Agent Yes 
Ramon 31 Content Yes 
Anette 19 Au Pair Nanny No 
Louise 19 Au Pair Nanny No 
Veronika 20 Au Pair Nanny No 
Christine 22 Assent Manager No 
Jörg 29 Broker Yes 
Ruben 26 Financial Analyst Yes 
Arnold 28 Software Engineer No 
Timur 29 Web Strategy 
Manager 
Yes 
Jeanette 28 Sports Agent Yes 
Olivia 29 Sales in Media 
Desing 
Yes 
Ernst 34 Sports Agent Yes 
Gabi 29 Sales in Tourism No 
Marie 27 Shop Assistant No 
Lukas 24 Waiter No 
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Simon 24 Shop Assistant No 
Fred 24 Barman No 
Rosi 25 Coffee Shop No 
 
 
Portuguese Interviewees  
 
Name Age Working Sector  Higher 
Education  
Patricia 33 Catering Staff No 
Andre 37 Coffeee Shop 
Assistant 
No 




Cruz 36 Software 
Manager 
Yes 
Duarte 34 Financial 
Assistant 
Yes 
Andre 24 Coffeee Shop 
Assistant 
Yes 
Leonardo 23 Coffeee Shop 
Assistant 
Yes 
Luciano 27 Waiter Yes 
Mauro 32 Shop Assistant No 
Pedro 28 Financial 
Analyst 
Yes 
Ana 24 Waiteress Yes 
Valeria 27 Coffeee Shop 
Assistant 
Yes 
Isabela 26 Retail Yes 
Vincente 33 Communication 
Analyst 
Yes 
Andriana 25 Retail Yes 
Lucia 29 Graphic 
Designer 
Yes 
Guillherme 27 Private Cab 
Driver 
Yes 
Francesca 27 Dentist Yes 
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